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History

Then and Now:
Blackfeet Subsistence and Glacier National Park
Chair: J D a n

Flores

The exportation of the national park idea around the world has produced, and continues
to produce, detrimental consequences for indigenous peoples residing on or near lands
desirable for aesthetic reserves. In the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries in
America, changing cultural images of native peoples, the economic realities involved
with creating and perpetuating the park idea, and scientific notions about hum ankind’s
rightful place in nature created the atmosphere in which the federal government
established the first national parks under the premise that native inhabitation and
subsistence usage of the park units should be prohibited or strictly regulated.
One of the most long-standing and contentious examples of the interplay between the
National Park Service and native communities developed around Glacier National Park
and its adjoining reservation inhabited by the Blackfeet Nation. The Blackfeet sold the
western portion of their reservation to the federal government, which later included the
ceded land in Glacier National Park and subsequently denied the tribe their explicitlyreserved usufruct rights upon the land in question. With the support of federal legal
representatives, officials at Glacier set a lasting precedent of native exclusion from the
tribe’s former resource base within the park. In the 1970s, the Blackfeet channeled
activist impulses into pressuring the Park Service for recognition of rights in Glacier and
achieved some policy changes. Nevertheless, the park continued to prohibit subsistence
activities that posed a challenge to the underlying goals of the national park ideal.
In addition to clamoring for recognition of expressly-reserved usufruct rights, many
Blackfeet in the modern era have interpreted the binding agreement with the federal
government to mean that the tribe retained a number of implied rights upon the ceded
lands that transcend the specific language contained in the agreement. In recent decades,
controversies over the grazing of livestock near the park border and employment and
business licensing practices have created further tension between the National Park
Service and the Blackfeet. Some policy changes have resulted, but I conclude here that
those activities that compromise the objectives of the national park idea still meet with
interdiction and regulation, and very likely will in the future.
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Introduction

Many Americans consider national parks part of their cultural heritage and
include an imagined wilderness in their national identity. As preservationists succeeded
in the latter part of the nineteenth century in persuading the government to set aside large
tracts of land as national parks, it became apparent that some of the designated areas
contained resident populations of indigenous peoples who threatened the desired
“pristine” character of the park system. Notions of primordial wilderness did not include
human inhabitants and federal officials refused to deal with the contradictions generated
by native habitation. Thus, authorities employed whatever means necessary to remove
native peoples in order to create ideal, uninhabited landscapes, thereby denying native
access to ancestral lands deemed necessary for physical and cultural survival.
Native Americans throughout the United States have had a long and complex
history o f interacting with the National Park Service. Except in a few instances, the
government had removed most tribes onto reservations before creating national parks, so
land-ownership disputes have not loomed very large in the dialogue between native tribes
and park officials. Nevertheless, tribes have historically argued for the right to continue
using parklands for subsistence activities, with varying degrees of success. Some parks,
Glacier for example, have been adamant in their refusal to allow native use of park units,
arguing that such usage may jeopardize the NPS mandate to “preserve the natural and
cultural resources for future generations.”
The debate between park officials at Glacier National Park and the Blackfeet
Nation represents, perhaps, the most bitter and protracted struggle by a native group for

recognition of subsistence rights on park lands. In a land cession agreement in 1896, the
tribe reserved specific subsistence rights that were honored in writing. The dedication of
the ceded land as part of a national park fifteen years later set in motion a heated drama
that continues largely unabated to this day as park officials have consistently denied the
tribe access to their traditional subsistence resources in the Glacier region. Historically,
the exercise of certain native subsistence activities in Glacier National Park has posed a
serious challenge to the founding principles of the National Park System. In this work, I
will focus primarily on the controversy surrounding the exercise of Blackfeet material
subsistence activities, whether explicitly listed in the Agreement of 1896 or implied, from
the 1970s until the present, which for simplicity’s sake I dub “the modern era.”
The first full treatment of the historical relationship between the Blackfeet and
Glacier National Park appeared not as a major work published by an academic press, but
rather as an unpublished M.S. thesis crafted at the University of Montana. In “The
Blackfeet Agreement of 1895 and Glacier National Park: A Case History,” completed in
1985, Christopher S. Ashby traced the history with special emphasis on the major legal
events and their impacts. Not until the mid-to-late 1990s did one find major works on
Am erica’s park system that discussed Indian issues and interests, and a handful emerged
within a few years’ span. In The H unter’s Game: Poachers and Conservationists in
Twentieth Century America (1997), Louis Warren showed how social conflicts erupted as
local commons gave way to state and federal commons. He did not confine his study to
national parks, and his chapter on the Blackeet and Glacier National Park provided just
one example of how state and federal hunting laws in different parts of the nation
transformed subsistence and market hunting into “poaching,” which frequently generated

resistance to game laws. His chapter on the Blackfeet and Glacier focused on wildlife
management and hunting, one of four usufruct rights reserved in the Agreement of 1896,
in the first half of the twentieth century.
In American Indians and National Parks (1998), Robert H. Keller and Michael F.
Turek provided a sweeping review of the historical tensions between national park units
and neighboring tribal communities. Although the scope and variety of relationships
makes generalization difficult, many similarities exist in the conflicts between native
communities and the Park Service and the authors showed how earlier disputes set the
stage for modem tensions. Their chapter on the Blackfeet and Glacier briefly detailed the
major developments regarding the controversy over explicitly-reserved usufruct rights
through the 1970s, and also listed a few modern points of contention. In Dispossessing
the Wilderness: Indian Removal and the Making o f the National Parks (1999), Mark
David Spence brilliantly exposed the “dark side” of the conservation movement and
showed how the federal government removed Indian peoples from three flagship parks-—
Yellowstone, Glacier, and Yosemite— and later erased the history of their occupancy in
order to create uninhabited wilderness. With penetrating insight, Spence profiled the
methods by which early park managers eliminated most Indian occupancy and use in
three of the “crown jew els” of the national park system. His chapter on the Blackfeet and
Glacier described traditional tribal use of the area and closely analyzed Blackfeet
resistance to exclusionary policies and how park responses generated an atmosphere of
hostility in the region. Spence focused on the events around the turn of the century up
through the mid-1930s, and only briefly explored the subsequent history of the
relationship.

In Indian Country, G od’s Country: Native Americans and the National Parks
(2000), Philip Burnham further highlighted land use conflicts in Glacier, Badlands, M esa
Verde, Grand Canyon, and Death Valley National Parks. Burnham shed great light on
the topic by introducing native voices into the debate. By conducting extensive
interviews with Indians living near park units, the author breathed life into the subject
and provided a counter-point to the document bias inherent in so many studies of Indian
peoples. O f all the aforementioned works, Indian Country, G od’s Country most
adequately addressed recent issues of contention in the Glacier region, conveyed the
feelings held by some Blackfeet towards the park and its policies, and opened up avenues
for further exploration, several of which I have tread to formulate the second half of this
study.
Through personal interviews with tribal members and several unpublished works
penned by scholars in recent years, I learned that recent issues of contention, although not
centered around the explicit usufruct rights reserved in the Agreement of 1896, are
inextricably linked to the agreement and that disparate interpretations of that pact
underscore much of the dialogue between the 21st-century Blackfeet and the National
Park Service. In “The Ceded Strip: Blackfeet Treaty Rights in the 1980s”(1987),
“Glacier National Park on Blackfoot Territory: The Assertion of Rights on Traditional
Lands”(2001), and “Blackfeet Oral Tradition of the 1895 Agreem ent”(2002), authors
Kenneth P. Pitt, Tarissa Spoonhunter, and Jim Kipp, respectively, highlighted the
importance o f the oral tradition in Blackfeet culture and argued that the oral history of the
agreement negotiations, still very much alive in Blackfeet country, does not agree with
many of the provisions laid out in the written Agreement of 1896. In order to determine

the true intentions of the tribal signatories, these scholars analyzed the transcripts o f the
negotiations and concluded that the tribe retained rights not listed in the written
agreement, such as the right to graze cattle, water rights, access to sacred sites, and so on.
In this work, I analyze just a select few o f the many issues that face the Blackfeet and the
Park Service in the modem era.
The nuances of the written document and the minutes of the council meetings
have generated much bickering over the years, but analysis and judgm ent of the
competing arguments is not the purpose of this study. However complex the intricacies
of the negotiation process and the resultant document may appear to legal-minded
academic observers, for many tribal members the true intent of the tribal representatives
is quite simple to discern. According to Tiny-Man Heavy Runner, a traditionalist wellversed in tribal language and culture, Blackfeet cultural law mandates that tribal
representatives always act with the future of the Blackfeet people in m ind.1 For many
Blackfeet, implicit in the controversial agreement is the intention to reserve for future
generations o f Blackfeet the ability to lead the good life upon the lands in question— to
subsist indefinitely.2 For many tribal members in the modem era, survival has little to do
with the hunting, fishing, and wood-gathering rights listed in the Agreement o f 1896.
Subsistence needs and the means employed to obtain those needs have evolved and
diversified over time as the Blackfeet, like all humans, have lived through and adapted to
changing times. Thus, many believe that the implications of the Agreement of 1896
confer to the Blackfeet general subsistence rights that transcend the specific language
contained therein.

1 Tiny-M an H eavy Runner, interview with author, March 23, 2005.
2 Ibid.; Ed D esR osier, interview with author, March 21, September 28, 2005.

Before addressing controversies over the exercise of implied subsistence rights on
the ceded strip in the modern era, I analyze the formative influences on early park
management policies regarding native peoples and show how they applied to the exercise
of Blackfeet reserved rights throughout the twentieth century. Chapter 1 takes a holistic
approach in examining the roots of exclusionary park policy and suggests ways in which
cultural, economic, and scientific factors shaped early park management of Indian affairs.
Chapter 2 traces the history o f the relationship between the Blackfeet and Glacier
National Park with a focus on conflicts over reserved agreement rights, with special
attention to the years following 1970. The second half of the work addresses controversy
over implied subsistence rights in the modern era. Chapter 3 provides an analysis of the
history of livestock trespass from the Blackfeet Reservation into the park and highlights
the role that different interpretations of the Agreement of 1896 has played in shaping the
debate. Chapter 4 traces the history of Blackfeet attempts to procure an economic stake
in lands formerly belonging to the tribe and illustrates how community solidarity and
activism yielded positive results.
My ultimate goal is to demonstrate that Blackfeet agency and assertiveness in
recent decades has yielded some positive results, but that many of the long-standing
exclusionary policies remain intact. Thus, although Blackfeet pressures upon the park
have engendered some policy changes in recent decades, the founding ideals of the
national park system have continued to trump native rights and the exercise of
subsistence activities that compromise the objectives of the national park idea still meet
with strict interdiction.

A NOTE ON SOURCES

Much of the primary material that went into the making of this work was derived
from park archival sources and government documents, i.e. Superintendent reports,
briefing statements, legal rulings, task directives, correspondence letters, etc. When
possible, I have tried to be specific when notating sources by providing box and folder
numbers. Due to a backlog at the park’s archives, m ost park documents from the last two
decades have not been screened for privacy concerns and are not open for public viewing.
Therefore, I had to request many documents through the Freedom of Information Act,
and those that I received did not include specific box and folder numbers. These
documents are listed as “GNPA,” meaning from Glacier National Park Archives. I
extend my gratitude to Deirdre Shaw, park archivist, and others who processed my
requests in timely fashion.
I was also able to gather several documents from the tribe. The Tribal Documents
Department is understaffed and has more pressing concerns than assisting academic
projects; therefore, tribal documents are few and underrepresented in this study. I
heartily thank Anna Lee Pemberton and the other staff at the Tribal Documents
Department for taking time out of their busy schedules to honor my requests. I have
completed the necessary procedures required by the Institutional Review Board in order
to conduct research on human subjects. Thank you to Edward DesRosier, Ted Hall,
Tiny-Man Heavy Runner, Leon Rattler, and Keith Tatsey for sacrificing your personal
time to meet with me. I hope that my interviews of tribal members will provide some

measure of balance to a study based primarily on documents. Last, but not least, I thank
the A.B. Hammond Fund for supporting my research trips and making this possible.
None of the interviewees have claimed to speak for the tribe as a whole. In this
study, I focus largely on the interplay between the park and the tribe, but there are
obvious and inherent problems with treating each party as a collective entity. As Leon
Rattler told me, “we (the Blackfeet) are a nation within a nation.” Using the term “tribe”
implies homogeneity and obscures the diversity of opinion that exists within the tribal
community. Park documents that use the term “tribe” refer only to the representative
body in contact with park officials and do not necessarily include the opinions of all tribal
members. Due to time considerations, I was unable to gain input from all segments of the
tribal population and many voices remain unheard. For simplicity and brevity’s sake, I
reluctantly, and frequently, employ vague terms such as “the park” and “the tribe.” I
encourage other scholars of this subject to seek input from different factions of the
population and challenge and revise my assertions and interpretations.

Chapter 1—Roots of Policy: Culture, Economics, Science

The withdrawal o f vast tracts o f public domain from private sale and the creation
of federally-owned national parks in the latter nineteenth-century established the United
States as the world leader in the conservation movement. Over time, other nations copied
the American model and created federal reserves of their own; however, the exportation
of the ideals of the American national park system frequently had, and continue to have,
detrimental effects on indigenous populations. As noted before, most tribes in the United
States had been removed to reservations before the establishment of national parks. This
was not the case in many of the places that imported the national park idea, i.e. Africa
and Australia. The establishment of national parks openly dispossessed native groups of
their ancestral homelands, and park administrators subsequently denied them access to
their resource bases, as was the case in Glacier National Park. The Blackfeet, like other
tribes, have sought to regain cultural self-determination and procure subsistence rights on
their former lands, but park administrators, adhering to established ideals, have denied
them these objectives. Before delving into a focused case-study of the relationship
between the Blackfeet and Glacier National Park, I will try to illustrate some o f the
causes of the situation. M ore specifically, in this chapter I will suggest some reasons
why American policy-makers established and managed the first national parks under the
premise that native inhabitation and use of park lands should be strictly prohibited.
No single factor exists that can neatly answer the larger question posed here.
Historians continue to debate what factors influence and explain historical processes;
some stress cultural and intellectual forces, while others emphasize economic and

material elements. In order to understand why the American national park idea precludes
native inhabitation and certain subsistence usages, I will adopt a multifaceted approach
and posit that a combination of cultural, economic, and intellectual factors led to early
park management policies that have continued, with slight alterations, to guide the
objectives of the national park system.
First, from a cultural perspective I will trace the historical evolution of the
perception of Native Am ericans’ relation to nature up through the early years of the
National Park Service. From Biblical times until recently, most associated the wilderness
with the domain of the “wild man,” and one’s moral evaluation o f the one, whether
positive or negative, conditioned his estimation of the other.1 Demographic pressures and
nationalistic impulses in mid-nineteenth century America, however, severed this
symbiotic relationship, and as a Romantic version of wilderness grew and matured, the
version of “the Indian” as N ature’s Child fell out of favor with the public. Thus, the
wilderness and the Indian diverged on different paths into what historian Mark David
Spence called “ separate islands of the mind.”
Although changing images influenced early park policy regarding native
subsistence usage, they alone cannot explain the situation. Equally if not more important
were the economic realities involved with creating and managing novel entities such as
the national parks. In an era o f rampant laissezfaire capitalism and political divisiveness,
the early parks lived precarious lives, and in order to ensure their survival, park officials
needed to equip the parks for tourist groups who would justify the park system ’s

1 Hayden White, “The Forms o f W ildness: A rchaeology o f an Idea,” in Edward D udley and M aximilian E.
N ovak, eds., The W ild M an Within: An Im age in W estern Thought fro m the Renaissance to Romanticism,
(Pittsburgh: U niversity o f Pittsburgh Press, 1972), 7.
2 Mark David Spence, D ispossessin g the W ilderness: Indian R em oval an d the M aking o f the N ational
Parks, (N ew York: Oxford U niversity Press, 1999), 37.
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existence. Hot on the heels o f the Indian Wars, tourists most likely would not tolerate the
presence of “wild” natives threatening tourists or preying on the parks’ wildlife, one of
the main attractions of the park system, and park officials responded in kind. Native uses
of the park that did not challenge the serene expectations of the tourist industry, however,
would face less severe restrictions than activities like hunting.
In addition to cultural and economic factors, the tenets o f late-nineteenth and
early-twentieth century science further precluded the use of park resources by native
peoples. Early modern ecologists openly criticized the commercialized development and
natural resource management enacted by early park officials and offered a competing
vision of park management advocating the preservation of natural conditions based on
scientific knowledge. Like W estern religion and philosophy, ecology enforced the
dichotomy between Man and Nature and claimed that man only disrupted the balance of
nature. Early ecologists did differentiate between primitive and modern man, but
surmised that native use of park-lands was so insignificant that it played no role in natural
processes, thus they, like all other humans, should be left out of the picture.

Culture
Hebraic mythology has proved highly influential to the development of the
concepts of the wilderness and the “wild man” in the Western world. Like all ancient
cultures, the Hebrews held a conception of an earthly paradise, and their core myth, the
Garden of Eden, is, as historian W illiam Cronon puts it, “so deeply embedded in Western
thought that it crops up almost anytime people speak o f nature.” Eden, as a “garden,”
boasted a benign and beautiful landscape, in stark contrast to the dark and foreboding

3 W illiam Cronon, ed., introduction to Uncommon Ground: Rethinking the Human P lace in Nature, (N ew
York: W .W . Norton & Company, 1995), 36.

character of wilderness. As shepherds who believed that wilderness harbored evil, early
Hebrews ascribed cursedness and wildness to the wandering life of the hunter and to the
desert, thereby projecting G od’s curse upon the wild men who inhabited the wilderness.4
The equation of wilderness and its inhabitants with sin and immorality formed a central
theme in the Judeo-Christian tradition and influenced Christian Americans well into the
twentieth century.
The Judeo-Christian view holding nature and its denizens as inherently corrupt
persisted, for the most part, throughout the entire medieval period.5 During the
Renaissance, some thinkers began to consider society as fallen from natural perfection,
and a more benign view of nature, albeit a cultivated and pastoral one, began to emerge
alongside the traditional Judeo-Christian view of nature as an evil environment accursed
by God. In turn, these two contradictory and competing visions of nature endowed upon
the W ild Man two distinct personalities.6 Thus, the perceptions of wilderness and the
wild man became inextricably linked as one’s opinion of nature influenced one’s opinion
of its resident “savage.” As Europeans developed new navigation technologies and
launched far-reaching expeditions in the fifteenth century, the largely conceptual debate
over the abstract idea of the wild man assumed a more practical air as Europeans
“discovered” real-life, physical manifestations of the W ild Man existing in a true state of
nature.

4 For more on the role o f wilderness and the “w ild man” within the Judeo-Christian tradition, see Roderick
Nash, W ilderness an d the Am erican Mind, (N ew Haven: Y ale U niversity Press, 1967), 13-15.
5 For more on m edieval conceptions o f the “wild man,” see W hite, 20-21; for a more detailed discussion o f
the works o f the m edieval scholar Saint Augustine and his influential opinions regarding nature and
w ilderness-dw elling “pagans,” see Nash, 4 -5.
6 For a more thorough analysis o f the two visions o f so ciety and nature and their influence on the
perception o f the W ild Man, see White, 28-30.
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Fortunately for historians, the first meeting between Europeans and the
inhabitants of the W est Indies is remarkably well-documented. Early reports of the
native population shone with optimism.7 Observations from subsequent voyages
provided the first negative images of the natives of the New W orld.8 The ambivalence
expressed by Columbus towards the natives of the New W orld would persist for centuries
and would become one of the primary attitudes and themes concerning the perception of
“the Indian” in America. Drawing upon moral evaluations of tribal peoples, Europeans
and later Americans projected two conceptions onto the image of the Indian: that of the
“good” Indian and that o f the “bad” Indian. Euro-Americans would manipulate this
dualistic image to justify their own intentions. Those that wished to exploit Indians
advanced the “good” image, at times, as a means to convince others of the easy
fulfillment o f white desires, and at other times advanced the “bad” image as rationale for
the perceived necessity of land-grabbing and assimilation schemes. Numerous historians
of images of Indians have established the link between attitudes and intentions, positing
that in order to understand the image of the Indian and its evolution oyer time, one must
look at white social and cultural developments, for the image is more o f a reflection of
white attitudes and desires than of those held by natives themselves.9
In addition to his observations of the native populations, Columbus commented
on the natural features of the New World. He extolled the fertility of the islands, made
frequent references to the lush vegetation, and boasted of a tropical land rich in natural

7 Christopher Columbus, Select D ocum ents Illustrating the Four V oyages o f Columbus, ed. C ecil Jane,
(London: Hakluyt Society, 1930), 8.
8 Ibid., 32.
9 See Gary B. Nash, “The Im age o f the Indian in the Southern C olonial M ind,” in The W ild M an Within,
55; Robert Berkhofer, Jr., The W hite M a n ’s Indian: Im ages o f the A m erican Indian fro m Colum bus to the
Present, (N ew York: Vintage Books: 1979), xiv-xvi.
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resources.10 Other early explorers of the Caribbean echoed Columbus’s writings and
helped portray America as an earthly paradise, and promoters o f discovery and
colonization embellished rumors from across the Atlantic and described America as the
“land of milk and honey.” Authors, most of whom had never set foot in the Western
Hemisphere, glorified the New W orld and produced entire books on the western lands
and its inhabitants.11 The glorified version of America as a second Garden o f Eden
prompted many Europeans to migrate across the Atlantic; however, for many the paradise
myth quickly shattered against the harsh realities of North America and those living in
close proximity to wild country developed a strong antipathy towards the American
wilderness that would persist for many generations.

19

Armed with the divine mandate to replenish and subdue the earth, early
Americans set out on a recovery mission to reinvent the whole earth in the Garden image
with the goal o f creating a pastoral, cultivated natural landscape, and pioneers took pride
in their conquest of wild lands and used the triumph over nature to bolster their national
ego.

19

In addition to posing a threat to the pioneer’s physical survival, the wilderness

represented a dark and sinister sym bol.14 This component held special importance for the
Puritans who tended to view the world through Manichean lenses and held providential

10 Columbus, 6-7, 12.
11 Sir Thomas M ore’s U topia becam e a best-seller when it first appeared in Latin in 1516, portraying the
N ew World as an uncorrupted environment with which to critique European institutions. M ichel de
M ontaigne used Brazilian cannibals to criticize French institutions and depicted the “savages” as living in a
benign Nature far purer than the artificial environments o f Europe, see M ichel de M ontaigne, “Cannibals,”
in S elected E ssays, ed. Donald M. Frame. (N ew York: W alter J. Black, Inc., 1943), 91, 86.
12 S ee Roderick Nash, 23-24.
13 Carolyn Merchant, “R einventing Eden: Western Culture as a R ecovery Narrative,” in W illiam Cronon,
ed., Uncommon Ground: Rethinking the Human P lace in Nature, 134; for an exam ple o f early frontier
boasts o f conquering the wilderness and its effect on the national ego, see J. Hector St. John de Crevecoeur,
L etters fro m an Am erican Farmer, ed. Susan Manning, (N ew York: Oxford U niversity Press, 1997), 40.
In this work the author, an emigrant French aristocrat turned American farmer, provides som e o f the best
glim pses into life on the early frontier.
14 Nash, 24.

14

interpretations of history. The Puritans adhered to the Augustinian belief that wild
country was a moral vacuum and its resident wild men heathens. Moreover, the Puritans
associated wild country with Satan, and as Christ’s chosen army, they felt it their duty to
vanquish the devil’s disciples: the American Indians. Victory in King Philip’s War, one
of the bloodiest wars in American history, convinced the Puritans that they had enacted
God’s will on earth.15
By the time of Thomas Jefferson’s presidency, an apocalyptic view of Indian
history was becoming prevalent and Americans on the Atlantic seaboard already
considered Indians an unthreatening, “spectral presence.” Historian Brian Dippie,
writing in 1982, contends that the notion of the “vanishing American,” despite the
ambivalence that has historically surrounded the term, has been the major theme
pertaining to federal Indian policy. The idea of the “vanishing American,” Dippie
asserts, underwent periods of fluctuating popularity and reevaluation, and attained the
status o f cultural myth as well as that of self-fulfilling prophecy.16 In search of a national
identity in the early nineteenth century, Americans advanced the image of the Noble
Savage to flaunt their imagined indigenous heritage. Furthermore, many Americans
included an imagined wilderness in their national identity and employed natural
landscapes to achieve national renewal. As later American expansion destroyed native
cultures and the wilderness condition, many mourned the passing of each.
Many historians credit Romanticism as the source of Am erica’s fascination with
its wilderness condition. Beginning in Europe towards the end of the eighteenth century,
the Romantic M ovement rebelled against modernity and exalted nature in its wild form.
15 Berkhofer, 81-83.
16 Brian W. D ippie, The Vanishing A m erican: White A ttitu des a n d U.S. Indian P o licy, (Connecticut:
W esleyan U niversity Press, 1982), xii-xvi.

The concept of the sublime suggested the association of wild nature with God; deism,
born in the Enlightenment out of religious skepticism, used the relationship between God
and the wild as the basis for religion.17 The new values associated with nature in turn led
to transformations in the character of the Noble Savage. Primitivism, although not a new
concept, flourished during the Romantic period as intellectuals intensified their critiques
of civilized society.18
The Romantic concepts of the sublime, deism, and primitivism left indelible
imprints on the W estern psyche and greatly influenced the unique American
Romanticism that began to develop in the early decades of the nineteenth century. The
ideas espoused by European Romantics drifted over the Atlantic and acquired special
meaning for American intellectuals, who, unlike Europeans, had direct contact with
“primitive” people and the wilderness condition. While Romanticism took firm root on
American soil and had a profound impact on arts and letters in early nineteenth century
America, many of its proponents consisted of Eastern, urban intellectuals who held
different opinions than those living on the frontier; consensus has always been a rare
phenomenon in American history. For most of the early nineteenth century, the
Romantic attitude coexisted and competed with the pioneer aversion to wilderness.19
Romanticism acquired a uniquely American flavor due to the nationalistic fervor
that gripped the nation following the W ar of 1812. Cultural nationalists urged American
themes to replace those inherited from abroad and assumed Jefferson’s burden of

17 Nash, 46.
18 Jean-Jacques R ousseau’s A D iscou rse on Inequality, first published in 1755, is the prime exam ple o f
Romantic prim itivism , and although the “N oble Savage” boasted a long career by R ousseau’s time, to m ost
modern observers Rousseau is, as historian Geoffrey Sym cox put it, “the high priest o f the cult o f
prim itivism .”
19 S ee Nash, 45-48, 55.
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defending the American environment and its aboriginal population against denigrating
attacks from across the Atlantic.20 They took their duty a step further and transformed
the mission from one of defensive posture into one of national pride, flaunting an
indigenous wilderness heritage as a form o f national identity. For several decades,
American Romantics used both the Romantic wilderness and its Noble Savage as
nationalist images; over time, however, the Noble Savage fell out of favor with the
American public while wilderness appreciation grew, effectively divorcing N ature’s
Child from his “natural environment.”
The use of Indian themes to boast cultural identity did not originate with the rise
of Romanticism in America. Discontented colonists, seeking to construct an original
identity apart from Britain, mimicked Indian customs and donned Indian garb years
before the American Revolution, often staging protests disguised as Indians, such as the
Boston Tea Party. Rebellious colonists transformed the symbol of the Indian into a form
of national self-definition, thus articulating a revolutionary, patriotic identity that they
transposed onto military flags, newspaper mastheads, and on numerous handbills.
Furthermore, the rioters conflated Indians with the land itself, suggesting that the
American environment bestowed freedom and liberty upon its aboriginal populations, as
well as upon its early white settlers. The American Indian and the land became symbols
of a unique North American past.21
After independence, the federal government embarked on an ill-fated “right of
conquest” campaign to procure lands from native tribes. The tribes resisted fiercely, and

20 For more on Jefferson and his refutation o f European critiques, see Anthony F.C. W allace, Jefferson and
the Indians: The Tragic Fate o f the F irst Am ericans, (Cambridge: Harvard U niversity Press, 1999), 76-78.
21 For more on R evolution era uses o f Indian sym bols, see Philip J. Deloria, P laying Indian, (N ew Haven:
Y ale U niversity Press, 1998), 12-26.

patriotic commentators recast the Indian in negative, racial terms. In spite of harsh
criticism, secret fraternal societies based on Indian themes continued to operate. As in
the past, anxieties brought on by social dislocation, in this case the rise of market
competition, rapid capitalism, and wage labor, made primitive themes attractive and some
men kept the secret societies alive despite their declining public image. The W ar of
1812, in which most tribes sided with the British, further tarnished the native patriotic
reputation.22
The Romantic emphasis on indigenous traditions, folk customs, and the
glorification of a national past inexorably led intellectual patriots to re-embrace the
Indian as a literary and artistic symbol for America in the decades following the War of
1812. Looking to match European boasts of ruins and ancient monuments, some
American literati declared the mysterious Indian mounds as evidence of a long-lost
Golden Age.23 W ith Indian removal in the early 1830s, the notion of the vanishing
Indian gained further acceptance, and members of the general public, seeking to repudiate
any and all sorts of Anglicization, began to define themselves by a fleeting, illusory
Indian past. The rising popularity of Indian plays in American theaters between 1828 and
1838 testifies to the ideological allure of the vanishing Indian.24 For example, Metamora;
or. the Last of the W ampanoags, enjoyed immense popularity in American theater until

22 For more on the changing nature o f early American im ages, see Deloria, 44-60.
23 Even Americans who found a link with natives demeaning settled on the Indian antiquities in their search
for a usable past, simply denying that they were Indian and claim ing they were the work o f a vanished
white race, or o f a vanished, “civilized ” native race, in the M ississippi Valley. For more on theories
surrounding the ruins, see Robert E. Bieder, Science Encounters the Indian, 1820-1880: The E arly Years o f
Am erican Ethnology, (Norman: U niversity o f Oklahoma Press, 1986), 104-146.
24 Deloria, 64.
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just before mid-century, casting King Philip as the first revolutionary hero, the honorable
first patriot who fought against the tyranny of the king.25
Responding to European allegations that American soil contained no historical or
cultural associations, intellectual patriots seized on America’s wilderness condition and
deemed an innocent land o f awe-inspiring landscapes preferable to European soil, stained
as it was with bloodshed and despotism. Romantic conceptions of wilderness did not,
however, exclude native peoples. American artists and writers, reflecting the
romanticism that characterized much of Western thought since the late eighteenth
century, in turn considered the Native American part of the landscape. This view was not
confined to intellectuals and elites, however, and the image of the wilderness as the
domain of the Indian prevailed among the American public in the early nineteenth
century.

9 ft

Prior to the establishment of efficient transcontinental railroad passage, most
Americans living in the first half of the nineteenth century could only experience the
American wilderness and its Indians vicariously through the images conveyed by
literature and art. George Catlin’s paintings comprise one of the first important pictorial
records of the Plains Indians and their homelands west of the Mississippi River. Catlin
joined the ranks o f Americans who mourned the disappearing wilderness and the
vanishing Indian, and he dedicated decades to preserving a record of the Indians “in the
uncivilized regions of their uninvaded country.” Catlin divided all Indians into two
categories: the,corrupted and the pure. Like many of his contemporaries who believed
the only “true” Indians were those uncontaminated by Euroamerican culture, Catlin
25 For m ore on Metamora and its significance, see Jill Lepore, The N am e o f War: King P h ilip ’s W ar an d
the O rigins o f Am erican Identity, (N ew York: Vintage Books, 1999), 191-204.
26 Spence, 12.
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sought to preserve the image of the “noble savage” before he inevitably perished before
the onslaught o f civilization. He appointed the same destiny to the American wilderness,
writing that “[B]lack and blue cloth and civilization are destined, not only to veil, but to
obliterate the grace and beauty of Nature.”27
Many scholars, too numerous to list here, have identified George Catlin as the
first to move beyond regret to the preservation concept and have called him the first
proponent of the national park idea. His idea o f a national park conformed to the
contemporary paradigm that held the wilderness as the domain of the Indian, and he
called for a large expanse of federally protected land containing both “man and
beast...the Indian and the buffalo.”

Catlin’s sentiments received approval from one of

America’s most influential wilderness philosophers: Henry David Thoreau. In 1858,
Thoreau voiced similar sentiments as George Catlin had two decades earlier in his plea
for the preservation o f land for wildlife and native use. He asked: “Why should not
w e .. .have our national preserves.. .in which the bear and the panther, and some even of
the hunter race, may still exist, and not be ‘civilized off the face of the earth?” ’29 This
inquiry may represent the last gasp for a protected, Indian-inhabited landscape.
The Civil W ar serves as a major turning point in the histories of the conceptions
of wilderness and native peoples. Until the mid-nineteenth century, Americans saw the
wilderness as the domain of the Indian, for better or for worse. In the latter part of the
century, however, the earlier appreciation for an Indian wilderness split into separate
movements for the confinement of Indians to reservations and the preservation of scenic

27 George Catlin, L etters an d N otes on the Manners, Customs, an d C onditions o f N orth Am erican Indians
(1844); reprint, with an introduction by Marjorie Halpin, 2 vols. (N ew York: D over Publications, Inc.,
1973), 1:5, 2.
28 Ibid., 260 (em phasis in original).
29 Thoreau, “C hesuncook,” in A tlantic M onthly 2 (1858), 317; quoted in Spence, 22.
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areas.30 To what do we attribute this massive paradigm shift? In Dispossessing the
Wilderness, historian Mark David Spence competently argues that westward expansion,
jingoist nationalism, and the racism that accompanied such trends shattered the Romantic
version of wilderness as one rightfully inhabited by native peoples.
Indian Territory in the early nineteenth century provided the type o f wilderness
that confirmed the romantic expectations held by artists and writers such as George
Catlin. This frontier, however, proved to be ephemeral. The withdrawal of British
claims to the Oregon Territory in 1846 and American victory in the Mexican W ar in 1848
opened up vast areas of new lands for American settlement, eradicating any pretensions
about a permanent Indian Frontier. With the end of the Civil W ar in 1865, westward
expansion resumed in full force, and America justified any and all actions as fulfillment
of its moral and biological duty to replace, through subjugation or extermination, the
inferior “race’s” misuse of the western half of the continent.31 M anifest Destiny
demanded it.
The nationalistic drive for westward expansion helped create changing
perceptions of native peoples. Relations with western tribes appeared relatively peaceful
during the first half of the nineteenth century. During the 1850s and 1860s, however,
violence escalated as contact between natives and white land-seekers increased. Heavily
publicized conflicts proliferated all around the West, and as a result of these Western
wars, images of “real,” present-day savages occupying coveted lands replaced romantic
images of disappearing aboriginals living harmoniously with nature.32 W idespread antiIndian sentiment engulfed many settler communities in the West, despite growing
30 Spence, 37.
31 Ibid., 28.
32 Lepore, 224; Spence, 30.

sentimentalism adhered to by many elites in the East. The guiding evolutionary theory of
the day asserted that in order to assimilate into the broader culture, tribal peoples must
abandon their ties to nature, settle onto reservations, and embrace “civilized,” sedentary
pursuits such as agriculture or the raising of livestock. Furthermore, the release of
D arwin’s Origin o f Species in 1859 provided strong evidence for a common origin
among all humans and mitigated the controversy between polygenesis and
monogenesis.

For some, D arwin’s work proved that the Indian could progress to a

“civilized” state if given the right conditions, i.e. those that promoted private property
conceptions. This thought found expression in federal policy with the Dawes Allotment
Act of 1887, which passed through the combined efforts of “friends of the Indians” and
hungry land-seekers in the West. W hether Indian hater or “friend of the Indian,” almost
everyone agreed that fulfillment of A m erica’s M anifest Destiny required the physical
destruction, physical removal, or cultural transformation of tribal peoples.34 The
establishment of the reservation system just preceded the creation of the first national
parks; thus, Indian removal became a familiar and accepted strategy.
Spence’s argument adequately illustrates how wilderness preservation was
predicated on native dispossession.

oc

What he does not explore, however, was how the

conditions in late nineteenth-century America he described affected the motivations for
the American public actually to seek out and utilize such aesthetic reservations after the
turn of the century. W hat role, or lack thereof, did native peoples play in the allure of the
national parks for the potential tourist? By analyzing the impact that modernity had on
the American sense of identity in the late nineteenth century, we see that Americans
33 Bieder, 142.
34 Spence, 30.
35 Ibid., 39.
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developed a new brand of primitivism that, instead of emulating the American Indian as
in the past, embraced a perceived wilderness condition inherited from white ancestors.
Thus, visitors to the national parks early in the twentieth century did not completely
divorce the image of “the Indian” from that of the wilderness, but rather relegated
him/her to the status o f “obstacle overcome,” an “emblem o f history.”
As Americans increasingly viewed reservations as the appropriate dwelling-places
for native peoples, new nationalistic impulses would further contribute to the demise of
an Indian wilderness in the American psyche. Many Americans in the early nineteenth
century had harkened back to an Indian past when articulating a national identity. By
mid-century, however, the use o f the Indian, and o f the Noble Savage specifically, as a
source of cultural identity had fallen out of favor among white Americans as the nation
matured and developed a history of its own.36 As the century progressed, more and more
writers seized upon the wilderness condition as a source of national identity and, armed
with growing public support for nature appreciation, convinced Congress to set aside
national parks.37 Around the turn of the century we witness a surge in primitivism as
many Americans came to view “over-civilization” as a threat to the virility and toughness
of the American character, and publicists for the parks seized upon these industrial
anxieties and promoted primitive, wilderness virtues as remedies to dreary city-life. As
in the past, social dislocations led men/women to idealize and envy the freedom of the
“wild man,” and, in America as elsewhere, this had frequently taken the form of the
Noble Savage. However, in the late nineteenth century historical developments and

36 S ee Lepore, 224-225; Berkhofer, 95.
37 Historian Alfred Runte convincingly argued that the search for a distinct national identity provided the
initial im petus behind scenic preservation. S ee Alfred Runte, N ational Parks: The A m erican Experience,
2 nd ed. (Lincoln: U niversity o f Nebraska Press, 1987), xx.
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nationalistic impulses would offer a new and more powerful “primitive” source of
inspiration: the frontier pioneer.
In the antebellum years, industrialization, the rise of big business, urbanization,
immigration, and other factors associated with “progress” led to widespread social and
cultural dislocation, and many Americans came to view an effeminate urbanism as a
threat to the development of the youth. Some, as in the past, sought to emulate the ways
of the Noble Savage as remedies for urban life, but, more commonly, others looked back
to a uniquely white past and advanced the frontier pioneer as a source Of inspiration for a
patriotic, wilderness symbol.38 After a series of alarming reports decrying the end of the
frontier appeared towards the end of the century, writers seeking to promote national
parks employed the frontier pioneer as evidence of an inherited wilderness condition.
In 1890, the U.S. Census Bureau Report officially announced the passing of the
frontier. Moreover, Frederick Jackson Turner’s frontier essays after 1893 called the
wilderness condition the essential formative influence on the national character and his
works exerted great influence over writers who saw the passing of the frontier as
depriving America of a unique past.39 In 1897, Teddy Roosevelt, co-founder of the
Boone and Crockett Club, prolific writer, and advocate of the American wilderness,
wrote The American Wilderness: Wilderness Hunters and Wilderness Game, in which the
future president echoed Turner by arguing that the frontier life endowed the pioneers with
fortitude, integrity, and strength of character, citing such legendary folk heroes as Davy
38 In P laying Indian, pp. 96-122, Philip D eloria analyzes these com peting visions by comparing the lives o f
Ernest Thom pson Seton, founder o f the W oodcraft Indians and the Boy Scouts o f America, and Charles
Beard, Seton’s successor as head o f the B oy Scouts. W hereas Seton advanced the im age o f the N oble
Savage as Nature’s Child living in com m union with nature, Beard, more characteristic o f the time period,
held Indians in low esteem and advanced the im age o f the pioneer w ho succeeded in taming the wilderness.
39 In “The Trouble with W ilderness; or, Getting Back to the Wrong Nature,” in Uncommon Ground, 72,
W illiam Cronon cites the “frontier m yth,” in addition to the Romantic notion o f the sublim e, as one o f the
sources for a widespread positive reappraisal o f nature in America.
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Crockett, Daniel Boone, and Kit Carson. As did Turner, Roosevelt viewed the Indian as
an obstacle to progress and civilization, making frequent references to the glorious
triumphs o f the pioneers, who, as “heralds of the oncoming civilization,” overcame the
savage, warrior tribes, the “red lords of the land.”40 Teddy Roosevelt greatly contributed
to the nascent form of primitivism that excluded the American Indian, but it was his
contemporary, fellow primitivist John Muir, who developed this theme more specifically
within the context of the National Park System.
M ost historians acknowledge John M uir as one of the foremost writers in
awakening public opinion to the benefits of preserving natural landscapes. In Our
National Parks, M uir echoed the primitivist sentiments of the age and wrote that many
over-civilized Americans were “ [A]wakening from the stupefying effects o f the vice of
over-industry and the deadly apathy o f luxury,” and “are beginning to find out
th at.. .wildness is a necessity.”41 Like the Transcendentalists before him, M uir believed
that nature held intrinsic value and mystic qualities, and he relayed his thoughts in many
essays that became minor bestsellers around the turn of the century. M uir promoted the
national park experience as the perfect remedy to rid oneself of the “dust and disease” of
modernity. Although he inherited many of his core tenets from the Romantic Movement,
M uir held a less romantic view of wilderness areas populated by native peoples.
Several environmental historians have argued that M uir ignored Native
Americans when formulating his own wilderness philosophy and that his idea of

40 S ee Theodore R oosevelt, “The American W ilderness: W ilderness Hunters and the W ilderness G am e,” in
J. Baird Callicott and M ichael P. N elson, eds., The G reat N ew W ilderness D ebate, (Athens: University o f
Georgia Press, 1998), 66-68.
41 John Muir, “S elections from O ur N ational Parks, ” in The G reat N ew W ilderness D ebate, 48.
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wilderness held no place for the American Indian.42 While I do not dispute these
assertions, I find it helpful to relate M uir’s opinions of native cultures to larger cultural
conceptions in order to reinforce the declining role that the Indian played in A m erica’s
growing wilderness identity. Although M uir made numerous derogatory remarks
regarding the Indians he initially met in both California and in Alaska, using terms like
“dirty,” “lazy,” “superstitious,” “hideous,” etc., elsewhere in his abundant commentary
on Native American cultures he reflected more favorably on native cultures and their
relationship with the environment.43 How, then, do we explain this ambivalence?
M uir’s experience with native tribes in Alaska after 1879 piqued his interest in
Indian views of nature, and as he had more contact with the Alaskan natives his
appreciation for native ways grew as he realized the similarities between his own
philosophy and those held by native cultures relatively uncorrupted by white civilization.
Like Catlin and Thoreau before him, M uir believed that “civilized” Indians were no,
longer “true” Indians and he held little respect for the “degraded” Indian who had fallen
from grace. W riting of an Indian he met in the California mountains, M uir regretted that
“unfortunately he proved to be a tame Indian from the Tule Reservation.. .claimed to be
civilized, and spoke contemptuously of ‘Wild Indians,’ and so of course his inherited
instincts were blurred or lost.” For Muir, early primal cultures lived harmoniously on the
land before the coming of the whites, whereas Indians tainted by civilization had lost
their environmental instincts.44

42 S ee Spence, 23; M ichael P. Cohen, The P ath less Way: John M uir an d A m erican W ilderness, (Madison:
The U niversity o f W isconsin Press, 1984), 189.
43 In H enry Thoreau an d John M u ir Am ong the Indians, Richard F. Fleck collects, presents, and analyzes,
m any o f M uir’s writings, especially those concerning the Alaskan natives, that provide a counterpoint to
the pejorative remarks highlighted by historians such as Spence and Cohen. S ee Richard F. Fleck, H enry
Thoreau an d John M uir Am ong the Indians, (Hamden: Archon Books, 1985), 28-70, 84-90.
44 S ee Fleck, 21-30, 69.
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M uir was not alone in his view of late nineteenth-century American Indians.
After the Civil War, popular artists using new mediums such as photography and sound
recordings portrayed reservation Indians as drunk and lazy and impressed upon the public
the transition of the American Indian from “wild, Noble Savage” to “degraded, inferior
reservation Indian.”45 For primitivists like Muir, the noble, ecological Indian was a
vanishing race, doomed before the inexorable juggernaut o f white civilization, and the
“real” Indian had no rightful place in the American wilderness. He expressed his view
succinctly in Our National Parks when he wrote: “ [As] to Indians, most of them are dead
or civilized into useless innocence.”46

Economics
In addition to analyzing changes in cultural perceptions of the wilderness and the
Indian, it is important to inquire whether the preservation of nature in its perceived
natural condition constituted the primary goal of early park management. The enabling
acts for the early parks did include preservation as a mandate, but also provided
allowances for use and development. The inherent juxtaposition in early park legislation
generated much ambiguity and left park officials with considerable freedom to interpret
the dual mandate as they saw fit. By analyzing early park programs and activities, we
can safely conclude that the use element took precedence over preservation as economic
realities necessitated that the parks take steps to meet the aesthetic expectations of a
nascent tourist industry. Furthermore, early preservation efforts largely served to
enhance the tourist experience and consisted of protective and selective measures to
safeguard the scenic attractions of the parks. For native groups who had used the parks
45 For more on late nineteenth century negative Indian imagery, see Berkhofer, 101-102; D eloria, 104-105,
117-118.
46 John Muir, “Selections from O ur N ational P arks,” in The G rea t N ew W ilderness D ebate, 57..
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as resource bases, this meant that some of their customary subsistence activities,
especially hunting, became prohibited as undesirable, consumptive use of park resources,
while others, if they proved compatible to the national park ideal, came under restrictive
regulations.
In “The W ilderness Narrative and the Cultural Logic of Capitalism,” British
environmental philosopher Carl Talbot offers a Marxist critique of the national park idea
and challenges the myth that national parks serve as sanctuaries of untransformed nature.
He argues that human activity has made the parks artificial, social constructs in which
Nature is made to conform to the economic and psychological needs of capitalism. After
analyzing, in true Marxist fashion, the reification of nature and the role of wilderness as a
leisure resource, Talbot concludes that capitalism’s management of nature in the parks
results in “nature emerging as a ‘stylized spectacle’ packaged for easy consumption.”47
Although this cynical interpretation may offend some who consider the national park
system the unselfish side of the conservation movement, Marxist philosophers are not the
only thinkers who have considered material elements in analyzing the park system.
Several renowned environmental historians, such as Alfred Runte and Richard W.
Sellars, too, have highlighted the powerful influence that economic factors and the tourist
industry have exerted upon the creation and management of the national park system.
Both Sellars and Runte have argued that from the beginning, the national parks
served corporate profit motives. The Northern Pacific Railroad Company, anticipating a
monopoly on tourist travel through the M ontana Territory, lobbied relentlessly for the

47 Carl Talbot, “The W ilderness Narrative and the Cultural L ogic o f Capitalism,” in The G rea t N ew
W ilderness D e b a te, 326-328.
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Yellowstone National Park proposal.48 Decades later, Louis Hill and the Great Northern
Railway, also with a clear profit motive in mind, weighed in heavily on the movement to
establish Glacier National Park and initiated a fierce advertising campaign, generating ad
brochures and printing magazine spreads to promote the park and the scenery within.49
Corporate park proponents sought to establish parks around monumental scenery and
held little regard for the preservation of ecological integrity through large nature reserves,
thus highlighting the role that economic motivations played in the birth of the national
parks.50
The collaboration between private business and the federal government,
established during the creation of Yellowstone and continuing through the creation of the
early parks, helped create a new kind of public land use in the W est as the railroads,
boasting magnificent landscapes on protected lands, contributed to the emergence of
tourism as an economically realistic form of land use.51 In a period of voracious resource
exploitation, park proponents assured politicians of the potential economic returns
tourism could provide as soon as the parks were ready to accommodate them; thus, in
order to maintain a politically viable rationale for the national parks, park administrators
had to develop the parks to please future tourists, the parks’ primary constituents and
bases of political support. For this reason, absolute preservation o f natural areas was
unrealistic; at the same time, too many unsightly intrusions into the landscape would

48 For more on corporate involvem ent in establishing the first national park, see Richard W. Sellars,
P reserving N ature in the N ational Parks, (N ew Haven: Y ale U niversity Press, 1997), 8-11.
49 S ee Runte, 92-93.
50 The concept o f “m onumentalism ” is one o f the main underlying themes in Runte’s N ational Parks, and
he applies it in his analysis o f all the parks established before 1934, see pp. 1-138.
51 Sellars, 10.
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detract from the parks’ aesthetic appeal. Some sort of balance between these
contradictory goals had to be reached.
The dual objectives of the national park idea found first expression in the enabling
legislation for the early parks. The Act of 1864 that spelled out the objective of Yosemite
Valley dictated that the lands be preserved for “public use, resort and recreation,” thus
providing for a reserve for nonutilitarian purposes.52 Similarly, Yellowstone’s enabling
act expressed the anticipation of recreational tourism as the Park’s purpose by setting
apart over two million acres “as a public park or pleasuring-ground for the benefit and
enjoyment of the people” and by making allowances for leases “for building
purposes... the erection of buildings for the accommodation of visitors” to provide for the
comfort and convenience of tourists. Protection of the natural landscape coexisted with
recreation as a stated purpose of the park, as Yellowstone’s enabling act also called for
the “preservation, from injury or spoliation, of all timber, mineral deposits, natural
curiosities, or wonders within said park, and their retention in their natural condition.”53
Although nearly two decades passed between the creation of Yellowstone and the
next national parks, the national park idea moved into the twentieth century with few
alterations from the standards set in 1864 and 1872.54 Other parks created before 1916,
when Congress established the National Park Service in order to provide centralized
management for the growing park system, also contained ill-defined concepts in their
enabling acts with little indication of their true intent. For example, Glacier National
Park’s enabling act of 1910 conferred exclusive control of the park to the Secretary of the

52 “An A ct authorizing a Grant to the State o f California o f the ‘Y o-Sem ite V a lley ,’ and o f the Land
em bracing the ‘Mariposa B ig Tree G rove,” June 30, 1864, 13 Stat. 325.
53 “An A ct to set apart a certain Tract o f Land lying near the Head-waters o f the Y ellow stone River as a
public Park,” March 1, 1972, 17 Stat. 32.
54 Runte, 64.
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Interior, who was responsible for “the care, protection, management, and improvement”
of the park, and whose duty it was to “provide for the preservation of the park in a state
of nature.” In clear deference to use interests, the Act also specifically allowed for the
harvest of dead timber, railroad right of way, the leasing of hotels, mining, and water
reclamation projects.55 Early administrators of the national parks interpreted the enabling
acts in similar fashions, liberally manipulating the extant conditions of the parks through
development for tourism and natural resource management in order to ensure public
enjoyment.56
As Richard Sellars noted, scenery “provided the primary inspiration for national
parks and, through tourism, their primary justification... Thus, a kind of ‘facade’
management became the accepted practice in parks: protecting and enhancing the scenic
facade of nature for the public’s enjoyment.”57 Yellowstone National Park, established
decades before the next national parks, served as a testing ground for the national park
idea and policies and attitudes developed there set precedents for managers of later parks.
In Yellowstone, as elsewhere, M other Nature had created the monumental scenery, but it
was left to human vigilance to ensure and guarantee the safety of the park’s scenery and
clientele.
The Indian Wars on the northern plains worried early park officials at
Yellowstone who feared that the presence of Indians could deter tourist traffic in the
park. Hoping to quell tourist apprehension, the first park guidebook reassured visitors that

55 “An A ct To establish ‘The Glacier National Park’ in the Rocky Mountains south o f the international
boundary line, in the State o f Montana, and for other purposes,” M ay 11, 1910, 36 Stat. 354.
56 Sellars, 27, 4.
57 Ibid., 4-5.
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“ [DJangers from Indians there is none.”

CO

This reassurance proved premature, and the

spillover of conflicts into Yellowstone cast doubt on the government’s ability to maintain
the park as a safe vacation destination. From 1877 to 1879, a series of Indian outbreaks
near Yellowstone negatively impacted the park’s public relations image and influenced
exclusionary park policy towards Indians in the decades that followed. For five days in
August of 1877, Chief Joseph and his band of Nez Perce wound through Yellowstone
National Park during their famous flight from federal troops. W hile there, the Nez Perce
took tourists prisoner and left two dead. During the next two years, conflicts with other
regional tribes, the Bannock and the Sheep-Eaters, contributed to the bad publicity as
local rumors and newspaper reports portrayed the park as a haven for violent Indian
marauders. Park officials responded by minimizing the past incidents and publicly
condemning them as unprecedented anomalies. In order to deter future problems, park
officials extended great effort toward eliciting promises from tribal leaders pledging to
stay out of the park and advertised these agreements to reassure the public and comfort
potential visitors. Furthermore, park officials initiated an effective campaign of
characterizing the thermal features of the park as taboo to the Indians in the area.59 The
erasure of natives from the history of the park served two primary purposes. First, the
argument that natives did not regularly use the area lent support to the claim that the
hostile incidents were highly unusual. Second, the portrayal of the park as unused by
humans reinforced the image of the park as a “pristine” wilderness area. Thus, early park

58 Peter N abokov and Lawrence Loendorf, R estoring a P resence: Am erican Indians an d Yellowstone
N ation al Park, (Norman: U niversity o f Oklahoma Press, 2004), 236, 23.
59 For more on the Indian outbreaks and the responses o f park officials, see N abokov and Loendorf, 225238.
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managers at Yellowstone considered banning Indians from the park, both physically and
historically, necessary for the continued security and integrity of the park.60
In Restoring a Presence: American Indians and Yellowstone National Park,
authors Peter Nabokov and Lawrence Loendorf argued that the “anxieties raised by
native peoples moving freely in and around the park’s western boundary presented
opportunities for military authorities to argue for their own protective necessity to the
park.”61 The military did assume stewardship of the park in 1886; nevertheless, images
of hostile Indians running loose through the park lingered in the public memory, and as
late as 1900, Y ellowstone’s acting superintendent, a captain of the 1st Cavalry, reassured
prospective visitors that the park was safe from renegade Indians.62 The highly
publicized Indian outbreaks in Yellowstone in the late 1870s jeopardized the success of
the national park idea, and subsequent efforts to dissociate the park from freely-roaming
bands of Indians influenced managers in later parks who adopted similar exclusionary
policies for similar reasons.
Even after concerns over tourist safety had abated, park officials at Yellowstone
and elsewhere considered native groups, especially hunters, threats to the parks’
preservation mandate and continued enforcing exclusionary policies. Although early
park officials focused largely on development for tourism, they also engaged in natural
resource management as part of the preservation mandate in the enabling legislation.
Natural resource management, argued Sellars, largely served tourism purposes and
functioned as an adjunct to tourism management.

60 Ibid., xi.
61 Ibid., 224.
62 Ibid., 230.
63 Sellars, 70.
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Monumental scenery may have

provided the initial impetus for the parks’ creation and constituted the parks’ principal
attraction early on, but wildlife quickly became another significant feature o f the parks
and added to their tourist appeal. Early efforts to preserve monumental scenery and
wildlife assumed a protective, and selective, nature as park officials deemed only certain
types of wildlife desirable for the tourist experience. The desirable species consisted
primarily of game animals, and protective, anti-poaching measures did not differentiate
between game hunters and natives who had traditionally hunted on park lands for
subsistence purposes.
General attitudes regarding desirable and undesirable wildlife greatly affected the
aesthetic expectations of the tourist industry, and in turn directly influenced early national
park wildlife policy. Early park managers, in efforts to preserve selective elements of the
park experience, enacted programs to protect game species, prized by hunters and highly
popular for public viewing, by eliminating undesirable predators and by developing anti
poaching regulations.64 Decades before ecological principles gained a foothold in
national park wildlife management, the common belief assumed natural predators would
not check game populations, but would outright destroy entire herds.65 Predator
reduction programs, an established management practice well before the birth of the
National Park Service, constituted the major preservation policy in Glacier National Park
as attention toward wildlife dominated most preservation activity during the first decade
of the park’s existence. There, as elsewhere, rangers used strychnine to reduce the coyote

64 Managers focused on protecting populations o f ungulates (hoofed grazing animals such as elk, m oose,
bison, deer, and bighorn sheep) and bears. Bears, although predatory, were popular among tourists, and
early park officials allow ed roadside bear feeding and bear shows at garbage dumps. Bears attracted much
attention in Glacier National Park, and pictures o f roadside bear feeding appear frequently in summer
editions o f the H ungry H orse N ew s until the practice was discontinued in the late 1960s. H ungry H orse
N ew s back issues available at the Glacier National Park A rchives, W est Glacier, MT.
65 Thomas R. Dunlap, Saving A m e ric a ’s Wildlife, (Princeton: Princeton U niversity Press, 1988), 70.
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population and hunted mountain lions with hounds.66 First instituted in 1914, predator
reduction programs continued for nearly two decades and brought wolves and mountain
lions to near extinction in most parks.67
Another game protection strategy that outlived and proved far more consequential
to tribes like the Blackfeet focused on the elimination o f human predation in the national
parks. A concern for G N P’s first Superintendent, the threat of poaching represented a
major obstacle for the early administrators of Yellowstone, the first national park.68
Yellowstone, which boasted, and still boasts, the most impressive variety of large
mammals, dominated the formulation of wildlife policy in the parks and the steps taken
by its early civilian and military caretakers established precedents that influenced nature
management throughout the entire park system for decades.69
The enabling legislation for Yellowstone National Park made wildlife protection
the legal responsibility of its caretakers; however, the legislation failed to provide
specific laws for governing the region or legal machinery by which officials could
enforce regulations or punish transgressors. The ambiguities and omissions of the
enabling legislation created major difficulties for the early civilian administration of the
park that struggled, and largely failed, to protect the park’s attractions from vandals and
poachers.

7 fl

Nathaniel P. Langford, upon his appointment as the first Superintendent of

66 For more on early w ildlife preservation policy in Glacier National Park, see C.W . Buckholtz, “The
Historical D ichotom y o f U se and Preservation in Glacier National Park,” (M .A. Thesis, U niversity o f
Montana, 1969), 23-26.
67 Sellars, 24.
68 W illiam R. Logan, first Superintendent o f GNP, heeded Secretary o f the Interior Walter L. Fisher’s
instructions regarding protection o f the park from poachers and other depredations and, like other park
Superintendents, sought to preserve the park by protecting it from outside influences. See Buckholtz, 15.
69 Sellars, 24.
70 For a brief interpretation o f the shortcom ings o f Y ellow ston e’s enabling legislation, see Duane Hampton,
H ow the U.S. C avalry S a ved O ur N ational Parks, (Bloom ington: Indiana U niversity Press, 1971), 32-33.
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the park, urged prohibiting all hunting, fishing, and trapping within the park under severe
penalties. However, legal machinery to enforce rules and punish transgressors remained
decades away and reports of skin-hunting parties ruthlessly slaughtering the park’s game
animals and depleting its herds continued to plague Langford’s civilian successors. Early
civilian administrators posted lists of prohibitions throughout the park, but, lacking any
legal backing or public sentiment, such efforts failed to deter vandals and poachers who
scoffed at the park’s weak enforcement efforts.71 After fourteen years o f civilian
administration, during which time a parsimonious and divided Congress failed to provide
an administrative framework for a sometimes-scandalous and ill-reputed park
government, the Secretary of the Interior authorized the Secretary o f W ar to detail troops
to the park, ushering in a new era of national park administration.
In How the U.S. Cavalry Saved Our National Parks, Duane Hampton argued that
during the thirty-two years of military protection of Yellowstone, the officers in charge
revised and enforced the rules and regulations governing the park, overcame various
threats to the park’s existence, determined policy, and set a precedent for a national park
system. Like their civilian predecessors, the military officers initially lacked a clearlydefined protection policy and judicial framework; unlike their predecessors, the military
developed extralegal measures and created an atmosphere of general respect for park
rules. Through its activities, the military administration gradually developed policy that
later park officials would adopt and transform into National Park policy.72

A s the title indicates, Hampton argued throughout the work that the military administration.succeeded
where the civilian administration failed, thereby saving the national park system .
71 For reports about gam e losses, see Hampton, 35, 39-41, 48, 50, 52, 55, 61; for early civilian attempts to
establish and enforce regulations, see pp. 36, 3 8 ,4 4 , 50, 61, 70-71.
72 Ibid., 8 1 ,9 0 -1 1 1 .
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In the years following the park’s establishment in 1872, park employees had
occasionally expressed concern over poaching by Indian hunters. As signs of wildlife
depletion became more visible in the late 1870s, conservationist groups pressured park
officials to ban Indian interlopers in the park, decrying the slaughter of the buffalo by the
“red ones” and condemning the “deviltry” of the hunting by fire-drive method.73 The
first military superintendent of Yellowstone, Captain Moses Harris, took very seriously
his task of preventing Indians from entering the park. Harris viewed bands of Shoshone
and Bannock Indians along the western border as serious threats to the park’s game. Like
many sport hunters and settlers of the time, Harris believed natives recklessly slaughtered
game in a more destructive manner than did white sport-hunters. Scout details easily
tracked native hunting bands who tended to travel in large groups, shadowing the natives
and warning them off when encountered. Such strategies did not completely prevent
natives from entering the park, but did serve to regulate their movements. Smaller bands
continued to enter the park through the late 1880s, and by the early 1890s reservation
agents proved more successful in restricting native movements off of their respective
reservations. By this time, however, the threat of local white hunters had eclipsed
concerns over native use o f the region.74
The efficacy of military policing and patrolling in protecting the park’s natural
resources attracted widespread attention and approval, and the Secretary of War, at the
bequest of the Secretary of the Interior, deployed the military to perform similar duties in
Yosemite, General Grant, and Sequoia National Parks in California beginning in 1891.75

73 N abokov and Loendorf, 238.
74 For information on early military efforts to deter native hunting, see Spence, 62-64.
75 Historian Richard Sellars acknowledged that by the tim e o f the creation o f the National Park Service in
1916, illegal hunting had diminished due to the aggressive protectionist p olicies o f the military. See
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After decades of impassioned pleas requesting legal machinery to reinforce park
regulations failed to have any effect, a high-profile poaching case involving bison and the
national press finally coerced Congress into taking action. The Act of May 7, 1894, in
addition to establishing a formal government for Yellowstone National Park, prohibited
all hunting, killing, wounding, or capturing of any bird or wild animal, laying the
foundation for all subsequent park wildlife legislation.76
As Congress created new national parks around the turn of the century, park
managers remained committed to the protection of game from human predators, native or
otherwise. Many officials at the new parks, however, chose to break from the
Yellowstone tradition of dissociating the national park idea from the image o f “the
Indian.” As Americans settled the W est and the dangers of the frontier passed, a W estern
antiquity began to command attention and received approval by the tourist industry.77 At
many national parks, the corporate interests so crucial in the establishment of the parks
isolated Indians in model settlements as curiosities in order to draw tourist dollars.
Drawing upon larger cultural conceptions of the Indians as a vanishing race, park
concessionaires used native peoples to represent relics of a lost age, as part of a
“museumized” presentation based on romantic, frontier themes, as part o f the scenery. In
1928, NPS Director Horace Albright wrote that the “best place for the Dude to see the
Indian in his natural state is in some of the national parks,” echoing George Catlin’s

Sellars, 71. John Muir lauded the army’s presence in California’s parks in O ur N ational Parks, 1901. See
Muir, in The G reat N ew W ilderness D ebate, pp. 50.
76 For more on the successful battle to achieve legal structure and the events leading up to the A ct o f M ay 7,
1894, see Hampton, 113-127.
77 Earl Pomeroy, In Search o f the G olden W est: The Tourist in W estern Am erica, (N ew York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 1957), 37.
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sentiment uttered almost a century earlier that national parks should be closely associated
with Native Americans.78
During the early years in Yellowstone, concerns about tourism as well as game
species motivated efforts to exclude Indians from the park as their presence threatened
both the recreation and preservation objectives of the national park ideal. As time passed
and conditions changed, the park system incorporated the image o f the “traditional
Indian” into its aesthetically-oriented policy of fagade management. Formerly a liability
to the park system’s recreation element, Indians became a profitable marketing tool.
W hat park officials did not condone, however, was the spectacle of “real” Indians
running loose and threatening the safety of tourists, as they had done in Yellowstone’s
infant years, or consuming the park’s prized natural resources. Hunting, the primary
point of contention between Glacier National Park and the Blackfeet in the first half of
the twentieth-century, held no place within the American national park ideal.

Science
In 1916 Congress created the National Park Service to provide a unified
administrative framework for the growing system of national parks. Overall, the National
Park Service continued the management practices of its military and civilian predecessors
discussed in the preceding section.
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The park service’s bent towards development for

recreational tourism did not, however, remain unchallenged as a growing number of
ecologists condemned the utilitarian nature of park management. Although the influence
and impact of ecology on the national parks was minimal and short-lived in the early
twentieth century, spanning roughly a decade in the 1930s, its ideas experienced a
78 Robert H. Keller and M ichael F. Turek, A m erican Indians & N ational Parks, (Tucson: U niversity o f
A rizona Press, 1998), 232.
79 Sellars, 48.
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resurgence in the late 1960s and had direct influence on the formulation of environmental
law. Early ecologists criticized the predator control programs, excessive commercial
development, and the general nonscientific approach taken by the National Park Service
towards park management; nevertheless, they considered the national parks the ideal
places for the preservation o f nature in its original state and fought bitterly to set aside
protected wilderness areas in the parks. Largely unsuccessful, their ideas about
mankind’s, and the Indian’s, role in natural processes would inform later park legislation,
culminating in the W ilderness Act of 1964. Although early ecologists differentiated
between primal and modern man, in the end all humans, including Native Americans,
were no longer recognized as agents of natural change and thus held no rightful place in
the national park system.
In a 1920 article for Ecology, Barrington Moore wrote that ecology represented
the third stage in the development of the biological sciences. First, Darwin and others
developed evolutionary biology that told humankind of its origins and connections to
other forms of life. Later in the nineteenth century, academics specialized in different
branches of biological science, constituting M oore’s second stage. Within this milieu of
academic, specialized studies at major universities emerged the third, or synthetic, stage:
ecology.80 The “very essence of ecology,” according to Victor E. Shelford and Frederick
C. Clements, two of the leading pioneers in the field, “is the synthesis derived from the
exhaustive analysis of the community and its habitat.”81 Ecology went beyond focused
studies of individual species and analyzed the relations of organisms to their environment
and the interactions between them. Given its focus on habitats and community
80 Barrington M oore, “The Scope o f E cology,” Ecology, v .l n o .l (January 1920): 3.
81 Frederick E. Clements and Victor E. Shelford, Bio-E cology, (N ew York: John W iley & Sons, Inc., 1939),

populations, the pursuit o f ecological knowledge required vast ecosystems in somewhatnatural states; thus, the strict preservation of natural areas became a primary goal for
early ecologists. As Shelford wrote, a “branch of biological science which obtains its
inspiration in the natural order of original habitats must depend upon the preservation of
natural areas for the solution of many problems.”82
In 1917, a committee of about twenty-five members from the Ecological Society
of America set out to create a list of all preserved areas in North America in which
natural conditions existed. The result of the project, The N aturalist’s Guide to the
Americas, was published in 1925, and in addition to listing a number of such areas, the
work contained essays by ecologists eliciting the uses and values of preserving natural
areas. Contributors to the volume suggested many reasons besides scientific research and
education, the central objectives for ecologists, for the importance of natural areas. Some
highlighted cultural elements, noting the value of natural areas to literature, art, and
0
-1

landscape architecture.

Others underscored the practical and economical importance

natural areas held for silviculture, geography, biology, and agriculture, arguing that the
study o f such areas could contribute to knowledge of pest control, possible medicines,
Q ,1

and the raising of livestock.

In addition to scientific and utilitarian reasons, some

contributors noted the rising appreciation of protected landscapes for scenic and

82 Victor E. Shelford, ed., introduction to The N a tu ra list’s G uide to the Am ericas, (Baltimore: The W illiam s
and W ilkins Company, 1926), 3.
83 S ee Seldon Lincoln W hitcomb, “The V alue o f Natural Areas to Literature and Art,” in Shelford, ed., The
N a tu ra list’s G uide to the Am ericas, 7-8; Stanley W hite, “The V alue o f Natural Preserves to the Landscape
Architect,” in N a tu ra list’s Guide, 8-9.
84 S ee W .W . Ashe, “The V alue to Silviculture o f Reserved Areas o f National Forest Types,” in N a tu ra list’s
Guide, 10-11; Stephen Sargent Visher, “The Importance to Geography o f the Preservation o f Natural
Areas,” in N a tu ra list’s Guide, 12-13; V.E. Shelford, “The Importance o f Natural Areas to B iology and
Agriculture,” in N a tu ra list’s Guide, 13-14.
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recreational purposes and provided commentary on the potential opportunities and
problems associated with the national parks.85
Ever since its inception in 1915, the Ecological Society of America expressed a
keen interest in the national parks and in 1920 gained representation on the National
Parks Committee, which later changed its name to the Council on National Parks, Forests
and W ild Life.86 In a 1920 brief in the society’s journal Ecology, editor Victor E.
Shelford wrote that the national parks “are as yet practically untouched and are, in fact,
nature museums.”

87

Years later, Shelford wrote in the same journal that the “Society has

always realized that these Parks are the country’s largest natural areas, and, if kept
undisturbed, afford vast possibilities for science and education.”88 The National Park
Service’s devotion to the development of recreational tourism did not, however, go
unnoticed by early ecologists who viewed commercial encroachments, such as excessive
road construction and the development of extraneous amusement features, as
endangerments to the scientific and educational purposes of the parks, as well as possible
encroachments on the “scenic and recreational aspects in which the general public is so
OQ

deeply concerned.”
In addition to critiquing the pro-development policies of the National Park
Service, early ecologists voiced objections to wildlife management in the parks, most
notably the predator reduction programs, and stressed that scientific research should play

85 S ee C.F. Korstian, “The Preservation o f Natural Conditions in the National Forests,” in N a tu ra list’s
Guide, 17-19; E. Lucy Braun, “National Parks and National M onum ents,” in N a tu ra list’s Guide, 20-27.
86 “Council on National Parks, Forests and W ild Life,” E co lo g y, v.5 no.2 (April 1924): 224.
87 V.E. Shelford, “The National Parks,” E cology, v .l no.4 (October 1920): 310.
88 V.E. Shelford, “A Change o f P olicy for the National Parks,” E co lo g y, v.7 n o .l (January 1926): 112.
89 D irect quote from V.E. Shelford, “The National Parks,” 311. For more on early eco lo g ists’ critiques o f
park developm ent, see Korstian, “The Preservation o f Natural Conditions in the National Forests;” E. Lucy
Braun, “National Parks and National M onuments;” “Council on National Parks, Forests and W ild Life;”
“National Park Standards,” E cology, v.10 no.4 (October 1929): 558.
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a larger role in park management.90 In the summer o f 1929, biologist George W right
answered their prayers by privately funding the first major scientific survey o f park
wildlife, initiating a decade-long stint o f scientific involvement in natural resource
management in the national park system.91
In 1933, George M. Wright, Joseph S. Dixon, and Ben H. Thompson formally
published the results of a field survey begun in May o f 1930 entitled Fauna o f the
National Parks o f the United States: A Preliminary Survey ofF aunal Relations in
National Parks. The report, the National Park Service’s first comprehensive statement of
natural resource management policies, recommended scientifically-based management of
the parks’ natural resources. M oreover, the authors of the report proposed a radical
departure from earlier practices. Not only did they suggest perpetuating the extant
natural conditions of the park, but, where necessary, they recommended restoring certain
areas to their original, “pristine” states.92 This was not the first such expression voiced
by ecologists; years earlier Charles Adams had suggested that the National Parks should
remain a “virgin” wilderness, for, if “parks are to be managed so as to pass them on to
future generations unharmed, they must in the main remain wild.”

What, then, did

ecologists envision when advocating the restoration and maintenance o f “prim itive,”
“pristine” wilderness areas? And furthermore, for the purposes of this study, what
preconceptions did they hold about m ankind’s agency in natural processes?

90 S ee Charles C. Adams, “The Administration o f W ild L ife in State and National Parks,” in N a tu ra list’s
G uide, 46; Sellars, 86.
91 Sellars, 91.
92 S ee G eorge M. Wright, Joseph S. D ixon, and Ben H. Thom pson, Fauna o f the N ational P arks o f the
U nited States: A P relim in ary Survey o fF a u n a l Relations in N ation al Parks, (W ashington, D.C.:
Government Printing O ffice, 1933) n.p.; see also Sellars, 96-97.
93 Adams, in Shelford, ed., N a tu ra list’s G uide, 4 9, 47.
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In 1916, Frederick C. Clements published his ideas on the concept that dominated
ecology for the next half-century-- holism and the climax theory of plant succession.94
For Clements and the ecologists who subscribed to his paradigm, natural processes
followed a simple and harmonious pattern. Plant biologist Michael G. Barbour wrote
that the “Clementsian landscape is a balance of nature, a steady-state condition
maintained so long as every species remains in place. Everything is cooperatively and
interdependently linked; if one element is disturbed, the whole will be changed.”95
Adams, Wright, and other ecologists sought to restore sections of the national parks to
their “pristine” states by allowing natural communities to undergo natural succession and
reach their climax, or final, stages. In order to do so, the biotic communities required
protection from outside, “unnatural” forces that would disrupt nature’s inexorable
journey towards a steady state. For the ecologists, the hand of man posed the greatest
threat.96
More than half a century before Clements published his groundbreaking work on
plant succession, George Perkins M arsh published the visionary Man and Nature, which
not only influenced conservation philosophy but also affected policy makers and business
leaders. The work called for the preservation of large natural areas and anticipated many
o f the tenets of modern ecology. M arsh’s view of hum anity’s role in the natural world
reflected the contemporary accepted dichotomy between Man and Nature, and his
thoughts on mankind’s relation to nature influenced the ideas of early modern ecologists
like Clements and Shelford. Marsh did not consider humankind an element of the natural

94 Dunlap, 144; M ichael G. Barbour, “E cological Fragmentation in the Fifties,” in Cronon, ed., Uncommon
Ground, 234.
95 Barbour, 235.
96 See Clem ents and Shelford, B io-E cology, 21, 93, 249; Edward N . Munns, “Park and Forest,” Ecology,
v.4 no.2 (April 1923): 221.
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world, but perceived us as a separate entity. He wrote “man is, in both kind and degree, a
power of a higher order than any other forms of animated life,” and although he lives “in
physical nature, he is not of her.” Man, then, is not part o f nature; henceforth, the “earth
was not, in its natural condition, completely adapted to the use of man.”97
Like most naturalists of his time, Marsh believed that the natural world exhibited
stability and permanence when left undisturbed by humans. For Marsh, “man is
everywhere a disturbing agent. W herever he plants his foot, the harmonies of nature are
turned to discords.” Marsh supported his assertion by detailing the irreparable damages
that humankind had enacted upon the natural world and by describing the despicable
profligacy humans had exhibited in utilizing the earth’s resources. Thus, successful
preservation of large natural areas required the exclusion of human activity from those
areas, for “the action of man upon the organic world tends to derange its original
balances.”98
Versed in Darwinian evolutionary biology linking humans and the natural world,
early modem ecologists did not consider, as Marsh did, humans apart from the natural
order. Stephen A. Forbes, a pioneer in the field, wrote in 1922 that man “is a part, and in
a multitude of cases an all-important part, of the environment of other forms of life.”99
The ecologists did, however, place mankind on a higher level than other life forms,
arguing that because o f his intellect man has adapted himself to any terrestrial
environment, modifying and evading local climates by erecting shelters and devising

97 G eorge Perkins Marsh, The Earth as M odified b y Human Action, (N ew York: Charles Scribner’s Sons,
1885), vii, 34, 35.
98 Ibid., 26, 33, vii.
99 Stephen A. Forbes, “The Humanizing o f E cology,” E cology, v.3 no.2 (April 1922): 89.
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technology for heating and cooling.100 O f all the motive forces affecting the succession
of biotic communities, Clements and Shelford asserted, “those of man are paramount.”
The threat o f m an’s actions upon climax stages loom ominously, as his disturbances, such
as fire, lumbering, clearing, hunting, and trapping, “have destroyed of modified the
climax in practically all forest regions.” 101 Thus, for the early modern ecologists, as well
as for Marsh, the preservation and restoration of “natural” conditions could only succeed
where “ecological conditions will remain unchanged except through natural agencies,”
where “the hand of man will not be found.” 102
Where, then, did native peoples fit into ecology’s ideas about man and the natural
world? Both Marsh and the early modem ecologists addressed primitive cultures and
held similar views regarding their impact on the natural world. Marsh wrote that
“ [P]urely untutored humanity, it is true, interferes comparatively little with the
arrangements of nature,” doubting that the “purely savage tribes” had caused any sensible
geographical change in the two millennia prior to “discovery” and colonization. For
Marsh, nomadic tribes did little damage to the environment; however, as man adopted a
stationary life, he “at once commences an almost indiscriminate warfare upon all the
forms of animal and vegetable existence around him .” As human societies advance in
civilization, the “destructive agency of man becomes more and more energetic and
i n i

unsparing.”

M arsh, like many contemporaries, considered the Indian a vanishing race

and wrote of primitive cultures in the past tense. Fate destined man to succumb to
civilization, and in doing so, sentenced him to derange the harmonies of nature.

100 See J.W. Redway, “Human E cology,” E co lo g y, v.2 no.3 (July 1921): 229; Clem ents and Shelford, BioEcology, 94.
101 Ibid., 249.
102 Munns, 221.
103 Marsh, 38-40, 42.
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The early modern ecologists held similar views of primal cultures, but they wrote
with less certainty when pressing their claims. Clements and Shelford subscribed to the
unilinear model of cultural evolution, with successive stages progressing from hunting to
pastoral to agricultural.104 They argued that at the most primitive, hunter-gatherer levels,
human societies were merely integral parts of the biome; in pastoral areas, “man perhaps
is still to be reckoned as a constituent of the biome rather than the superdominant in
it.” 105 Only with the advent of agriculture and the mastery over steel did man acquire
dominance within the biome. Like M arsh, the early modem ecologists recognized
differences in the intensity of reactions exerted by man at various culture levels, and, like
Marsh, they doubted native tribes had enacted any considerable change on the land before
the arrival of Columbus. Shelford wrote in 1933 that primitive man, “who could not
remove the forest or exterminate the animals, is probably properly called a part of nature.
At the time of the discovery o f America, a scattered population of Indians had locally
modified the vegetation, but had not destroyed any of the vegetation types.” 106
Nine years earlier, Clark Wissler, one of the first ethnographers o f native peoples,
contributed an article to Ecology advancing the opposite position. In the article, W issler
attacked the general conception that grouped all native tribes into a collective,
homogenous stereotype. Before the arrival of Columbus, argued Wissler, “the American
Indian did not stand still, some tribes advancing to an agricultural level and others to an
age of bronze. Thus, the Indian tribes not only furnish us examples o f primitive hunters,

104 Clem ents and Shelford, 156.
105 Ibid., 24 (italics added).
106 Victor E. Shelford, “The Preservation o f Natural B iotic Com m unities,” E cology, v.14 no.2 (April 1933):
241 (italics added).
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but of agriculturalists, and of higher forms of society.” 107 He proceeded to argue that
tribal societies, be they hunting or farming, actively manipulated the flora and the fauna
in their environments. Unlike Marsh and the early modem ecologists, W issler claimed
“there is reason to believe that in prehistoric times whole areas were devastated by man.”
He concluded: “It is thus clear that man is by inheritance a disturber o f nature.” 108
Despite his recognized expertise and impressive credentials regarding native
cultures, W issler’s opinion of native land use represented and remained the minority
opinion until the latter twentieth-century, when scholars challenged the dominant
paradigm and began to re-examine core assumptions and present research suggesting
natives had manipulated and modified the land more than previously thought. The
authors of Fauna o f the National Parks advanced the belief that native peoples only
lightly modified their environment and, in their quest to determine “original” conditions
in the park units, used as a reference point “the period between the arrival of the first
whites and the entrenchment of civilization in that vicinity.” Like other early modern
ecologists, the authors wrote hypothetically when addressing pre-contact conditions,
noting that “[W]e can know little of the other pictures that preceded this period,” but
certain that “violent changes occurred immediately afterward.” Eager and confident in
their speculation, they asserted that the “rate of alteration in the faunal structure has been
so rapid since, and relatively so slow before, the introduction o f European culture that the
situation which obtained on the arrival of the settlers may well be considered as
representing the original or primitive condition that it is desired to maintain.” 109

107 Clark W issler, “The Relation o f Nature to Man as Illustrated by the North American Indian,” E cology,
v5 no.4 (October 1924): 313.
108 Ibid., 317 (italics added).
109 Fauna o f the N ational Parks, n.p.
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How, then, does one apply early ecological notions of native land-use to ideas
regarding native access to park lands? If, as the early modem ecologists maintained,
natives hardly altered natural conditions, why deny them access to the “pristine” areas of
the national parks? One reason may have to do with temporal considerations. Clements
and Shelford wrote in 1939 that bio-ecology concerned itself primarily with m odem man,
and, like other early modem ecologists, wrote of “primitive” cultures in the past tense.110
Having evinced adherence to unilinear models of cultural evolution, perhaps the early
ecologists considered early twentieth-century Indians, at the end of the assimilation era,
closer to “civilized” modes of life and therefore possessed of far greater destructive
capacities than their primal ancestors.
Another reason justifying native exclusion lay with presumptions regarding
traditional native use of the areas the ecologists sought to set aside as nature reserves.
Prior to the late twentieth-century, when serious studies o f historical native use of the
park areas first appeared, the common assumption was that native societies had not
historically used the park areas to any considerable extent; thus, they held no agency in
the natural processes contributing to the climax states of the park units. Shelford
expressed this opinion succinctly in 1933 when he wrote that “most of the areas which
are now available for reservation as nature sanctuaries or nature reserves were probably
not much affected by these primitive men. This is the argument for leaving them out of
the picture.” 111

110 Clem ents and Shelford, 24.
111 Shelford, “The Preservation o f Natural B iotic Com m unities,” 241.
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Summary
In this chapter I have attempted to convey the atmosphere within which American
policy-makers established the first national parks under the premise that native
inhabitation and use of park lands should be strictly regulated. From a cultural
perspective, conditions unique to a maturing nation essentially bifurcated the Romantic
vision of an Indian wilderness, with the images of the Indian and the wilderness
diverging on separate paths later in the nineteenth century. From an economic
perspective, the corporate nature of the park system sought to create a serene
environment to meet the aesthetic expectations of a nascent tourist industry; thus, the
permission of native activities assumed a selective nature. From an intellectual
perspective, the emerging science of ecology presented a competing vision of park
management policies and goals that, although unsuccessful at first, greatly influenced
later park notions of mankind’s, and the Indian’s, rightful exclusion from natural areas in
the park system.
Thus far this study has taken a generalized approach to the history of the
formative years of the national park system and the concepts introduced provide
underlying themes for the rest of this work. As C.W. Buckholtz claimed, development
and preservation policies in Glacier National Park’s early years were part of a national
policy generally instituted in all national parks.112 The relationship between Glacier
National Park and its neighboring tribe the Blackfeet, however, was not typical within the
overarching national park system. The Blackfeet based their claim to subsistence rights
on park lands on explicit language in a land-cession agreement predating Glacier
National Park’s inception, thus their struggle evolved within a highly-disputed legal
112 Buckholtz, 12.
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framework. Controversy over subsistence rights explicitly listed in the agreement, most
notably hunting, comprises the focus of the next chapter.
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Chapter 2—Language and the Law: The Blackfeet, Glacier, and Reserved

Subsistence Rights

The historical relationship between the Blackfeet and Glacier National Park may
represent the most protracted and contentious example of the interplay between national
parks and native groups. As was the case with many other tribes, the coming o f AngloAmerican civilization heralded the erosion of the Blackfeet traditional subsistence base.
Left with land as its only commodity, the tribe proceeded to sell its lands and ultimately
sank into a dependent and marginalized status on reservation land. In a land cession in
1895, the tribe reserved specific subsistence rights that were honored in writing. When
Congress dedicated much of the ceded land as part of a national park fifteen years later,
park managers initiated a century-long campaign repudiating those native subsistence
rights deemed impermissible in the National Park System.
In this chapter, I will trace the history of the tribe’s attempts to force the National
Park Service to recognize the explicit usufruct rights reserved in a binding agreement
with the federal government, with special focus on the decades since 1970. More than
any other tribe, the Blackfeet has fiercely resisted exclusionary park policies and has
repeatedly forced the park to justify its actions. Adamant in its opposition to certain
native activities within park boundaries, the park has found a powerful ally in the federal
government whose legal representatives have repeatedly ruled against the tribe in the
legal arena. The historical evolution of the themes introduced in the previous chapter,
cultural perceptions of native peoples and the dialectic dialogue that shapes park
management (use vs. preservation), provides a stage upon which the drama in
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northwestern M ontana has unfolded and continues to do so. By tracing historical
developments pertaining to such overarching themes alongside the history o f the
contentious relationship between Glacier National Park and the Blackfeet, I hope to
explain why the general policy of native exclusion and denial of resource extraction is not
ironclad within the overarching National Park System, nor within Glacier National Park
itself. Furthermore, I will show how Blackfeet pressures upon the park in the 1970s
forced park officials to become more accommodating to native interests. Yet, native uses
of park lands that compromised either of the dual objectives of the park system still
commonly met, and continue to meet, with strict regulation or outright prohibition.

Pre-Park Tribal History
Until recent times, many historians agreed that the Blackfeet migrated from the
Great Lakes region to the northern plains sometime during the seventeenth century.
However, new archaeological and ethnographic research of genetic and linguistic
evidence, oral history, and fur trade documents suggests that the tribe has resided in the
region for thousands years.1 Furthermore, oral histories collected and preserved by a
group of Anglo-American writers around the turn o f the twentieth-century suggest that
Blackfeet use of the Glacier area was extensive and regular prior to the reservation era.
Beginning in the late 1880s and continuing throughout the Assimilation era (roughly
from 1887 until 1934), a group of Anglo-American writers offered a competing vision to
the dark and racist view of tribal cultures that gained many adherents in the late
nineteenth century. Many of these writers, i.e. George Bird Grinnell, James Willard

1 Brian R eeves and Sandy Peacock, O ur M ountains A re O ur P illow s: An E thnographic O verview o f
G la cier N ation al Park, (Glacier National Park, Montana, 2001), 77. This study focu ses on the Southern
Piikani tribe that lives on the B lackfeet Reservation in Montana, and in em ploying the term “Blackfeet,” I
refer to this tribe.
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Shultz, W alter McClintock, Clark Wissler, and Mary Roberts Rinehart, spent time with
the Blackfeet and published literary works replete with Blackfeet legends, folklore,
mythology, and common tales o f daily life among the tribe. Prisoners to nineteenth
century conventions, these writers lamented the inevitable demise of tribal cultures and
sought to record and convey the value of Blackfeet culture while accepting the notion that
it could not prevail in the industrial world.

Oral history and recent archaeological

research indicate that the Blackfeet gathered a wide array of food and medicinal plants in
the foothills and mountains, and bighorn sheep, mountain goats, elk, deer, and smaller
animals of the Glacier region provided important meat and hide resources.3 Although the
Blackfeet regularly used the mountains for material and spiritual subsistence purposes,
the tribe most commonly found its “staff of life” roaming the plains.
Even before the introduction of the horse, the buffalo provided the mainstay of
Blackfeet subsistence. During the Blackfeet’s pre-horse “dog days,” nomadic hunting
units enticed buffalo into rude corrals on foot, and the buffalo complex influenced tribal
migration patterns and cultural developments. The Blackfeet saw no whites for nearly
250 years after Colum bus’s “discovery.” Nevertheless, elements of European material
culture appeared in the Northwest early in the eighteenth century. First exposed to th e ,
horse during a skirmish with Shoshoni warriors in 1730, the tribe spent the rest of the
2 For a generalized summary o f the writers’ collective contribution to influencing attitudes towards Indians,
see Sherry L. Smith, Reim agining Indians: N a tive A m ericans Through A nglo Eyes, 1880-1940, (N ew York:
Oxford U niversity Press, 2000), 3-16. She also devotes a full chapter to George Bird Grinnell, pp. 45-67,
and a chapter covering both Walter M cClintock and Mary Roberts Rinehart, pp. 67-95.
3 T hese writers generated too many works detailing B lackfeet uses o f the Glacier area to name all here. For
a start, see G eorge Bird Grinnell, Blackfoot L odge Tales: The Story o f a P rairie P eople (1892); James
Willard Shultz, B lackfeet Tales o f G lacier N ational P ark (1916); W alter M cClintock, The O ld North Trail
o r Life, L egends an d Religion o f the Blackfeet Indians (1910); Clark W issler and D.C. D uvall, “M ythology
o f the Blackfeet Indians,” originally published in 1908 in the A n th ropological P apers o f the Am erican
M useum o f N atural H istory, vol. 2, part 1; for a list o f traditional plant materials found in Glacier National
Park and a map o f traditional hunting and plant-collecting locales in the region, see R eeves and Peacock,
231-233, 147; for a synthesis o f these works and a concise summary o f B lackfeet traditional use o f the
Glacier region, see Spence, 73-76.
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eighteenth century perfecting the equestrian arts and securing steady access to firearms
through French and British traders. Neighboring tribes feared the Blackfeet, who further
strengthened their hegemony by restricting the western tribes’ access to firearms. By the
end of the century, the Blackfeet had become “masters of the northwestern plains.”4
Although relations with the British and the French had been relatively amicable,
the Blackfeet quickly developed hostile relations with American fur companies. Despite
repeated defeats and withdrawals, American fur companies persevered and gradually
established trading forts along the M issouri and Marias rivers, which prompted a
southward shift among the Blackfeet tribes. In the 1830s, demand for beaver declined
and trade in buffalo robes increased with the buffalo robe becoming the standard of value
in the Blackfeet trade. By the 1850s, the tribe had been trading directly with whites for
nearly 75 years and had grown accustomed to the traders’ wares. Whites were few on the
Northwestern Plains, however, and the Blackfeet remained ignorant o f the true nature of
the larger white m an’s civilization and its insatiable thirst for tribal lands.5
Desire for tribal lands quickly became an obsession for the United States
government shortly after its inception in the 1780s. After encountering fierce tribal
resistance in its initial attempts to procure native lands through force, the government
abandoned its policy of the “right of conquest” based on pure military coercion and
adopted the “right of purchase” policy, based on treaty negotiations with tribes as
sovereign nations, in order to acquire western lands. Certainly, the government
subsequently broke many of the treaties it initiated; moreover, the government frequently
inserted vague clauses that, contingent upon assumed future developments, would
4 For more on early Blackfeet history, see John C. Ewers, The Blackfeet: R a id ers on the N orthw estern
Plains, (Norman: U niversity o f Oklahoma Press, 1958), 11-30.
5 Ibid., 45-72.
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eventually render the treaties obsolete. This strategy often proved successful in securing
exclusive ownership over lands formerly utilized by tribal peoples. Predictably, it also
generated much controversy and conflict. The situation that developed around Glacier
National Park provides a case in point.
The Blackfeet first entered into formal relations with the United States with the
Lame Bull Treaty of 1855. Unlike most treaties of the mid-nineteenth century, the Lame
Bull Treaty did not extinguish aboriginal land title through sales or cessions. Moreover,
it did not transfer any land at all.. Although the treaty did designate a parcel of land as
belonging exclusively to the Blackfeet, it did not provide for Indian removal to
reservations, nor did it stipulate the division of communal lands; thus, it shared little in
common with the reservation policy being enacted throughout the W est.6 The Blackfeet
remained too powerful to force land cessions from and expressed no desire to confine
themselves to a reservation.
The goal of the treaty was to pacify the nomadic warring tribes residing both east
and west of the Rocky M ountains so as to facilitate the safe passage, via railroad, of
whites through the region.7 In order to impose peace among the native bands, the treaty
established that a portion of the Blackfoot territory, as designated in the Treaty of Fort
Laramie o f 1851, “shall be a common hunting-ground for ninety-nine years, where all the
nations, tribes and bands of Indians, parties to this treaty, may enjoy equal and
uninterrupted privileges.” The notion o f a common hunting ground was not foreign to
the tribes of the Northwest; in fact, a regional Indian commons already existed. The

6 W illiam E. Farr, ‘“ When W e W ere First Paid’: The Blackfoot Treaty, the Western Tribes, And the
Creation o f the Comm on Hunting Ground, 1855,” G rea t P lain s Q uarterly, v.21 no.2 (2001): 131.
7 Charles Kappler, Indian Affairs: L aw s an d Treaties, v.2, (W ashington: Government Printing O ffice,
1904), 738.
8 Ibid., 737.
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Lame Bull Treaty did not create a common hunting ground, rather, it merely recognized,
defined, and limited the pre-existing commons.9 This local commons would live a short
life, however, as the territory in question would constitute just one chapter in “the
essential story at the heart of Am erica’s western past: the local commons giving way to
the extra-local, the community surrendering authority in resource allocation to state or
national agents.” 10
Along with the establishment of a common hunting grounds, the Lame Bull
Treaty designated a large swath of land, extending east from current day Glacier National
Park to the border of North Dakota, and extending north from the Mussellshell and
Missouri Rivers to the border of Canada, as “the territory of the Blackfoot Nation, over
which said nation shall exercise exclusive control.”11 In exchange for the concessions
made by the Blackfeet and other tribes, the government promised annual payments of
$20,000 for ten years. The architects of the Lame Bull Treaty, by creating both common
and exclusive territories, sought to buy time until the federal government could mobilize
a full reservation effort. Whites commonly perceived the decline of the buffalo as a
parallel development to the demise of native populations, and believed that in short time
precipitous declines in both buffalo and Indian populations would open lands and enable
a full reservation effort. They were partially right— negotiations destroyed the common
hunting ground within ten years, and the buffalo had all but disappeared within thirty
years.

19

The “vanishing” Indian, however, never vanished.

9 Farr, 148.
10 Louis S. Warren, The H u n ter’s C am e: Poachers, Conservationists, an d Twentieth-Century A m erica,
(Ann Arbor: U M I Dissertation Services, 1995), 24.
11 Kappler, 737.
12 Farr, 150.
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In 1860, the first steamboats reached Fort Benton, home to the first Blackfoot
Agency on the recently created Blackfeet Reservation. After the establishment of
M ontana as a territory in 1864 and the end of the Civil W ar in 1865, prospectors flocked
to northwestern M ontana and the “Blackfeet W ars” ensued. The M assacre on the Marias
in the winter of 1870, in which the army killed 173 Blackfeet, mostly women, children,
and the elderly, “pacified” the tribe, put an end to the Blackfeet Wars, and ensured safe
passage through M ontana for white settlers.13
Increasing white immigration in the decades following the Lame Bull Treaty of
1855 intensified efforts to acquire Blackfeet land. As the buffalo disappeared, tribes of
the Plains lost their traditional means of survival. Disease and warfare ravaged native
populations, which became less self-sufficient and more dependent upon the government
for survival. Ever since the time of Jefferson, the government sought to procure native
lands by creating states of dependence and by extending credit in hopes of generating
debt.14 This tactic proved successful, on the Plains as well as across the whole continent.
Situations of poverty and starvation forced tribes to sell the only commodity they had
left: land.
Beginning with the Lame Bull Treaty, the Blackfeet entered into a series of
treaties and agreements with the federal government that continually redefined their evershrinking land base. Treaties in 1865 and 1868 transferred Blackfeet lands and resources
to government hands. In 1871, the United States ended formal treaty making with native
tribes, and dealings with Indians took the form o f Executive Orders and Acts of
Congress. Two Executive Orders in 1873 and Acts of Congress in 1874 and 1888

13 R eeves and Peacock, 113.
14 W allace, 19.
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removed most of the land guaranteed to the Blackfeet in the Lame Bull Treaty of 1855.
M ilitarily broken, the tribe’s economic independence suffered a fatal blow with the
disappearance of the buffalo in the 1880s. The Dawes Severalty Act o f 1887, designed to
replace communal living patterns with individual, market-oriented ones, opened hundreds
of thousands of acres to white settlement. By the time Congress passed the Indian
Reorganization Act in 1934, 40% o f reservation lands lay in the hands of whites.15 By
1890, the Blackfeet Reservation was a small fraction of its original size, and in 1895, that
fraction would shrink even further.

Glacier National Park
In the early 1880s, James Willard Schultz, whose Blackfeet tales provide some of
the earliest ethnographic accounts of Blackfeet life, noticed prospectors lured by rumors
of gold in the hills near St. Mary Lake and suggested to a politically-connected
acquaintance that the Blackfeet Reservation be opened to white settlers. The motion to
open a mineral strip within the western border of the reservation made its way to the
Commissioner of Indian Affairs and to the Secretary of the Interior. George Bird
Grinnell, editor of Forest & Stream, nature advocate, and adopted member of the
Blackfeet tribe, doubted the mineral content of the area in question and feared the soil
erosion that mining activities would produce. Nonetheless, Grinnell eventually became
one of the government’s three negotiators for the government in the land cession. In
1888, the Blackfeet sold the Sweet Grass Hills to the government, but by 1895 the
proceeds from that sale had run out. Out of money and unsuccessful at farming on the

15 R eeves and Peacock, 121.
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semi-arid northern plains, the tribe turned to Grinnell, long considered a “friend,” to
handle proceedings for additional land sales.16
Differing opinions concerning the selling price and provisions of the cession
t

divided the tribe, but, despite any dissent, all remained steadfast in their demand to retain
traditional subsistence rights on any land they ceded. After working the price down from
3 million to 1.5 million dollars, the commission and the tribe sealed the deal. Ratified by
Congress on June 10, 1896, the agreement drew the boundary of the new reservation, and
included a provision that would continue to haunt the National Park Service to this day:
Provided, That said Indians shall have, and do hereby reserve to
themselves, the right to go upon any portion of the lands hereby conveyed
so long as the same shall remain public lands o f the United States, and to
cut and remove therefrom wood and timber for agency and school
purposes, and for their personal uses for houses, fences, and all other
domestic purposes: A nd provided further, That the said Indians hereby
reserve and retain the right to hunt upon said lands and to fish in the
streams thereof so long as the same shall remain public lands of the United
States under and in accordance with the provisions of the game and fish
laws of the State o f M ontana.17
In 1898, the ceded strip opened to miners. By 1902, the boom had become a bust. The
ceded land, however, would soon be incorporated into one of the “crown jew els” of the
American national park system.
George Bird Grinnell knew that no mineral wealth lay buried in the mountains the
Blackfeet called “The Backbone of the W orld,” but he did perceive an altogether
different kind of wealth. As early as 1891 he began to entertain the idea of creating

16 For a discussion o f Schultz and Grinnell and their role in advancing the 1895 agreement, see Keller and
Turek, 45-47.
17 Charles Kappler, Indian Affairs: L aw s an d Treaties, v .l, (W ashington: Government Printing O ffice,
1904), 606. For consistency’s sake, I refer to the agreement negotiated in 1895 as the Agreem ent o f 1896,
reflecting the year in which C ongress ratified it.
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Glacier National Park.18 As editor o f Forest & Stream, Grinnell-published articles
advocating the preservation of the region, and aided by the lobbying of local politicians,
managed to convince Congress to set aside the region as a national park. On May 11,
1910, President W illiam Howard Taft signed the necessary legislation, and Glacier
National Park was bom.
F igure I: G lacier N ational P ark an d the Blackfeet R eservation (m ap taken fro m Spence, pp. 92)
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Glacier N ational Park and the Blackfeet reservation.

Language in the enabling act appears contradictory. The Act conferred exclusive
control of the park to the Secretary of the Interior, who wasresponsible for “the care,
protection, management, and improvement” Of the park,and whose duty it was to
18 Keller and Turek, 48.

“provide for the preservation of the park in a state of nature.” 19 The Act also specifically
allowed for the harvest of dead timber, railroad access, and the leasing of hotels. These
competing objectives highlight the dichotomy of use and preservation inherent in all early
park legislation, and Glacier National Park’s enabling act provides just one example
within the overarching national policy regarding the management of the early national
park system. W hat the legislation did not mention, however, was the Blackfeet tribe or
its rights guaranteed in the Agreement of 1896. Although the legislation failed to
mention the tribe or its rights specifically, it would have serious consequences for the
park’s eastern neighbors.
For some Blackfeet, the creation o f the park meant opportunities for employment.
As discussed in the previous chapter, early park officials adopted the mandate for
recreational tourism as their chief intent, and Glacier was no exception. The powerful
corporate interests guiding early park management in Glacier reserved a special role for
native peoples. At the time of the park’s creation in 1910, the Great Northern Railway
Company carried little commercial traffic through the area, so park bureaucrats joined
with the Great Northern, its largest concessionaire, to build a park that would draw
visitors. Works by Grinnell, Shultz, McClintock, Wissler, and Rinehart closely identified
the Blackfeet with the Glacier area, and the railroad played upon larger cultural themes,
such as the frontier myth and the “vanishing Indian” motif, to promote the Blackfeet as
the “Glacier Park Indians.” The railroad did not attempt to portray the reality of tribal
life under pressure to assimilate, but rather, judging by their choices and printed
promotional materials, embraced and exploited the “noble savage” motif, advancing and

19 “An A ct To establish ‘The Glacier National Park’ in the R ocky Mountains south o f the international
boundary line, in the State o f Montana, and for other purposes,” May 11, 1910, 36 Stat. 354.
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employing “physically impressive, fullblooded, prototypical Indians of the great Plains,
horse-riding tipi-dwelling buffalo-hunting real Indians, noble savages, who would give
the visitor the thrill of a lifetime, straight out of the W esterns— as long as they were not
too bloodthirsty.”20 The Great Northern Railway employed tribal members as dancers,
greeters, and caddies for tourists staying at the com pany’s plush hotels. The railroad
even hired a group of Blackfeet to live near Glacier Park Hotel in a small tipi
encampment during the summer with nightly performances featuring singing, dances,
sign language, and the occasional adoption ceremony. Officials heavily publicized the
“Glacier Park Indians” in early park promotional literature, as well as through several
notable trips for delegations o f the “Glacier Indians” to the New York Travel Show, the
Portland Rose Festival, and the Chicago Land Show.21 The railroad made the Blackfeet
an integral and expected part of the Glacier experience.
By the early 1940s, company officials began expressing worries about the shows
outside the Glacier Park Lodge, criticizing the show as monotonous, hokum, and worn
out. Furthermore, the railroad experienced difficulty hiring older Blackfeet who matched
the romantic image the company promoted. The younger generations proved too modem,
disinterested in tribal matters, and hard to regulate. The Office of Indian Affairs had
never been too enthused about the show, arguing that tribal employment for exhibition
that showcased and encouraged traditional lifestyles hampered federal efforts towards
assimilation. In 1950, the Great Northern officials decided to let the Blackfeet approach

20 Ann Regan, “The Blackfeet, the Bureaucrats, and Glacier National Park, 1910-1940,” unpublished paper
presented at the Western History A ssociation Conference, B illings, MT, October 1986, copy available in
the G eorge C. Ruhle Library, Glacier National Park, W est Glacier, MT, pp. 3.
21 For early native activities and promotional efforts for the park, see Regan, 3-5.
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them to arrange for entertainers; the tribe, perhaps tired of acting as show pieces, stayed
away.

22

Whereas the fagade-management approach adopted by the corporate culture
during G lacier’s early years allowed and even promoted the presence of regulated groups
of Blackfeet as romantic parts of the scenic Glacier experience, the exercise o f certain
reserved treaty rights conflicted with the purposes of an aesthetic park and made
management inconvenient and difficult. In addition to development for recreational
tourism, the enabling legislation had also mandated the preservation of the park’s natural
resources. Designation of the park gave administrators the power to begin shaping a
landscape that would conform to the desired status of the park as one existing in a “state
of nature.” Immediately, they banned hunting, the carrying of firearms, the cutting of
live trees, homesteading, and fishing except by hook and line. Natives, whether claiming
ignorance of park boundaries or openly defying park rules, persisted in their customary
subsistence activities, and hunting remained widespread within the park until the mid1910s.23 Park administrators considered Blackfeet hunting a threat to wildlife, but
confusion over jurisdiction prevented clear courses of action. The confusion over
jurisdiction ended in 1914, when Congress passed legislation conferring to the federal
government exclusive jurisdiction over Glacier National Park. The legislation also
specifically prohibited hunting in the park.24
Punishments resulting from hunting violations in the park aroused the ire of tribal
members cognizant of the 1896 agreement guarantees. In November of 1915, two

22 See Regan, 7-8, 12.
23 See Warren, 290-293.
24 G lacier National Park Act, A ugust 22, 1914, 63 P.L. 177, 63 Cong. Ch. 264, 38 Stat. 699. S ee Sections 1
and 4.
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Blackfeet tribal members separately wrote M ontana Senator Harry Lane requesting
information regarding Indian hunting rights in the park. Unsure of how to respond,
Senator Lane passed along the letters to the commissioner of Indian Affairs, who in turn
forwarded them to the Department of the Interior.25 The Solicitor of the Interior, citing
the 1896 Ward v. Race Horse ruling that terminated Bannock hunting rights in
Yellowstone, referred back to the Agreement of 1896 and concluded that the “right to
hunt and fish under this agreement was temporary and precarious.” He further replied that
tribal rights to game in the park had ceased upon establishment of the national park.
Citing the Agreement of 1896, he asserted that, upon dedication of the ceded land as a
national park, it no longer qualified as public land of the United States.

9 f\

Shortly after the creation of the National Park Service in 1916, Glacier National
Park officials became concerned with deer and elk hunting on the reservation to the east,
where ungulates migrated during winter storms.
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In an effort to protect wildlife

populations, officials embarked on a decades-long struggle to extend the park boundary
six miles to the east. The Park Service failed in its efforts to extend the park boundary;
however, it did manage to secure jurisdiction over the Blackfeet Highway that ran along
the eastern border of Glacier. Park control of the highway failed to deter hunting in the
park or on the reservation, and disputes persisted.28
In 1924, Peter Oscar Little C hief circulated a petition on the reservation calling
for recognition of native rights in Glacier, lamenting that “now we are all known as the
25 Spence, 90.
26 Letter from Solicitor Preston C. W est to the Secretary o f the Interior, Jan. 4, 1916, on file at the Glacier
National Park A rchives, W est Glacier, M T (hereafter referred to as G NPA): F 19-11.
27 In the Superintendent’s Annual Report for 1923, Supt. Eakin com plained that bands o f migrating elk “are
being ruthlessly slaughtered by the Blackfeet Indians, and w e have no recourse...the Indians are hunting
the elk to a point o f exterm ination.” S ee S.A .R . 1923, GNPA: F7-2.
28

•

Keller and Turek, 54. Superintendent Eakin com plained in 1921 that train-men on the Great Northern
oftentim es tipped o ff the natives as to the rangers’ whereabouts. See Regan, 10.
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Glacier National Park [Indians] of M ontana... [But we Indians can’t] hunt there.”29 The
fate of the petition remains a mystery, and Little Chief inquired twice more in writing in
1926 and 1928 about its status. During this period of bureaucratic neglect, tensions
between tribal members and park rangers sharpened and by the early 1930s, according to
historian Mark David Spence, “a near state of war existed on the eastern side of the
park.”30 Eight years after the fact, Little C h ie fs petition was answered when in June of
1932 another solicitor’s report reinforced the judgm ent passed in 1916 that focused on a
narrow, and legally disputable, definition of “public lands.” Solicitor Finney concluded
that the reserved rights were determinably extinguished when the ceded lands ceased to
be public lands, i.e. when Congress dedicated the land as a national park. He further
noted that the Blackfeet reserved right to hunt, as stated in the Agreement of 1896, “was
expressly subject to the provisions of the game and fish laws o f the State of M ontana.”

31

A poaching case involving four Blackfeet resolved in favor of the park in the spring of
1933 confirmed the park’s right to arrest Indians in the park and demonstrated that
poachers would face prosecution. A local newspaper headline read: “All Hunters Barred
from Park Reserve: Indians Do Not Hold Hunting Rights by Treaty.”32
A 1935 Court of Claims decision in the case of Blackfeet Indians (et al.) v. United
States further strengthened the legal position of the National Park Service. The decision
claimed that prior
to the act of May 11,1910, the Indians of the Blackfeet Reservation did
not exercise to any appreciable extent the rights reserved in the aforesaid
agreement of September 26, 1895, to hunt and fish in and remove timber

29 Quoted in Regan, 10-11.
30 See Spence, 93-94.
31 Letter from Solicitor Finney to the Secretary o f the Interior, June 21, 1932, GNPA: F19-12.
32 See Christopher A shby, “Blackfeet Agreem ent o f 1895 and Glacier National Park: A Case H istory,”
(M .A. Thesis, Forestry Department, U niversity o f Montana, 1985), 54-55.
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from the land ceded in the agreement, and such rights were authoritatively
terminated by the limitations of the act of May 11, 1910.33
This decision surely came as a surprise to many Blackfeet who had been chastised by
park rangers for exercising their reserved rights, as it must have for tribal members old
enough to remember traditional use of the area before the creation of the park. James
Willard Schultz, among others, had testified that some two hundred Blackfeet had
actively used the land in question between 1895 and 1910, but personal observations and
oral history failed to convince the courts. Anglo-American cultural prejudice has led
many to dismiss oral tradition as mere superstition without any factual foundation and to
accept only written documentation as valid. The clash of cultures embodied in these
different forms of historical transmission has frequently proved disastrous for native
societies that have been forced to conform to the demands of written documentation and
have, in many cases like this one, failed. When discussing the important role that oral
tradition plays in Blackfeet culture, Tiny-Man Heavy Runner, referring to the writings of
James W illard Schultz, insisted that “it (our history) is in writing.”34 The opinion that
tribal groups had not extensively used park lands was not a novel one, as ecologists, park
officials, and bureaucrats made similar arguments in the case of Yellowstone and
elsewhere.35 In one of the earliest histories of GNP, M adison Grant wrote that the east
side of the park once “formed the westerly portion of the Blackfeet Indian Reservation,
but was not used by these Indians.’06

33 Blackfeet Et. Al. Nations v. U .S ., United States Court o f Claim s, 81 Ct. Cl 101; 1935 U .S. Ct. Cl.
34 Tiny-M an H eavy Runner, interview with author, March 23, 2005.
35 A s noted in Chapter 1, pioneer ecologist Victor E. Shelford cited the absence o f native use o f park-lands
as justification for their exclusion. S ee Shelford, “The Preservation o f Natural Biotic C om m unities,” pp.
241. For a brief summary o f the widespread m isconceptions holding that Indians feared national park
areas, see K eller and Turek, 24.
36 M adison Grant, E arly H istory o f G lacier N ational Park, M ontana, (W ashington: Government Printing
O ffice, 1919), 6.
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In the 1930s, as the NPS vigorously enforced anti-hunting laws in GNP with the
Interior Department’s unwavering legal support, larger changes in federal Indian policy
prompted the park service to adopt new paradigms towards native peoples residing on
lands adjacent to newly-designated park units and it began loosening strictures pertaining
to native subsistence uses.’7 According to historian Sherry Smith, writers like Grinnell
and McClintock succeeded in creating new ways to conceptualize native peoples and
helped lay the intellectual and cultural groundwork for the Indian New Deal and for
deeper changes in popular conceptions of Indians in America that occurred in the 1920s
and 1930s.38 Their writings coincided with the rise of the professionalization in
anthropology. Anthropologists, led by Franz Boaz, joined with such popular writers in
challenging federal policies aimed at forced acculturation and, through their promotion of
cultural relativism, laid the philosophical basis for an enlightened Indian policy.39
M ounting pressure for substantial policy reform in the 1920s impacted the Roosevelt
i
administration, whose Commissioner of Indian Affairs, John Collier, ushered in the
Indian New Deal. The Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, originally the brain-child of
Collier, provided for tribal self-determination of lands, culture, and government, thereby
constituting a sharp policy reversal from the assimilationist goal of allotment. Although
none within the Indian Service directly supported native claims to the established national
parks, respect for native cultures, a proclaimed cornerstone of the Indian New Deal, did
affect policy formulation in newly formed park areas.40

37 Frank Norris, A laska Subsistence: A N ation al P ark Service M anagem ent H istory, (Anchorage: U .S.
Department o f the Interior, 2002), 21.
38 Smith, 5.
39 D ippie, 281.
40 S ee Spence, 134; Norris, 21.
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Although most of the new parks condoned only limited gathering activities of
plant materials for nutritional, construction, craft, or ceremonial purposes, a few park
units tacitly allowed hunting.41 At Everglades National Park(1934) and Olympic
National Park(1938), park officials proved far less zealous in their enforcement efforts
than officials at Glacier. In Everglades National Park and Olympic National Park,
officials reluctantly accepted subsistence hunting so long as it remained both small in
scale and away from the public view.42 Once hunting harvests violated either o f these
conditions, as they did in Olympic National Park: in the early 1980s, the guiding
principles of the National Park System triumphed over native land rights. Changing
perceptions of native peoples may have impacted the formation of subsistence regulation
in newly-created parks, but they failed to make headway against the enshrined traditions
o f parks like Glacier, one of the emulated “crown jew els” of the National Park System.
After the Court of Claims ruling in 1935 officially terminated Blackfeet rights
within the park, the park and the tribe locked into a stalemate that remains largely
unresolved to this day. The Blackfeet were one of the first native groups to reorganize
under the IRA and Blackfeet animosity towards the park became rooted in a centralized
political body, which spread and became an integral part of tribal policy and an
expression of Blackfeet national identity.44 In spite of overall negative opinions

41 For a con cise list o f known subsistence uses in non-Alaskan NPS units established prior to 1976, see
Norris, 24.
42 For a brief summary o f subsistence regulation at Everglades National Park and Olym pic National Park,
see Norris, 21-23. For a more thorough treatment, see K eller and Turek, 90-131, 216-232.
43 For more on the Blackfeet and the IRA, see Paul C. Rosier, R ebirth o f the B lackfeet Nation, 1912-1954,
(Lincoln: U niversity o f Nebraska Press, 2001). Historian Graham D. Taylor argues that generally, during
the Indian N ew Deal, bureaucratic emphasis on tribal political organization, which failed to gain
community support, precluded plans for econom ic native self-sufficiency. See Graham D. Taylor, The N ew
D ea l an d A m erican Indian Tribalism : The Adm inistration o f the Indian Reorganization Act, 1934-35,
(Lincoln: U niversity o f Nebraska Press, 1980). For claim s about Blackfeet tribal governm ent and general
opinions towards the park, see Spence, 98.
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regarding the park, tensions eased in the late 1930s and for over two decades relations
appeared relatively amicable and the Blackfeet abstained in their pressure upon park
officials for the recognition of hunting rights in the park.44 During this temporarily
dormant period in tribal-park tensions, changing historical conditions and opinions
greatly impacted development and management in Glacier and throughout the entire
National Park System.

The Bigger Picture
The end of W W II in 1.945 signaled an end to economic stringencies and
unprecedented numbers of visitors ventured out to the national parks. Unlike other parks,
Glacier was not totally inundated by tourists and the post-war tourism boom did not
overwhelm the park’s facilities.45 By the mid- 1940s, most tourists visited the park by
automobile and highway maintenance constituted a major factor in the park’s effort to
enhance the tourist experience. In 1955, the National Park Service initiated its ambitious
“Mission 66” program that sought to prepare the parks for anticipated increases in tourist
numbers. M ission 66 dominated the National Park Service program at Glacier for a
decade; however, it did not signify a blank check for rampant development.46 The
fundamental principle of the program embodied the twin pillars of the park system:
preservation and use. Assuming visitors would use certain areas, park officials made

44 In a March 24, 2005 interview Ted Hall, BIA em ployee with long experience dealing with tribal-park
matters, claim ed that the tribe and the park got along fine until Edward A. Hummel was appointed
Superintendent in 1958. Supt. Hummel, according to Hall, took a hard line against the Indians and acted as
if there was no agreement at all. Interview in possession o f the author.
45 Buckholtz, 116.
46 For highway construction and M ission 66 projects in GNP, see Alan S. N ew ell, D avid Walter, and James
R. M cD onald, “Historic Resources Study, Glacier National Park and Historic Structures Survey,” (Denver:
NPS D enver Service Center, 1980), 169-179, copy on file in George C. Ruhle Library, W est Glacier, MT.
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preparations by improving roads, trails, and park facilities that would limit the impact to
specified areas, in effect preserving the wilderness condition of the rest of the park.47
Not surprisingly, the pro-development aspect of the Mission 66 program
provoked harsh criticism, far more than previous park development had faced. Leaders
of the burgeoning environmental movement voiced their concerns directly to the public
and to politicians and effectively broadcast their disapproval of national park
management. Critics lambasted the proliferation of tourist facilities, road design, and
excessive road construction, objecting to the modernization and urbanization of the
national parks encouraged by the Mission 66 program.48 In 1963, ecologists, whose
influence in the park service had waned towards the end of the 1930s, again produced a
written report echoing many of the suggestions and critiques regarding park management
included in the 1933 Fauna o f the National Parks. This time, however, their arguments
reached a much wider audience and resonated much more powerfully.
Wildlife M anagement in the National Parks, more commonly known as the
Leopold Report, appeared in 1963 and represented the first review of Park Service natural
resource management conducted by experts from outside the bureau. The study reflected
the growing awareness of ecology and received widespread publicity, contributing to the
growing criticism of the commercialization of the national parks.49 Similarities between
the Leopold Report and the Fauna o f the National Parks abound. Overall, the central

47 S ee Sellars, 181; Buckholtz, 93. Buckholtz claim s the nature o f the terrain in Glacier made tourists
reluctant to leave the developed areas; thus, the developed areas succeeded in confining tourists to small
portions o f the park, thereby protecting and preserving the adjacent natural areas. See Buckholtz, 119.
48 For genera] critiques, see Sellars, 185. For criticism s specifically leveled at GNP, see N ew ell, Walter,
and M cD onald, 180.
49 The report was reprinted in its entirety in Living W ilderness, Audubon, N ational P arks M agazine, and
A m erican Forests.

theme of the report insisted that scientific management of the parks should replace strict
protection of the parks’ resources in order to ensure their preservation.50
The stated objective of the Leopold Report mirrored that expressed in Fauna o f
the National Parks. The “objective of every national park,” wrote Leopold and the gang,
should be the maintenance and/or re-creation of a “reasonable illusion of primitive
America.” The most quoted passage declared that a “national park should represent a
vignette of primitive America.” The authors defined “primitive America” as “the
condition that prevailed when the area was first visited by the white man.”51 Thus, the
j

authors, like the early modern ecologists and preservationists in general throughout the
1960s, adhered to and reinforced the widespread paradigm positing modern man as a
disruptive and unnatural, presence in wilderness areas, assuming that Europeans were
harbingers of widespread environmental degradation. They did not draw the dichotomy
between Man and Nature as sharply, however, when addressing Native Americans. The
report implied that native groups only minimally altered their environments and caused
little to no adverse effects on the natural world. A t the same time, it denied them any
agency in the historical evolution of the American landscape. The authors endorsed
manipulation o f the environment by the Indians, particularly their use of fire. In 1967,
the NPS reversed its long-standing policy of absolute fire-suppression in the majority of
its parks; however, despite the report’s implication that native modification of the
environment had been “natural,” the Park Service had neither the intention nor the means

50 A. Starker Leopold, S.A. Cain, C.M . Cottam, I.N. Gabrielson, T.L. Kimball, “W ildlife M anagem ent in
the National Parks,” in The G reat N ew W ilderness D ebate, 105, 108.
51 Ibid., 106-107.
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to make allowances for the extensive use of fire by Native Americans in its forests.
Humans, including Indians, no longer were agents of “natural” change." ‘
The Park Service adopted the Leopold Report as policy soon after its appearance
in 1963, and, as historian Richard Sellars has opined, much of National Park Service
history since then has been shaped by the continuing struggle to change the direction of
national park management, particularly as it affects natural resources.

Cl

The year after

publication of the Leopold Report, Congress passed revolutionary legislation, inspired by
the report and by the growing environmental movement, that would impact lands on a
much larger scale. The W ilderness Act of 1964 authorized Congress to set aside federal
lands, not just within the National Park System, as nature preserves without any overt
development. The act defined wilderness as
an area where the earth and its community of life are untrammeled by man,
where man him self is a visitor who does not rem ain.. .an area of
undeveloped Federal land retaining its primeval character and influence,
without permanent improvements or human habitation, which is protected
and managed so as to preserve its natural conditions and which (1) generally
appears to have been affected primarily by the forces o f nature, with the
imprint of man’s work substantially unnOticeable...54
This act finally provided a legislative avenue for the preservation of areas conforming to
the primitive ideals envisioned by the authors of Fauna o f the National Parks and the
Leopold Report. The act also presupposed that humans were not agents of natural
change.
Although the W ilderness Act of 1964 proved a sharp contrast to the goals of
M ission 66, it too addressed the dual objectives of the park system. The Act articulated a

52 Runte, 206.
53 Sellars, 215.
54 “An A ct To establish a National W ilderness Preservation System for the permanent good o f the w hole
people, and for other purposes,” Sept. 3, 1964, P.L. 88-577; 88 Congress.

73

preservation rationale by prohibiting future development and human habitation in
designated wilderness areas. The Act also expressly revealed a recreation rationale,
declaring wilderness an “enduring resource.. .for the use and enjoyment of the American
people,” thereby justifying wilderness because of its instrumental value as a setting for
certain outdoor recreational activities and for solitude. Furthermore, in addition to
addressing preservation and recreational use, the Act contained a group of pro
development clauses that limited wilderness preservation.55 The Act did not specifically
mention native peoples; nonetheless, it would become another sticky point of contention
between the Blackfeet and Glacier National Park. Proponents of wilderness designation
in the “ceded strip” feared the impact that recognition of native rights could have on their
efforts, whereas the tribe feared the effects that wilderness designation could have on the
exercise of reserved usufruct rights.
Accompanying major developments in the national environmental agenda during
the 19.60s were changes in cultural conceptions of native peoples. After WWII, popular
opinion turned against the cultural pluralism embodied in the Indian New Deal as the
Eisenhower administration proposed the termination of federal services and recognition
as a challenge to tribal self-determination. Termination faded by 1960, and the
philosophical legacies of Collier’s Indian New Deal influenced Indian policy in the
decades that followed.56 Beginning in the 1960s, the counter-culture advocated a “back
to the land” philosophy as it rebelled against the dominant culture and yearned for an
alternative to an increasingly technological and materialistic society. In doing so, the

55 For an insightful analysis o f the W ilderness A ct o f 1964 and its em bodim ent o f the dual objectives o f the
national park ideal, see Mark W oods, “Federal W ilderness Preservation in the United States: The
Preservation o f W ilderness?” in The G reat N ew W ilderness D ebate, 131-153.
56 See D ippie, 342-344.
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movement searched for a symbol that would epitomize its tenets, and, like primitivist
movements had in the past, it emulated the folkways of people perceived as living closer
to nature, in this case those of Native Americans. The environmental movement
embraced the image of the “noble savage” as one imbued with ecological wisdom and
extolled the romantic character of traditional tribal culture.57 Renewed respect for tribal
culture, by the counter-culture and by society as a whole, influenced the NPS, which,
beginning in the early 1960s, began to adopt new attitudes toward Native Americans.
Due to increased sympathy toward Indian causes by society as a whole, as well as
increased militancy among native groups in the vicinity of existing park units and among
tribal communities involved in attempts to establish new park units, the Park Service, by
the early 1970s, displayed more sensitivity and respect for tribal viewpoints. As an
example, the Park Service began to allow greater native uses of existing parks and
included native concerns in the planning of new parks. Many o f the sixty-four national
recreation areas, national seashores, and national lakeshores the NPS created between
1963 and 1972 (all technically National Park Service units) allowed hunting.

co

Permissible hunting by any group in the national parks, however, remains a rare
exception, whereas activities like regulated collecting of plant materials for specific
purposes pose far less of a challenge to the ideals o f the National Park System.
The tumultuous events of the 1960s, in addition to shaping the public’s opinions
of native peoples, also caused reverberations in Indian country. Native communities
across the country witnessed a resurgence of interest in traditional tribal culture and,

57 For m ore on changing cultural conceptions o f Indians in the 1960s and 1970s, see Shepard Krech III, The
E cologica l Indian: M yth an d H istory, (N ew York: W .W . Norton & Company, 1999), 15-16, 20-22, 27; see
also D eloria, 154-169.
58 For NPS policies regarding park units in the 1960s and 1970s, see Norris, 25-27.
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inspired by the success of African-Americans in the Civil Rights movement of the 1960s,
began actively to assert their rights again in the 1960s. Political activism thrived among
many native communities, mostly urban ones, and gave rise to the Red Power Movement.
The American Indian Movement (AIM) staged a number of high-profile demonstrations
demanding recognition of tribal rights: the occupation of Alcatraz Island (1969-1971), the
Trail of Broken Treaties march on W ashington, D.C. and the trashing of the BIA building
(1972), and the heavily publicized reoccupation and protracted siege at W ounded Knee
(1973). AIM attracted several Blackfeet members into its ranks, and W oody Kipp, the
man whose court victory in 1974 reinvigorated tribal pressures upon Glacier to recognize
the usufruct rights in the Agreement of 1896, personally participated in the march on
D.C. and the flare-up at Wounded Knee.59 The militant nature of tribal political activism
did not escape the notice of Glacier Superintendent William J. Briggle, who wrote in
February of 1973, regarding a proposed cooperative visitor center between the tribe and
the park, that “ [RJeflecting on the strained relationships with Indians in our country today
and a possible worsening situation ahead, one of the ways we might help alleviate this is
to work together cooperatively where opportunities are available.”60 Briggle’s attempt to
defuse a potentially explosive situation proved ineffectual, and his premonition came to
fruition less than a year later when a tribal member rekindled the fiery situation between
the park and the tribe.

59 In 2004, Kipp published an autobiography detailing his experiences with AIM. S ee W oody Kipp, Viet
Cong a t W ounded Knee: The T rail o f a Blackfeet A ctivist, (Lincoln: U niversity o f Nebraska Press, 2004),
87-137.
60 Letter from Supt. W illiam J. B riggle to Director o f the M idw est Region, February 22, 1973, GNPA: F1913.
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Revival
On September 15, 1973, park rangers arrested Woody Kipp for entering the park
without paying the entrance fee required by law. He appealed to the United States
District Court For The District Of Montana, Great Falls Division, and the judge’s ruling
on January 2, 1974 boded well for the tribe. The judge focused on the definition of
public lands in the cession agreement. He noted that “public lands of the United States,”
in strict legal terms, refers to lands subject to sale or disposal under general laws. By this
definition, lands in GNP did not qualify as public lands. On the other hand, the judge
acknowledged the definition of “public lands of the United States” in popular usage as
referring to lands belonging to the government and open to the public. The judge
reiterated the rule of interpretation stating that a “treaty with Indians must be construed,
not according to the technical meaning of its words to learned lawyers, but in the sense in
which they would naturally be understood by the Indians.” The judge ruled in Kipp’s
favor, arguing that it was “inconceivable that the Indians understood that there was
hidden in the questioned phrase a privilege in the United States to terminate the reserved
rights by changing the character of the public ownership...I conclude that the reserved
rights were not extinguished by the act creating the park.”61 Although the judge upheld
the right of free entry, he did not apply his ruling to the other rights of hunting, fishing, or
wood-gathering. Nonetheless, park officials feared the potential ramifications of the
ruling upholding any Blackfeet rights within the park.
Officials within the Park Service immediately lobbied to appeal the Kipp
decision, for several reasons. Coinciding with the Kipp battle was an effort by the Park
Service to establish some 917,600 acres within Glacier National Park, roughly 95%, as a
61 United States v. Kipp, January 2, 1974, 369 F. Supp. 774.

“wilderness area” as proposed by the W ilderness Act o f 1964. Since nearly half of this
i

acreage lay east of the Continental Divide, the proposed land was “subject to the alleged
rights o f the Blackfeet Indians to remove weed and timber, hunt and fish.” NPS Director
Ronald W alker wrote in February of 1974 that “the arguments utilized to uphold the right
of entry into the park might also be employed to support the right to remove timber from
wilderness therein.” Aware that section 4(a)(3) of the W ilderness Act provided that the
act could not “ .. .modify the statutory authority under which units of the National Park
System are created,” the Park Service included a provision accompanying the draft
wilderness proposal repealing the “alleged rights of the Blackfeet Indians” and strongly
recommending that the government appeal the “Kipp” decision. Since the W ilderness
Act defined wilderness as federal “land retaining its primeval character and
influence. ..with the imprint of man’s work substantially unnoticeable,” then logging,
wrote Walker, “within a Glacier wilderness would violate the intent of the Wilderness
Act.”62
Superintendent Briggle of GNP shared the D irector’s desire to appeal the Kipp
decision, but for different reasons. Labeling K ipp’s action an “obvious test case” in a
letter to the Regional Director of the Midwest Region penned less than a week after the
judge’s decision, Briggle noted that the decision acted only on the right of entry and did
not pertain to any of the other claimed rights. However, fearing a precedent, Briggle
worried: “ [W]e are deeply concerned with Judge Sm ith’s decision because of the other
rights claimed by the Blackfeet Indians,” and “are of the strong opinion that an appeal

62 Letter from NPS Director Ronald W alker to Assistant Solicitor o f Parks and Recreation, February 16,
1974, GNPA: F19-13; 78 Stat. 893; 78 Stat. 891; the tribe opposed any efforts towards wilderness
designation on the “ceded strip,” since such a designation would eclipse their traditional rights, see Philip
Burnham, Indian Country, G o d ’s Country: N ative A m ericans an d the N ational Parks, (W ashington, D.C.:
Island Press, 2000), 155.
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should be made on this case.” H e admitted that while “it might be possible to live with
the free entry aspect of the decision, any unfavorable decision about hunting and timber
harvest that might be rendered would be completely unacceptable in a national park.”
The Superintendent advocated taking a positive stand on “this lesser decision,” writing
that “ [W]e fully anticipate that test cases of the other rights will be forthcoming.”63
Again, his prediction came true.
Inspired by K ipp’s victory, three tribal members next intentionally violated park
regulations to test the usufruct rights in the Agreement of 1.896.64 At 3:45 P.M. on
January 23, 1974, a park ranger apprehended three tribal members in the process of
committing three separate violations near the St. Mary Visitor Center. George Kipp II,
brother of Woody Kipp, had fired a W inchester 270 and was charged with hunting;
Charles J. Momberg was caught in possession of fishing equipment in closed waters and
was charged with fishing out of season; Darrell Momberg was apprehended cutting a
small live tree and charged with destroying a tree branch. Charles Momberg and George
Kipp pleaded nolo contendere to their charges and were given a fine of $100, later
suspended, and were placed on a 90-day non-supervisory probation. Darrell Momberg
entered a plea of not guilty. On July 9, .1.974, U.S. District Judge Russell E. Smith, the
same judge who had acquitted Woody Kipp, found Darrell Momberg guilty of the crime
as charged and fined the defendant $1.00. In his ruling, the judge concluded that the
defendant had cut a piece of dead wood from a live tree “for the purpose o f testing the
Indian rights,” and not “for any of the purposes mentioned in the agreement.” The same

63 Letter from Superintendent B riggle to Regional Director, January 10, 1974, GNPA: F19-13.
64 A m em o from G N P Superintendent Mart to the Regional Director o f the M idw est R egion, January 24,
1974, related a call from an attorney in Browning indicating, before the transgressions occurred, that
“certain unidentified Indians desired to be arrested for hunting and fishing in the park,” GNPA: F 19-13.
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judge admitted he had recently become aware of the 1935 Court of Claims finding that
officially terminated tribal rights. Backtracking from his analysis in United States v.
Kipp, the judge upheld the earlier decision and the tribe’s window of opportunity all but
disappeared 65 Tribal rights to free entry did remain intact, however.
The inconsistency of the ju d g e’s ruling did not escape the attention of the tribe,
and shortly after the Momberg ruling tribal lawyers teamed up with the Native American
Rights Fund to write a petition to the Secretary of the Interior. Presenting a
comprehensive analysis of previous cases and legal precedents, the petition requested that
the Department recognize the usufruct rights guaranteed in the Agreement of 1896 and
that the National Park Service enter into a cooperative agreement with the tribe to
implement the reserved rights. Moreover, the petition asserted unequivocally that the
establishment of Glacier National Park had not abrogated the reserved rights.66
The petition advanced two core arguments challenging the validity of the
Department’s refusal to recognize the agreement rights. The first argument dealt with the
rule of interpretation, or what legalists call the Canons of Construction. The Canons of
Construction mandate that courts must examine the historical circumstances in which the
government and tribes negotiated treaties/agreements and, relying on the negotiation
process itself, must interpret treaties/agreements “in the sense in which they would
naturally be understood by the Indians.” Judge Sm ith’s decision in the Kipp case adhered
to the rule of interpretation, and the authors of the petition declared that the legal analysis
in the “Kipp” decision should remain determinative; thus, the adverse ruling in the

65 For details about the transgressions and the M om berg decision, see above letter; S.A .R . 1974, GNPA; 29
Stat. 353-354.
66 Philip E. Roy, “Petition o f the B lackfeet Tribe o f Indians to the Secretary o f the Interior to approve a
conservation agreement providing for the regulation o f Blackfeet reserved rights on the eastern portion o f
Glacier National Park,” (Browning, MT, 1975), 1.
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“M omberg” case was unjustified as the 1935 Court of Claims finding should not set aside
the determination in the “Kipp” case. Judge Smith had cited the 1899 Jones v. Meehan
case as precedent, but in fact the Supreme Court first stated the basic rule in Worcester v.
Georgia (1832), and C hief Justice M arshall’s express statement in the case established
the standard for judicial interpretations of Indian treaties ever since.67
The second core argument advanced by the authors of the petition dealt with the
inherent sovereignty of Indian nations spelled out in the 1832 ruling Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia. As sovereign nations with inherent powers of self-government, tribes retain the
power to regulate the exercise o f reserved rights both on and off reservations; however,
the Lone W olf v. Hitchcock ruling in 1903 granted plenary power to Congress to
unilaterally abrogate treaties made with tribes. Subsequent Supreme Court rulings
determined that in order to exercise this power, Congress must issue an express statement
of the intention to extinguish reserved rights. Noting that both the 1910 and 1914 statutes
establishing the park and prohibiting hunting, respectively, made no mention of Blackfeet
rights, the authors concluded that “longstanding principles of federal Indian law preclude
abrogation where there is no clear legislative intention to do so.”
The Secretary of the Interior rejected the proposal. Interior Solicitor Austin
concluded that “a legal basis does not exist for granting the petition and, therefore, the

67 Ibid, 25-26. Several other critics o f court treatment o f Blackfeet legal rights have echoed many o f the
arguments set forth by the authors o f the petition. For a more in-depth legal analysis o f the BlackfeetGlacier story, see Kenneth P. Pitt, “The Ceded Strip: B lackfeet Treaty Rights in the 1980s,” unpublished
paper on file at the Ruhle Library; Christopher S. Ashby, “The B lackfeet Agreem ent o f 1895 and Glacier
National Park: A C ase History;” Tarissa Spoonhunter, “G lacier National Park on Blackfoot Territory: The
Assertion o f Rights on Traditional Lands,” (M .A. Thesis, American Indian Studies Department, U niversity
o f Arizona, 2001); Jim Kipp, “B lackfeet Oral Tradition o f the 1895 A greem ent,” (M .S. Thesis,
Environmental Studies Department, U niversity o f Montana, 2003). For a more general critique o f federal
legal policy towards native rights and national parks, with special emphasis on a case in O lym pic National
Park concerning the Quinault tribe, see H. Barry Holt, “Can Indians Hunt in National Parks? Determinable
Indian Treaty Rights and U nited States v. H icks,” Environm ental Law, v. 16 (W inter 1986): 208-254.
68 Roy, 5-6, 23, direct quote pp. 46.
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petition must be rejected on legal grounds.” Like Judge Smith had done in the
“M omberg” ruling, the Solicitor reiterated that the viability of the alleged rights had been
previously litigated and decided by the Court of Claims in 1935, which declared that “the
1895 reserved rights had terminated and that no compensation was due.” Agreeing with
the petition’s allegations that Congress made no express intention to abrogate tribal
rights, Austin responded “it is evident that Congress intended to prohibit hunting and
timbering in Glacier National Park with no exception for the Blackfeet T rib e.. .on the
face of the 1914 statute.” Thus, since Congress made no express provision to preserve
the rights, “we interpret the 1914 statute as terminating those rights.” The Solicitor did
uphold the right of free access for tribal members.69
Although the petition failed to produce its desired effect, the compelling legal
arguments contained therein did not fall on deaf ears. In a letter sent to the Assistant
Secretary of Fish, W ildlife, and Parks and to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs,
Solicitor Austin admitted that the tribe’s arguments were not “totally unpersuasive or
unworthy o f consideration.” Perhaps aware that his rejection of the petition rested on a
shaky legal foundation, the solicitor expressed concern that other legal bodies could
arrive at a different verdict regarding the alleged rights. This concern held immediate
importance because several wilderness proposals affecting the ceded strip were currently
pending before Congress, and the Solicitor warned that “Congressional deliberations on
these bills may provide an opportunity to seek legislation favorable to the tribe.” In a
startling about-face, the Solicitor recommended that, in order to avoid a potential
Congressional ruling officially recognizing tribal rights, “you may wish, as a policy

69 Letter from Solicitor Austin to Philip E. Roy, General Counsel o f the Blackfeet Tribe, D ecem ber 17,
1975, GNPA: F19-13.
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matter, to consider a legislative accommodation of the tribe’s request.”70 No effort
towards legislative accommodation ever surfaced. Congress also never formally
designated any land as “wilderness” areas in Glacier National Park.
The National Parks and Conservation Association, an environmental watchdog
group that had condemned the petition by declaring that “Indian attempts to penetrate
national Park lands for exploitative purposes.. .represent another sad commentary in
Native American History,” took comfort in the legal rejection of claimed tribal rights.71
Officials at GNP surely rejoiced as well. Nevertheless, park officials rightfully sensed
tri bal backlash and took steps in the mid-to-late 1970s in hopes of preventing a souring of
relations. The park increased efforts, at least on paper, to improve general relations by
maintaining communication with tribal officials, working cooperatively with the tribe,
and accommodating, when possible, tribal requests. Superintendent Iversen wrote in
early 1975 that “[W]e are genuinely sincere in working with the Blackfeet to our mutual
benefit and have recently demonstrated it by our actions,” noting that park officials
withdrew a court case regarding cattle trespassing, established positive equal employment
opportunity goals, and directed more park interpretive programs to appreciation of Indian
cultures.72 A subsequent park press release announced that both tribal and park officials
were “exploring ways to improve their neighborly relationship.”73

70 Letter from Solicitor Austin to A ssistant Secretary o f Fish, W ildlife, and Parks and to the Com m issioner
o f Indian Affairs, February 24, 1976, G NPA, F19-13.
71 See A shby, 72.
72 Letter from Supt. Iversen to Mr. James Baker, V ice Chairman o f the Blackfeet Tribal Business Council,
January 10, 1975, GNPA: F 19-13. The S.A .R . from 1975 stated that “Blackfeet Indian cultural programs
and relationships with the park increased over the year,” citing the regular show ing o f the film “The Sun
G ave Man the Pow er,” the developm ent o f an A /V Program on Blackfeet crafts, the performance o f dance
and crafts in the St. Mary Visitor Center, and the involvem ent o f Blackfeet leaders in training sessions.
73 U .S. Department o f the Interior/National Park Service N ew s Release: “B lackfeet and Glacier Park
Improving Neighborly Relationships,” September 22, 1977, GNPA: F19-13.
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Reciprocating park attempts to improve communications, Mr. Earl Old Person,
Blackfeet Tribal Chairman, stated in 1977 that “neither the Blackfeet Reservation or
Glacier National Park can operate successfully in administrative isolation.” He professed
that “when neighbors learn to know each other better there will be a higher degree of
mutual respect and understanding.”74 In what the park dubbed the first joint meeting
between the tribal council and park staff, tribal officials echoed Earl Old Person’s
sentiments and traced the source of most controversial problems between the tribe and
the park to rumors, misinformation, and poor communications which, claimed tribal
officials, “we are working to eradicate.”75 In kind, the park also worked to rectify
problems related to misunderstanding.
Prior to the early 1970s, notable tribal contention over the denial of Blackfeet
alleged rights within Glacier had largely subsided by the late 1930s. For many park
employees in the late 1970s, the issue of tribal rights was either a faint memory, or more
likely, to use the parlance of our time, “news to me.” The revival of the issue brought on
by the high-profile court cases in the mid-1970s resuscitated a tense atmosphere, and park
officials felt compelled to inform all park personnel, especially the park rangers who
dealt directly with tribal members, on matters pertaining to tribal relations. A briefing
statement posted to park personnel shortly after the Solicitor’s rejection of the tribal
petition provided a brief background of the issue by describing, if inadequately, the
Agreement of 1896. After outlining the test cases brought to court and the ultimate
rulings in favor o f the National Park Service, the statement acknowledged that tribal
“members continue to feel that certain rights were retained.” The statement made clear
74 Ibid.
75 U .S. Department o f the Interior/National Park S ervice N ew s Release: “Joint M eeting B etw een Blackfeet
Tribal Council and Glacier National Park Staff,” January 25, 1978, GNPA: F 19-13.
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the park’s position: “If permitted these rights would allow Tribal members to undertake
many activities contrary to National Park Service policies and regulations and lead to the
decimation of the natural resources on the east side of the Continental Divide. The
National Park Service contends that legislation subsequent to the Treaty of 1895, negates
any remaining Blackfeet rights.”76
In addition to providing background and clarifying the park’s official position, the
statement made recommendations as to necessary courses of action. It proclaimed that
park personnel should work to maintain the best possible relations with the tribe on a
local level; however, it warned that “the Treaty rights claimed sometimes makesfsic] a
good working relationship more difficult.” It further demanded that park personnel
exercise great care with law enforcement actions taken against tribal members and that
cases involving treaty rights “must be very clear cut and without technical procedure
faults in the execution of park actions.”77 Park staff doubtlessly hoped to avoid any
confrontation that could exacerbate tensions and cause a public outcry, as did tribal
officials.
The alleviation of public concern and the conveyance of a good working
relationship between the two parties constituted important goals for both park and tribal
officials.78 Since most visitors to the park also traveled through the Blackfeet
Reservation, it was in the public interest that the park and the tribe work together in
76 Glacier National Park, “B riefing Statement: Blackfeet Treaty R ights,” Decem ber, 1976, GNPA: F19-13.
77 Ibid.— — '
78,Pfanguage in correspondence letters and press releases supports this assertion. S ee Letter from Supt.
d versen to Mr. James Baker, V ice Chairman o f the Blackfeet Tribal Business Council, January 10, 1975,
GNPA: F 19-13. A Letter from Supt. Iversen to the Regional Director dated September 12, 1977, claim s
that “the tribe is sincerely interested in bettering their public im age,” G NPA. S ee also U .S. Department o f
the Interior/National Park Service N ew s Release: “Joint M eeting B etw een Blackfeet Tribal Council and
Glacier National Park Staff,” January 25, 1978, GNPA; U .S. Department o f the Interior/National Park
Service N ew s Release: “B lackfeet and Glacier Park Improving N eighborly R elationships,” September 22,
1977, G NPA.
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serving the visitors: any tourist deterrents could have adverse financial ramifications for
both parties. The fact that a good amount of tourist travel went through the reservation is
of no small consequence. Park rangers did not deny the legally-sanctioned right of free
access to tribal members; nevertheless, the tendency of non-Indians to pass through the
reservation and into the park while claiming to be members of the Blackfeet Nation did
not proceed unnoticed and generated much concern for park officials.79
Proximity considerations also engendered concerns over the desired aesthetics of
the “Glacier experience.” As noted earlier, during the park’s early years officials
unsuccessfully tried to extend the eastward boundary in order to protect ungulate
populations that migrated east to lower elevations in the winter. Another motive for the
proposed extension lay in the park’s desire to shield tourists from the realities of modern
Indian life: signs, stores, and unsightly shacks could offend some tourists during their
wilderness excursions.

xo

In spite of mutual efforts towards accommodation and positive feedback from
joint meetings, park and tribal officials failed to preserve an amicable atmosphere along
the contested park border.81 Some Blackfeet individuals took matters into their own
hands and lashed out against park rangers. In the late summer of 1977, four tribal
members assaulted two park rangers, and in the early 1980s, according to an anonymous
retired ranger interviewed by historian Mark David Spence in 1994, a near state of war

79 See M em o o f M eeting between Glacier National Park S taff and Blackfeet Indian Tribal Council
Members, M ay 10, 1979, GNPA: F20-8.
80 K eller and Turek, 61-62.
81 Tribal and park leaders expressed optim ism after several m eetings in the late 1970s. S ee Letter from
Supt. Iversen to Regional Director re: M eeting with B lackfeet Tribal O fficials, September 12, 1977,
GNPA; U .S . Department o f the Interior/National Park Service N ew s Release: “Joint M eeting Between
B lackfeet Tribal Council and Glacier National Park Staff,” January 25, 1978, GNPA; M em o o f M eeting
between Glacier National Park Staff and Blackfeet Indian Tribal Council M em bers, M ay 10, 1979, G NPA.
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resurfaced and armed conflict nearly broke out on several occasions.

Although park

officials met frequently with tribal officials and enhanced their efforts to sensitize the
Glacier staff and tourists to issues concerning the Blackfeet tribe in the decades that
followed, they did not budge from their policy prohibiting native hunting within the park.
W hile a state of discontent festered along the eastern border of GNP in the early
1980s, developments elsewhere rattled the foundations of the National Park System.
Unlike in the contiguous United States, the federal government established national
parklands in Alaska before extinguishing aboriginal title; thus, many parks in Alaska
today allow inhabitation as well as hunting by indigenous groups. With the passage of
the Alaska Native Claim Settlement Act (ANCSA) in 1971, Congress officially
extinguished all aboriginal title to land; however, lawmakers recognized that the
termination of aboriginal title would have to be accompanied by legal protections of the
natives’ continued subsistence use of the public lands.83 On December 2, 1980, Congress
passed the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA), which
designated 100 million acres, roughly 28 percent of the state, as conservation areas and
added ten new units to the national park system, nine of which allowed subsistence use.
The NPS maintained that subsistence activities, including hunting, could be compatible
with wildlife conservation and the national park idea in Alaskan park units.84
Neither the NPS, Congress, nor the general public shared such an optimistic
appraisal of native hunting in national parks in the lower forty-eight. The issue came
under the national spotlight in January of 1984 when a judge dismissed charges against

82 For more on the assault on park rangers, see Letter from Supt. Iversen to Regional Director, September
12, 1977, GNPA: F 19-13. For more on general discord in the early 1980s, see Spence, 99-100, 169.
83 Theodore Catton, Inhabited W ilderness: Indians, Eskimos, a n d N ational P arks in Alaska, (Albuquerque:
U niversity o f N ew M exico Press, 1997), 81.
84 Ibid., 85.

two enrolled members of the Quinault Indian Tribe caught illegally hunting several elk
within Olympic National Park, basing his decision on explicit treaty guarantees made in
1855. The enabling legislation for the park, established in 1938, not only preserved
Indian treaty rights but also failed to ban hunting in the park. Although Congress
officially banned hunting in the park in 1942, the Quinault tribe had an unspoken
agreement with park rangers: as long as tribal members used discretion when poaching
within the park, stayed out of public view, hunted for ceremonial or subsistence purposes
only, and did not abuse the privilege, rangers looked the other way and did not bother
them. The judge’s acquittal of the two immediately sent shockwaves through the
environmental and hunting communities and caused a public uproar. Raising the
unsettling specter o f widespread uncontrolled Indian hunting on federal lands and
remonstrating against a frightening precedent, the government pressured the court to re
hear the case. The court reversed its decision, upheld Park Service regulations, and
convicted the two tribal members.85 Court recognition of native treaty rights in the
national park system enjoyed a short-lived reign of success, but in the end, the
entrenched, federally-supported guidelines of the national park ideal triumphed over
native claims to the cherished American landscape contained within park boundaries.
A quarter of a century after the “M omberg” case, another violation of park
regulations revived the controversy over Blackfeet rights in the eastern half o f Glacier
National Park. On January 18, 2000, two NPS biologists surveying bighorn sheep on
Spot Mountain spotted two tribal members illegally hunting sheep within the park and
radioed the hunters’ location to Forest Service officers who apprehended the two tribal
members on the Blackfeet Reservation. After being indicted with conspiring to violate
85 See Holt, “Can Indians Hunt?” 208-211, 243-244; Keller and Turek, 90, 122-124.
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the Lacey Act, one of the defendants, Bailey D. Peterson, appealed the case to test the
reserved rights issue.86 Some observers held high hopes for the case. Indian Country •
Today covered the story under the headline: “Blackfeet hunter case may resolve century07

old federal land dispute.”

The tribe was divided in its support of Mr. Peterson, as the

defendant was trophy hunting rather than subsistence hunting. The defendant had killed
three bighorn sheep, but had just taken the heads and had not preserved the meat.88 On
November 17, Judge Donald Molloy of the U.S. District Court denied the defendant’s
motion to dismiss the case. The judge held that the Act of August 22, 1914, that
officially prohibited hunting in the park applied to the Blackfeet in abrogating their right
to hunt, as all hunting was prohibited in the park. Some tribal members consider this
^ ,-case, like the “M omberg” decision, a setback for the Blackfeet in exercising their
reserved rights and fear that it could be another obstacle in asserting reserved rights for
the tribe in the future.

QQ

Summary
The Blackfeet, like most tribes, conveyed vast tracts of land to the federal
government, reserving pre-existing rights to themselves through treaties and agreements
that specified the forms and limitations of the reserved rights. The Blackfeet Reservation
borders Glacier National Park, and the exercise of these rights sometimes conflicted with
the purposes of the national parks, making management inconvenient and difficult. Of
the four reserved rights enumerated in the Agreement of 1896—unrestricted access, the
cutting of timber, hunting, and fishing—hunting constituted the primary point of

86 S ee U .S. v. Peterson, N ovem ber 17, 2000, 121 F. Supp. 2d 1309, CR 00-9-M -D W M .
87 Ron Selden, “Blackfeet hunter case may resolve century-old federal land dispute,” Indian Country
Today, v.20 n o.20 (N ovem ber 2000): D5.
88 Spoonhunter, 66-67.
89 S ee U .S. v. Peterson; Spoonhunter, 66-67.
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contention between the Blackfeet and the park in the decades following the establishment
of Glacier National Park. Blackfeet attempts to win recognition of hunting rights met
with staunch opposition by park officials and official rejection by federal courts based on
legal grounds. Several scholars, mentioned in this chapter, have leveled scathing
indictments at the government’s interpretation of the Agreement o f 1896. My objective
here is not to join the chorus, but rather to place the act of hunting in Glacier within the
larger context o f hunting in the National Park System. More than any other, hunting
represents an extractive activity that threatens the natural resources and the aesthetic
quality of the parks, as well as the safety of tourists and hikers; thus, proponents of the
national parks have deemed it an unacceptable practice in the sacrosanct National Park
System.
The 1984 case of United States v. Hicks in which, under federal pressure, a judge
overturned a favorable decision for tribal hunting rights, holds great significance for
several reasons. First, it illustrates the leverage the government possesses and the extent
to which it will use such leverage to prohibit hunting in the national parks. Second, the
case shows that park officials and government agents are not the only steadfast opponents
o f hunting in the national parks. Public uproar by environmentalists and hunters
threatened to turn the situation in Olympic National Park into a political nightmare. For
these reasons, permissible hunting in the national parks by any group remains a highly
unlikely possibility.
During a span of a few months in the 1970s, the Blackfeet tested all the explicit
agreement rights: hunting, fishing, timber cutting, and free entry. The park charged
George Kipp II and Charles M omberg, Jr. with hunting and fishing out of season,
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respectively, but neither of the defendants raised the treaty defense in their case and they
both pleaded no contest. The defendants’ attorney stated that the tribe preferred to raise
the agreement issues pertaining to hunting and fishing rights directly with the Secretary
of the Interior rather than with a criminal court. In a 1985 M.A. thesis entitled “Blackfeet
Agreement of 1895 and Glacier National Park,” Christopher Ashby wisely surmised that
the defendants very likely adopted their position “due to the magnitude of the
Government’s evidence for prosecution.”90
Historically, assertion of the reserved right of fishing has received little attention
from the Blackfeet tribe. One possible reason is that traditionally, most Blackfeet
considered fish taboo and only one small band actively fished for food.91 O f course,
customs have changed. During a native-run interpretive tour of the park, tour guide
Edward North Piegan informed the tour group that the Blackfeet did not traditionally
harvest fish and would rather starve than consume the flesh reserved for the beings of the
Underworld. After a slight pause, he jokingly remarked that “today we eat fish every
Friday.” Furthermore, the park allows the general public to fish in its waters in-season
and under regulation. The park currently requires that anglers release any bull trout
caught because it is an endangered species, an obvious measure to safeguard the park’s
resources for future generations. Park officials consider controlled fishing an activity
compatible with the goals of the park system, but do not afford any special privileges to
the Blackfeet. Perhaps park managers fear they could not control harvests out of season.
M oreover, any special privileges for the tribe very well could engender unwanted and
public hostility from environmental and sporting groups.

90 Ashby, 69.
91 For more on taboo flesh foods among the Blackfeet, see Ewers, 86-87.
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Darrell Momberg, charged with cutting a live tree in 1973, did plead not guilty to
the charge and went before the judge to test the agreement rights. Judge Smith ruled that
the defendant had not cut the tree for domestic purposes, as stated in the agreement, but
rather to test the agreement rights and found him guilty. By skirting the issue, the judge
prevented Momberg from using the Agreement as a defense for his violation. The
removal of vegetative resources, like hunting, represents an extractive activity with
potentially harmful results to the park’s resources and aesthetic presentation. The park
has acknowledged that many plants in the region have religious significance for the
Blackfeet and does allow the tribe to gather medicinal herbs under permit; however, as
early as 1980 park managers expressed concern that increased harvests might cause
detrimental effects to the park’s resources.

QO

The cutting of timber for domestic

purposes, or for any purpose, closely resembles logging, an act incompatible with park
ideals and certain to draw fire from environmental and logging groups. Considering that
park officials have identified Blackfeet and Forest Service logging adjacent to the park as
a primary threat to the park proper, permissible timber extraction on any scale by any
group within the park too seems an unlikely possibility.

QT

O f the four explicit agreement rights, free entry remains the only one honored by
the National Park Service. The fact that tribal members may enter the park without
paying an entrance fee may irk some visitors who resent paying the modest fee when
others are exempted, but acknowledging that Blackfeet tribal members may enter the
park free of charge in no way confers special use privileges harmful of the park’s

92 U .S. Department o f the Interior/National Park Service, “Summary o f Threats to Glacier National Park,”
n.d./1980, pp. 2, GNPA: F13-10.
93 Both the “Summary o f Threats to Glacier National Park” released in 1980 and many o f the
Superintendent Annual Reports from the last tw o decades identify logging by the Forest Service and the
B lackfeet Nation as external threats to GNP.
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resources or recreational capacity. The right of free access may have caused some
administrative problems for park personnel at the entrance gates on the eastern side of the
park, but overall it poses little challenge to the underlying goals of the national park
system. Superintendent Briggle expressed this position concisely when he wrote in 1974,
regarding the “Kipp” decision, that while “it might be possible to live with the free entry
aspect o f the decision, any unfavorable decision about hunting and timber harvest that
might be rendered would be completely unacceptable in a national park.”94
Controversy over the Agreement and the reserved rights contained therein has
underlain many of the problems between the park and the tribe. Many tribal members
remain suspicious of the validity of the agreement as it appears on paper and the
government’s interpretation o f the agreement and maintain that the tribal representatives
present at the negotiations intended to retain the opportunity for their descendants to
subsist on the ceded lands indefinitely. For many Blackfeet in the modem era,
subsistence transcends the activities expressly listed in the Agreement of 1896. The
exercise o f implied subsistence activities on the ceded strip in the modern era comprises
the focus of the rest of this study.

94 Letter from Superintendent B riggle to Regional Director, January 10, 1974, GNPA: F19-13.

Chapter 3—The Modern Era: Livestock and Contested Terrain

The Great Northern Railway no longer owns the Glacier Park Lodge, but
Blackfeet themes still have a visible presence in the historic lodge and continue to figure
into the “Glacier experience.” Large canvases and flags portraying frontier themes,
including Indians, adorn the walls of the hotel and hang from the rafters o f the in-house
restaurant. A teepee decorates the vast, manicured front lawn, and poles carved in the
likeness of noble, stoic chiefs support the roof of the front porch. A picture-book near a
stuffed mountain goat contains photos of Blackfeet groups greeting visitors to the lodge
in the early twentieth century. No dancers entertain guests as in the past, but Curly Bear
W agner still holds his weekly “fireside chats,” begun in the 1980s as part of the “Native
America Speaks” program, with guests in the lobby of the lodge. In early fall of 2 0 0 5 ,1
managed to catch Curly Bear’s last performance of the season. He injected a healthy
dose of humor throughout his performance, regaling the crowd with tales of horse-theft,
Blackfeet encounters with Lewis and Clark, and the important role women have played in
Blackfeet culture. At one point he asked the audience what wildlife they had seen on
their trip. After running down a list o f famous Glacier wildlife without eliciting any
answers in the affirmative, Curly Bear asked if anyone had seen any “slow elk.” He met
with looks of confusion. After a silent pause interrupted only by the crackling of burning
logs, a couple across the way burst into laughter—they got it. The female loudly
proclaimed, “H e’s talking about cows!” The audience joined in the laughter, with several
raising their hands signifying that they had indeed seen cattle on their trip.
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M ost visitors to the Glacier Park Lodge, or to Glacier National Park, likely do not
include cows on their list of “hope-to-see” animals in the rugged and sublime M ontana
wilderness. W hat most tourists probably do not realize is that the Glacier Park Lodge
does not reside in the park proper, but rather rests on reservation land. The official
entrance to the park lies several miles away. Driving along the road to the Two M edicine
entrance to the park, I spotted dozens of “slow elk” foraging in the valley on the eastern
side o f the road, the side farther from the park boundary. No tangible divide delineates
the border of the park, which makes it quite simple for grazing livestock from the
reservation to drift into the park. The ancient and persistent recurrence of such activity
has generated much consternation and frustration for park personnel, and mitigation
measures enacted by the park has in turn aggravated many in the Blackfeet community.
Thus, the grazing of livestock on park land provides yet another point of contention
between the two parties.
The disappearance o f the buffalo, the “staff of life” for the Blackfeet, forced tribal
members to adopt non traditional forms of subsistence. One enterprise promoted by
government agents and embraced by some was cattle ranching. Traditional cattle grazing
techniques on the reservation allowed livestock to roam at will with very little control
over their movements, and tribal adherence to such methods throughout the twentieth
century resulted in stock near the western border of the reservation, often grazing on
lands within Glacier National Park. Park personnel considered grazing from the
reservation illegal trespass that compromised the preservation and aesthetic goals o f the
park system. Tribal members evoked the oral history of the Agreement o f 1896 to argue
they held rights to use the land for grazing, as well as to claim that the current location of
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the boundary does not match the boundary described in the agreement. A legal ruling in
1976 officially denied tribal grazing rights and park managers twice attempted to fence
lengths of the boundary as a permanent and effective solution to the problem. Tribal
resistance and political maneuvering halted both efforts as tribal members vehemently
opposed a visible and permanent symbol of denied rights and alienation. Joint efforts
have largely failed to alleviate problems associated with stock trespass, and it continues
as an issue of contention to this day.
In its quest to “civilize” the Indians, the federal government sought to replace the
traditional nomadic tribal activities of hunting and gathering with sedentary, “civilized”
pursuits such as agriculture and the raising of livestock. The Agreement of 1896
recognized that “the situation of the Blackfeet Reservation renders it wholly unfit for
agriculture, and since these Indians have shown within the past four years that they can
successfully raise horned cattle,” then “there is every probability that they will become
self-supporting by attention to this industry.” 1 As did many other tribes, the Blackfeet
favored the herding of cattle over farming, for ranching somewhat resembled caring for
horses, an honorable and prestigious activity in many tribal communities.2 Although the
tribe made noticeable progress in the cattle business in the 1890s, drought and
overgrazing became major problems for tribal ranchers. Local cattle barons, in violation
of federal law, extensively ran herds of cattle onto the Blackfeet reservation that
consumed much of the grass, thereby undermining tribal ranching efforts and

1 Charles Kappler, Indian Affairs: L aw s an d T reaties, v .l, (Washington: Government Printing O ffice,
1904), 607.
2 Ewers, 307.
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contributing to overgrazing.

a

Agency corruption and illegal livestock trespassing on

reservation land prevented the tribe as a whole from developing strong, profitable ties to
the cattle market, and by 1918 only three percent of the population owned the estimated
40,000 head of cattle on the reservation, while most owned none at all.4 By this time,
Glacier National Park had come into existence and soon enough the Blackfeet, formerly
victims of illegal livestock trespass, would become brandished by park officials as the
transgressors.
Secretary of the Interior W alter L. Fisher instructed W illiam R. Logan, G lacier’s
first Superintendent, to protect the area from poachers, grazing interests, illegal timber
cutting, or other “depredations” that threatened the park’s ultimate preservation.5 As
noted in Chapter 1, preservation for early park managers, including Logan, meant
selective protection of park resources and did not necessarily imply keeping the park in
an unimpaired, natural state. Although Glacier’s enabling legislation specified the
“preservation of the Park in a state of nature” as a primary goal, it also allowed Park
superintendents to lease acreages within the park to private individuals. In addition to
allowing timber production, the park’s early superintendents issued several grazing
permits to private landowners in the region, thereby substantiating claims that G lacier’s
early managers did not adhere to a strict program of resource preservation.6 Stephen
Mather, first director of the National Park Service, reluctantly accepted the practice of
cattle grazing in the national parks and argued that officials should restrict such activities
to isolated regions where any evidence of destruction or resource utilization could escape

3 Jack Holterman, “The B lackfeet A gency and Glacier Park,” 1985, 5-11, 23-27, 32, unpublished paper on
file at the George C. Ruhle Library, W est Glacier, MT.
4 Ibid., 37.
5 Buckholtz, 15.
6 Ibid., 19.
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the notice of tourists.7 According to one tribal member, the park continued limited
grazing activities until the late 1940s.8
The park may have allowed grazing if approved and regulated by park officials,
but it did not condone or permit such activity by unlicensed outside interests. On several
occasions early in the park’s existence, park officials brought ranchers to court for
grazing in the park without permits.9 But overall, the issue did not receive serious
attention from park superintendents until the early 1970s. When it did, park officials
pointed to the Blackfeet Reservation as the primary source of livestock wandering into
and damaging the park. Nearly every park document addressing the issue claimed that it
was an “ancient” or “long-standing” problem. W riting in 1970, a ranger from the Two
Medicine administrative unit, on the eastern border of the park, labeled stock trespass an
“historic problem in Two Medicine, and one that is mentioned in practically every ranger
report from that area.” 10 The issue received scant attention from park authorities until
William J. Briggle began developing measures to address the problem in 1973. What
prompted Superintendent Briggle and his successors to initiate formal proceedings and
devote considerable attention to solving problems associated with livestock grazing
within the park? Several factors may explain his break with tradition. Perhaps
Superintendent Briggle had an assertive and active personality. Certainly, larger
developments affecting the three concepts introduced in the first chapter, i.e. the two

7 Ibid., 44.
8 Ted Hall, interview with author, March 24, 2005.
9 For a few exam ples, see the Superintendent’s M onthly Report for September, 1922, and July, 1923,
GNPA: F 7-2, F7-3.
10 Glacier National Park, “T w o M edicine Operations, 1970: Operations and Suggestions,” Decem ber 27,
1970, pp. 16, GNPA: F13.-4.
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dialectic forces shaping park management (use vs. preservation) and perceptions

Of

American Indians, created a situation that required serious attention.
The recreation rationale underlying the park system necessitated action regarding
stock trespass in order to maintain and present a desirable aesthetic package for the
tourist industry. A park ranger complaining about stock trespass in 1970 surmised that
perhaps “the main reason so little has been done to control trespass is because most of it
is out of sight o f visitors and administrators.” 11 This statement implies that, historically,
the eastern parts of the park most vulnerable to stock grazing did not receive heavy
visitation. During the 1960s this began to change. Glacier’s “M ission 66” program
stressed development to accommodate rising trends in tourism following WWII. In 1960,
Glacier Park Inc. bought out the Great Northern and became the park’s primary
concessionaire, and still is today. GPI immediately initiated an aggressive development
policy, and with park support constructed more new buildings and improved more
concession facilities between 1962 and 1967 than the Great Northern had in the previous
three decades.12 Much o f this development took place in the eastern portions of the park.
Thus, increased visitation in the park forced park officials to pay closer attention to
activities that impacted the aesthetics of the park. The same ranger quoted above
exclaimed later in the report that “ [S]tock trespass is a problem that is visibly there— the
cattle can be seen and effects of trampling and overgrazing are obvious.” 13 Beginning in
the mid-1970s, complaints about the presence of cattle filtered in from local
conservationists and park visitors and compelled park personnel to take action. The

" Ibid.
12 Buckholtz, 105.
13 Glacier National Park, “Tw o M edicine Operations, 1970,” 17.
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“pristine” Glacier wilderness portrayed by park promoters and expected by tourists did
not include livestock.
The preservation rationale also helps explain why officials in Glacier began
earnestly to address grazing in the park in the early 1970s. As ecological ideas finally
took hold and exerted influence on park operations in the 1960s, park observers began to
recognize events occurring external to park boundaries as the cause of serious damage to
park resources. Adjacent activities included road development, logging, agriculture,
energy extraction, and grazing, just to name a few .14 Concurrent with this revelation was
an increased emphasis on resource and habitat management within the parks. In the case
of Glacier, grazing represented both an external and internal threat whose detrimental
effects on park resources compromised the newly emphasized goal of maintaining and/or
restoring parks to their “primitive” conditions. The same ranger quoted above noted that
“now that the service is so conscious of resources management, something should be
done.” 15 W hether or not tourists could see the effects of grazing, ranger reports about
resource degradation and the enhanced importance attached to resource management and
preservation in general demanded that park officials actively take steps to resolve
problems associated with livestock grazing.
Changes in perceptions natives held about their own identities and resultant
actions also coerced park officials into intensifying efforts towards resolving livestock
problems in Glacier. As discussed in the previous chapter, in the 1960s and 1970s native
groups began proudly to embrace their identities as American Indians, and a resurgence
of interest in tribal customs and history led Indians across the country actively to assert
14 U .S. Department o f the Interior/National Park Service, “State o f the Parks R eport-1980,” pp. 1, GNPA:
F60-14.
15 Glacier National Park, “T w o M edicine Operations, 1970,” 16.
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their rights. The Blackfeet channeled this impulse into pressuring Glacier to recognize
the reserved rights listed in the Agreement of 1896. Although the Agreement failed to
include grazing explicitly, many Blackfeet read between the lines and claimed that they
had retained grazing rights.16 Pressured by the tribe, park officials deemed it utterly
necessary to take a firm and proactive stance on grazing within the park lest they appear
submissive to tribal claims regarding alleged rights and indifferent to perceived threats to
the park. Tribal members based much of their resistance to park mitigation measures on
alleged rights derived from the Agreement of 1896 and viewed the problem as a treaty
rights issue. The park viewed it as a clear-cut trespassing issue with legal ramifications.
A 1965 Solicitor’s opinion on cattle trespassing in Yellowstone National Park
clarified the legal status of livestock trespassing on national park lands. The attorney for
a defendant in a cattle trespass case argued that under Montana state law, cattle are not
legally trespassing unless there is a legal fence between the parties. Moreover, Montana
law does not require stock-owners to fence land. The Solicitor responded that the park
was under exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, and “with certain exceptions, not
germane here, the laws of the state adjoining the Park have no force or effect within the
Park.”

17

Thus, federal law superseded state law regarding trespassing of domestic

animals on federal lands. This opinion provided a clear course of legal action for
officials at Glacier.
In the winter of 1973, Superintendent Briggle approved a memo laying out a
three-year plan of control measures designed to eliminate domestic livestock trespass

16 See G lacier National Park, “Briefing Statement: Blackfeet Treaty R ights,” Decem ber, 1976, GNPA: F1913.
17 M em o from Field Solicitor to M idw est R egional Director re: Cattle Trespass in Y ellow stone, A ugust 10,
1965, pp. 1-2, available in the “Livestock Trespassing Binder” at the C hief Ranger’s O ffice in W est
Glacier, MT. Hereafter referred to as “Binder.”
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along the east boundary of the park. The plan included constructing a total of 30 miles of
fencing consisting of drift fences, electric fences, and cattleguards on all east side
entrance roads at the boundary. As an interim protective measure, the plan suggested
employing a “cowboy herder type individual” with horse and dogs to patrol the boundary
and ward off or remove trespassing livestock.18 In late summer of the same year, park
personnel initiated enforcement of horse and cattle trespass violations, issuing notices and
citing and fining several individuals. The Superintendent wrote that the “park will
continue with its aggressive efforts to control trespass livestock.” 19 Adhering to more
strict management regimes, the park also removed horse concession facilities on the
shore of Lake M cDonald to prevent possible pollution and preserve aesthetic quality.20
As the park began to take proactive measures against livestock trespassing from
the Blackfeet Reservation, tribal members in turn took proactive measures against the
park and brazenly asserted their perceived rights on the ceded strip. Although Judge
Russell E. Smith’s January 1974 decision in the “Kipp” case upholding the tribal right of
free entry failed to address other rights listed in the Agreement of 1896, it did contain
testimony from tribal leaders at the negotiations expressing their desire to reserve timber
and grazing lands in the ceded strip.

The minor victory troubled park officials and

inspired subsequent premeditated test cases that ultimately failed to advance tribal
interests. Nonetheless, the tribal petition submitted in 1975 demanding recognition of
tribal rights and proposing a joint conservation agreement generated concern for park

18 M em o from C h ief Ranger to District Manager, Hudson Bay re: Control o f Livestock Trespass along Park
Boundary, February 23, 1973, pp. 1, “Binder.”
19 S.A .R . 1973, pp. 6, GNPA.
20 Ibid., pp. 3.
21 S ee U nited States v. Kipp, January 2, 1974, 369 F. Supp. 774, pp. 6.
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officials, who stepped up demands to clarify the park’s position regarding livestock
trespassing.
In December of 1975, Visitor Protection Specialist Robert A. Bums wrote that
joint efforts to solve livestock trespassing problems “with the Blackfeet Tribe have not
been successful and each attempt to do so seems to esculate (sic) the seriousness of this
problem and to add recognition and validity to the Indian claims on Park lands according
to the original treaty agreements.” He noted that recent court actions had proved
ineffective and expressed disapproval over the option of impounding trespassing
livestock due to staffing issues and the certainty of straining “the friendly relations which
we have been trying to maintain.”

22

Burns also repeated an earlier request for

information deemed crucial to defending the eastern portion of the park against alleged
Blackfeet rights: basic quantitative data outlining adverse impacts from stock trespass.
In October of 1971 and again in July of 1975, Resource M anagement Specialist
Clyde M. Fauley stressed the need for basic quantitative data to support ranger and
naturalist claims of vegetative resource degradation and adverse impacts on grizzly,
mountain sheep and other wildlife on the east side of the park resulting from extensive
'y 'j

domestic livestock trespass.

W hereas the first request remained unanswered and largely

ignored for nearly four years, tribal pressures upon the park several years later conferred
a sense of importance and urgency to the issue. The Chief Park Ranger forwarded the
request to the Superintendent, reminding him “that it was difficult to answer the question

22 M em o from V isitor Protection Specialist to C hief Park Ranger re: Research Proposal (Adverse Impact o f
D om estic Livestock Trespass), Decem ber 19, 1975, pp. 1, “Binder.”
23 M em o from the Resource M anagem ent Specialist to the C hief Park Ranger re: Research on adverse
im pacts o f dom estic livestock trespass, July 16, 1975, “Binder.”
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asked at the last Tribal Council meeting ‘W hat does grazing hurt?’”24 Park personnel
apparently believed that scientific data was required in order to make a firm, justifiable
stance against livestock trespassing. In a formal research proposal submitted in
December o f 1975, the Visitor Protection Specialist, referring to the tribal petition then
under consideration by the Secretary of the Interior, wrote that
[SJhould the treaty claims or the conservation agreement recently submitted
by the Tribe be seriously considered at higher Government levels a factual
research package which verifies our claim of serious degradation of the
natural resources will be the key to our defense of retaining land east of the
Continental Divide as part of the National Park.25
In addition to defending the status of the park against treaty claims, the requested data
was “needed in order to determine courses of action to prevent trespass..., prepare
prosecution actions for trespass court cases, and possibly justify funds for fencing.”

Of*

Funding for an extensive research program never appeared. The results o f a field
study conducted by a graduate student from the University of Idaho years later proved
largely inconclusive and ineffectual. Echoing ranger reports, the study described
extensive trail networks, trampling damage to beaver dams, and trampling around water
sites. The author concluded that trespass had not greatly influenced the grassland type at
the time and that overall effects of trespass on the vegetation appeared minimal. She
further concluded that competition between livestock and elk could not be evaluated
without intensive further study.

01

Due to insufficient funding for long-term research,

most impacts have not been quantified and are still derived from park ranger, naturalist,

24 M em o from C hief Park Ranger to Superintendent, July 18, 1975, “Binder.”
25 M em o from V isitor Protection Specialist to C hief Park Ranger re: Research Proposal (Adverse Impact o f
D om estic L ivestock Trespass), D ecem ber 19, 1975, pp. 1, “Binder.”
26 Ibid., 2.
27 N ancy A. Clifton, “Evaluation o f Vegetation C om position and U tilization o f Swiftcurrent Ridge Area o f
G lacier National Park, with R eference to U se by Trespass L ivestock,” C ollege o f Forestry, W ildlife and
R ange S ciences, U niversity o f Idaho, n.d./1977: 1, 5, 8-10, “Binder.”
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and visitor observations and experiences.28 On a larger scale, the dearth of applied
ecological research and the subjectivity involved with defining “overgrazing” have made
it difficult to quantify the ecological impacts of grazing, and despite the significant
growth in the literature in the last two decades, scientists continue to disagree over the
extent to which grazing causes environmental disturbance.

9Q

Fortunately for park officials, defending the eastern portion of the park from
alleged treaty rights, grazing or otherwise, did not require a “factual research package.”
Events in the legal arena settled the issue. On July 20th, 1976, Judge Russell E. Smith
found tribal member Lloyd Flammond guilty of allowing his cattle to trespass in Glacier
National Park. The judge admitted that tribal negotiators in 1895 had bargained for a
reservation of grazing rights, but “whatever may have happened to the fishing, hunting,
and firewood rights which were reserved, no grazing rights were ever reserved to the
Indians.” He further asserted that the law required all persons, regardless of ethnicity, to
fence their cattle out of federal lands.30 The judge fined him $250 and placed him on
unsupervised probation for three years. Superintendent Iversen wrote: “[W]e consider
this a landmark case.”31
Just a few months prior to the ruling, the Interior Secretary had rejected the tribal
petition and officially stated that Blackfeet treaty rights did not survive the creation of the
national park. In conjunction, these two legal opinions created a near impregnable line of
defense for the park against Blackfeet treaty claims. As Regional Solicitor John R. Little

28 Tamar Losleben, Glacier Program National Parks Conservation A ssociation, “L ivestock Trespass in
Glacier National Park: Crossing the Great D iv id e,” A ugust 1, 2003, pp. 15.
29 See Debra L. Donahue, The W estern Range R evisited: Rem oving L ivestock fro m P ublic Lands to
C onserve N ative B iodiversity, (Norman: U niversity o f Oklahoma Press, 1999), 41-42, 113-116.
30 United States v. Lloyd Flammond, July 20, 1976, CR 75-41-G F, pp. 1-2.
31 S.A .R . 1976, G NPA.
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wrote to the Regional Director of the NPS, since the Agreement of 1896 “is silent on the
question of grazing... we do not believe the Blackfeet ever retained such rights... and,
thus, have no right at present. Further, should such treaty rights exist by virtue of the
treaty, the Solicitor’s opinion rendered on February 24,1976 would apply to the
situation.”32 Simply put, the legal position was that the tribe never reserved grazing
rights, and those rights they did reserve expired upon creation of the park. Park officials
now possessed legal authority to prohibit and penalize stock trespass within the park.
Legal authority secured, park officials still faced the daunting task of actually
preventing stock trespass, and this task proved rife with complication. In the years that
followed, the park persisted in employing an array of measures in hopes o f eliminating
stock trespass from the reservation, but overall they met with little success. The park
hired a cowboy with horse and dog for a summer to ward off and remove trespassing
livestock, but the length of the border, roughly 64 miles, rendered the task a physical
impossibility for a “lone ranger.” Rangers impounded cattle and horses and then fined
the owners for the impoundment fees, but inadequate facilities hampered success and
cattle and horses mysteriously escaped on several occasions. The park also attempted
offering leeway to owners of trespass stock by sending warning letters alerting them to
stock trespass and granting 72 hours after receipt of their letter to remove said livestock.
After the grace period, the owners received citations and became subject to legal action.
Convictions failed to deter further trespass.33

32 M em o from Regional Solicitor, Denver, to the Regional Director, Rocky Mountain R egion, NPS,
D enver, June 30, 1977, “Binder.”
33 For a summary o f conditions, management actions, and results o f action, see handwritten M em o from
Hudson Bay District Ranger Bob Frauson, March 9, 1977, pp. 1-2, “Binder.”
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The only measure that seemed to work was fences. By M arch of 1977, park
personnel had constructed five miles of wire fence and one mile of electric fence. The
absence of continuing programs for fence repair and maintenance, combined with alleged
incidences of deliberate cutting and removal o f fence portions, left many o f the fences in
poor condition. In March of 1977, the Hudson Bay District Ranger stressed that in order
to eliminate stock trespass, the park needed to initiate a large program of fencing and
cattle guards for the eastern and southern boundaries of the park.34 His impassioned plea
for a fencing program was not new. Park personnel had identified fencing as the best
solution and had proposed plans and recommendations for fencing parts of the boundary
-JC

for years.

Now, armed with legal authority to prohibit grazing from the reservation,

park officials took serious steps to get the job done.
Several obstacles stood in their way. One was funding. Federal law required that
owners of livestock bear the burden of fencing cattle out of federal lands. In United
States v. Flammond, Judge Smith acknowledged that this requirement, “though onerous,
is legal.”

36

The park rightfully assumed that ranchers on tribal lands held no desire to

fund drift fences personally, so they successfully lobbied the National Park Service and
received $53,000 to fund the fencing of the boundary.37 Another obstacle lay with
maintenance of the boundary. Issues such as severe winter climate and questions

34 Ibid., 3.
35 S ee “T w o M edicine Operations, 1970,” 16-17; M em o from C hief Ranger to D istrict Manager, Hudson
Bay re: Control o f Livestock Trespass along Park Boundary, February 23, 1973, pp. 1-2; M em o from
V isitor Protection Specialist to C hief Park Ranger re: Research Proposal (Adverse Impact o f Dom estic
Livestock Trespass), Decem ber 19, 1975, pp. 2; M em o from C hief Ranger to M anagem ent Assistant re:
Outlines o f talks for advisory board visit, June 7, 1976, GNPA: F I -4; N ancy A. Clifton. “Evaluation o f
V egetation Composition and Utilization o f Swiftcurrent Ridge Area o f Glacier National Park, with
R eference to U se by Trespass L ivestock,” 13.
36 United States v. Lloyd Flammond, pp. 2.
37 See M em o from Supt. Iversen to Regional Director, RM R re: Fencing Project, October 18, 1978,
“Binder.”
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pertaining to responsibility over maintenance and continued funding complicated the
proposal.

38

According to tribal member Ted Hall, questions such as where to fence and
IQ

how to maintain it posed bigger problems than the cattle themselves.

Problems over

maintenance never arose, however, as the third obstacle, tribal opposition, forced park
officials to abandon the fencing project.
Superintendent Iversen may have received mixed messages from the tribe
regarding fencing of the boundary. At a meeting in 1975, the tribal council objected to a
fencing project and the park abandoned its plans, and on several other occasions
negotiations between the tribe and the park broke down on a joint fencing venture as the
tribe was convinced that a fence would weaken claims to park lands.40 Yet, on May 31,
1977, Superintendent Iversen received a letter from Leonard Mountain Chief, Land
Committee Chairman for the Blackfeet, proposing negotiations on the boundary line. He
wrote: “[W]e feel the Boundary is not proper at the present time, due to the fact, it is not
fenced, which makes it impossible to keep the animals from the Park to remain in the
Park and the animals from the Blackfeet reservation out of there.” Mountain Chief
claimed that animals from the park ran on the road rights-of-way, “which is endangering
our people.”41 Confused yet determined, Superintendent Iversen proceeded with the
fencing plan and advertised the recently awarded contract.
When the tribe realized that the NPS was finalizing plans to approve the contract
for construction of 35.2 miles of fencing along the park’s eastern boundary, opposition
came fast and furious. Daniel Boggs, Chairman of the Blackfeet Tribal Business

38 See Letter from Field Solicitor to Research Specialist, February 19, 1975, GNPA.
39 Ted Hall, interview with author, March 24, 2005.
40 See M em o from Supt. Iversen to C hief Ranger re: M eeting with the B lackfeet Tribal Council, June 17,
1977, GNPA; M em o from Hudson Bay District Ranger Bob Frauson, March 9, 1977, pp. 2.
41 Letter from Leonard Mountain C hief to Supt. Iversen, May 26, 1977, “Binder.”
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Council, wrote to Glacier officials that “your recent action has created strong and totally
negative reaction here on the Reservation.”42 An enclosed tribal resolution officially
expressed strong objection to the construction of the fence and demanded that the
National Park Service “cease and desist from any and all plans for construction of said
fencing.” As grounds for its position and recommended course of action, the tribe
accused the park of neglecting to consult with the tribe and failing to conduct an
environmental or wildlife habitat study. Moreover, the “National Park Service has not
consulted with the Blackfeet Tribe concerning the effects which the fencing would have
upon well established treaty rights” on the ceded strip.43 If the park refused to “cease and
desist,” the tribe promised legal action and threatened to take the matter to the
congressional delegation and to the media 44
The National Park Service cancelled, temporarily, plans to construct drift fences
along the boundary. By highlighting the absence of an environmental study, the tribe
exposed a legal flaw in the proposed project, and by threatening legal action, the tribe
forced the park to postpone its plan for fear of potential litigation. Park officials soon
dealt with these concerns, but issues surrounding treaty rights continued to plague the
park as it strove to fence the boundary. The tribe had stated that the fence would impact
“well established treaty rights.” Legal rulings had effectively denied the tribe grazing
rights, among others, on the ceded strip, but the logic behind such reasoning failed to
persuade many tribal members who remained convinced that the tribe held grazing rights.
Drawing upon Blackfeet oral history of the Agreement of 1896, many within the tribal

42 Letter from Daniel C. B oggs to Supt. Iversen, August 4, 1978, “Binder.”
43 The Blackfeet Nation, Tribal R esolution #20 8 -7 8 , August 4, 1978, copy available at the Tribal
D ocum ents Department, Browning, MT.
44 Letter from Daniel C. B oggs to Supt. Iversen, August 4, 1978, “Binder.”
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community believe that the Blackfeet retained the right to use the land below the tree line
on the entire mountain front in the ceded strip. By analyzing the intent of the tribal
signatories, many Blackfeet believe that they have a priority on utilizing these lands for
grazing. A position paper issued by the Blackfeet Tribal Council stated that “[0]bviously
we would have thought we could graze our cattle and horses on these lands should
conditions such as drought require the use of these upstream mountain valleys.”45
Furthermore, many Blackfeet reject a narrow interpretation of the Agreement that only
recognizes the specific rights of access, fishing, hunting, and wood-gathering. By
interpreting these rights in a broader sense, many Blackfeet claim that by retaining the
four specific rights, essential to survival in 1895, the tribal signatories intended to reserve
the ability of their descendants to subsist upon the ceded lands indefinitely and the
explicitly-listed rights represent an implied right to continued livelihood 46 “Cattle,”
Blackfeet Nation chairman Bill Old Chief told a Missoulian reporter in 1999, “are but a
modern-day version of that old hunting right granted a century ago.”47
A more effective argument advanced by the tribe years later, and based on “well
established” treaty rights, asserted that a fence could potentially impact the right of free
entry recognized in the “Kipp” decision in 1974. Another major concern in the tribal
community dealt with the actual location of the boundary, itself a hotly contested issue.
At several meetings with park officials the tribe expressed hostility towards fencing
45 S ee B lackfeet Nation, “Position Paper o f the Blackfeet Tribe o f the Blackfeet Indian Reservation:
Regarding that Portion o f L ew is and Clark National Forest which was in 1896 D ivested from the B lackfeet
Indian Reservation by an A ct o f Congress,” pp. 6, attached to Tribal Resolution #162-85, February 7, 1985,
copy available at the Tribal Docum ents Department, Browning, MT. See also Jim Kipp, “Blackfeet Oral
Tradition o f the 1895 A greem ent,” 90-91. Kenneth Pitt takes a legal approach and concluded that the tribe
retained the right to graze on the ceded strip. See Kenneth P. Pitt, “The Ceded Strip: B lackfeet Treaty
Rights in the 1980s,” 40-46, 63-64.
46 Edward D esR osier, interview with the author, East Glacier, MT, March 21, 2005; Tiny-Man Heavy
Runner, interview with the author, Browning, MT, March 23, 2005.
47 M ichael Jamison, “Blackfeet take boundary dispute to W ashington,” M issoulian, 27 N ovem ber 1999.

110

because it would suggest an established boundary, and many considered the boundary’s
location to be inaccurate.

The language in the Agreement o f 1896 delineating the

reservation boundary is quite obscure and remains open to interpretation. “Beginning at a
point on the northern boundary of the reservation due north from the summit of Chief
Mountain, and running thence south to said sum m it...,” and so forth.49 In sum, the
agreement described a boundary that ran from “peak to peak,” or “mountain to
mountain.” In 1932, the Blackfeet unsuccessfully pressed for compensation for lands
they considered lay on the eastern side of the boundary, arguing the boundary should be
four miles further to the west. Again, in 1957, the tribe petitioned the park for 45,000
acres of land that it considered part of the reservation. The federal Indian Claims
Commission resurveyed the boundary with solar observation techniques, upheld the
extant boundary, and dismissed the complaint.50 Nonetheless, many tribal members
remain distrustful of the legal process and reject the current boundary.51
In Blackfeet Oral History and the 1895 Agreement, tribal member Jim Kipp
utilized Blackfeet oral tradition to contest the location of the boundary. According to
Kipp, corrupt reservation agents changed the original, accurate boundary map and altered
the markings according to their own interests; thus, the negotiated boundary line differed
from the one described in the ratified agreement. Furthermore, he accused government
officials of incorrectly surveying most of the monuments used as landmarks in the

48 For exam ple, see M em o o f M eeting between Glacier National Park S taff and Blackfeet Indian Tribal
Council Members, May 10, 1979, pp. 4, GNPA: F20-8; M inutes o f M eeting with Glacier National Park
Staff and B lackfeet Tribal Council and Other Tribal Representatives, N ovem ber 3, 1982, GNPA: FI 9-14.
49 Charles Kappler, Indian Affairs: Law s an d T reaties, v .l, (W ashington: Government Printing O ffice,
1904), 606.
50 See Ashby, 58; Burnham, 150.
51 See M ichael Jamison, “Blackfeet take boundary dispute to W ashington,” M issoulian, 27 N ovem ber
1999.
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agreement, a sentiment shared by many Blackfeet elders.52 Some in the tribal community
believe that at some point years ago, government agents surreptitiously moved the
boundary eastward. Leon Rattler, chief o f the Crazy Dogs Society, an organization
dedicated to preserving Blackfeet language and traditional culture, claimed that many
years ago a forest fire exposed long rows of concrete blocks, the old boundary markers,
located many miles to the west of the current boundary.53
Besieged by vociferous tribal opposition, officials at Glacier halted plans to fence
the boundary, but they did not desist in trying to eliminate stock trespass. The release of
the “State of the Parks Report” in 1980, the National Park Service’s “first Servicewide
survey designed to identify and characterize threats that endanger the natural and cultural
resources of the parks,” signified and mandated a serious commitment to dealing with
previously neglected threats carrying the potential to cause significant damage to park
resources or seriously degrade important park values or park experiences.54 The Report
included grazing among 73 identified threats and attributed to the practice aesthetic
degradation, physical removal of resources, and exotic encroachment, all unacceptable
conditions in the national park system.55 The “Summary of Threats to Glacier National
Park” listed illegal domestic livestock trespass as one of seven primary existing threats to
the park. The report identified the Blackfeet Reservation, as the specific source of the
threat, but also acknowledged that non-Indians owned much of the trespassing livestock.
The report also stated that “Blackfeet claimed treaty rights adversely affectsCsfc) much of

52 S ee Jim Kipp, 60, 81-91.
53 Leon Rattler, interview with author, Browning, Montana, March 23, 2005.
54 U .S. Department o f the Interior/National Park Service, “State o f the Parks Report, 1980: Executive
Sum mary,” pp. 1, GNPA: F60-14.
55 U .S. Department o f the Interior/National Park Service, “State o f the Parks R eport-1980,” pp. 4-5, GNPA:
F60-14.

112

the park resource planning on the east side of the park.”56 Even if they so desired,
officials at Glacier could not allow or ignore illegal livestock trespass within the park.
Park officials continued to implement new measures, both with and without tribal
cooperation, in hopes of alleviating trespass problems. At meetings, park personnel
insisted that drift fences were the best solutions, and claimed that fencing of 10% of the
boundary would solve 90% of the problems. Tribal representatives continued to oppose
the project. In 1981, legal experts advised against park plans to obtain an injunction
aimed at reducing cattle trespass, citing lack of proof of irreparable damage and the
difficulty involved in naming specific defendants.57 Both the tribe and the park expressed
interest in a joint “range rider” program consisting of hired hands patrolling the
boundary, but both parties suffered from funding problems.

CO

In May of 1983, the NPS

issued a Law Enforcement Directive stating that “there are no easy solutions to the
recurring problem, therefore, law enforcement will continue to be our primary tool.”59 In
spite of these initiatives, trespass continued and the Superintendent wrote in 1983 that the
“Park will continue to work towards an agreement with the Tribe on fencing as the only
permanent solution to the problem.”60
In September of 1985, the Park received an unexpected token of support when
five local cattle ranchers, most of whom were Blackfeet, sent a letter to the park, the
Blackfeet Tribal Council, and the BIA requesting limited fencing along the contested
56 U .S. Department o f the Interior/National Park Service, “Summary o f Threats to G lacier National Park,”
n.d./1980, pp. 1-3, GNPA: F13-10..
57 M em o from V isitor Protection Specialist to the C hief Ranger re: D iscussion regarding injunction,
October 30, 1981, “Binder.”
58 See M em o o f M eeting between Glacier National Park Staff and Blackfeet Indian Tribal Council
Members, May 10, 1979, pp. 4, GNPA: F20-8; M inutes o f M eeting with Glacier National Park Staff and
B lackfeet Tribal Council and Other Tribal Representatives, N ovem ber 3, 1982, GNPA: F19-14.
59 U .S. Department o f the Interior/National Park Service, “Law Enforcement D irective N o. 18,” May 24,
1983, pp. 1, “Binder.”
60 S.A .R . 1982, pp. 16, GNPA.
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boundary. In agreement with park officials, the ranchers admitted that past approaches
had failed to curtail trespass problems, but for the first time the ranchers described how
unsuccessful measures adversely affected those residing on the east side of the boundary.
They blamed cost, in terms o f wages and supervision, and the “necessity to ride range
routinely and in inclement weather” for undermining the success of the range rider
program. They continued that regulation enforcement and fines levied by the court
system “created an atmosphere of contempt toward the Park Service and a feeling of
‘helplessness’ as to what could be done.” Moreover, the long hours spent herding cattle
out of the park in order to avoid court penalties meant less time for other important tasks,
which, indirectly, inflicted heavy financial costs upon the ranchers. Existing limited
cattle fencing, according to the authors, represented the only successful measure to date,
and they thought “that the same accomplishments can be made in our area with minimum
fencing along major cattle routes.” Proclaimed benefits included improved working
relationships, reduced resource damage in the park, greater ability for ranchers to control
their cattle, and the elimination of legal actions and associated costs for ranchers, the
park, and the tribe.61
The park’s first attempt to implement a fencing program years earlier had failed
for two main reasons: the lack of support from local interested parties and the absence of
an environmental assessment for the proposed fence. With the letter from the local
ranchers, the park secured some measure of support from local interests and, intent on a
fencing project, began preparing an environmental report. Superintendent Haraden wrote
to Chief Old Person that the letter from local ranchers “accurately summarizes the long
term problem of livestock trespass into the park” and, after briefly listing the previous
61 Letter from five local cattle ranchers to GNP, BTC, BIA, September 21, 1985, “Binder.”
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and unsuccessful measures aimed at alleviating the problem, claimed that federal
regulations coupled with complaints from conservation groups and concerned individuals
necessitated that park superintendents “take action, as needed, to protect the Park
resources and enforce regulations.” He further alerted the Blackfeet Tribal Council to
park plans to begin construction of selected and minimal fencing in the fall of 1985 62
Tribal response surprised no one. A reply stated official objection to fencing based on
familiar grounds: failure to consult with the tribe, potential impacts on treaty rights, and
concern for game migration and habitat.63 Superintendent Haraden assured the tribe that
the park would comply with NEPA requirements regarding fence construction and
invited Tribal Council representatives to discuss the issue and review the proposed
fencing plans.64
A boundary fence constructed in the fall near the St. Mary entrance to the park
virtually eliminated stock trespass in the area and confirmed the efficacy of fencing. A
temporary cessation of grazing leases adjacent to the Boulder Creek drainage almost
eradicated stock trespass in that area.65 Overall, 1985 witnessed some promising
developments curbing stock trespass into the park, and events in early 1986 generated
further optimism for park officials. In February, the park received $42,000 for fencing
projects on the eastern boundary.66 In March, the Acting Regional Director of the NPS
approved the environmental assessment prepared by G NP’s Resource M anagement
Division. Justifying the purpose and need for the project, the report asserted that “use of
Park lands by livestock alters the natural environment, reduces the carrying-capacity of

62 Letter from Superintendent Haraden to C hief Old Person, October 24, 1985, “Binder.”
63 Letter from C hief Old Person to Supt. Haraden, N ovem ber 14, 1985, “Binder.”
64 Letter from Supt. Haraden to C hief Old Person, N ovem ber 26, 1985, “Binder.”
65 Glacier National Park, “Cattle Trespass: 1985 Annual Report,” “Binder.”
66 M em o from C hief Ranger to Hudson Bay District Ranger, February 12, 1986, “Binder.”
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native wildlife, reduces visitor safety, and violates the National Park Service’s mandate to
maintain those lands as a naturally functioning ecosystem.”67 The environmental
assessment failed to move the Tribal Council, which continued to oppose the fencing
project.68 After consulting with the tribal council, park officials revised the
Environmental Assessment to address issues of concern. The revised report promised
that if “livestock grazing ceases on neighboring lands as part of a long-term management
plan, the fence will be removed. The fence is solely to exclude livestock and is not meant
to symbolize a property boundary, legal or otherwise; no abrogation of perceived or real
treaty rights is implied.”69
Responding to tribal opposition and following through on pledges to involve
tribal input on fencing proposals, park officials held an open house meeting at the St.
Mary Dormitory and on several occasions tried to arrange meetings with tribal
representatives in the spring of 1986. Attempts to gain tribal input proved fruitless, and
in the summer park personnel began construction of temporary fence segments.70
Judging by a history of outspoken antagonism, silence from the east surely must have
come as a surprise to park officials. Maybe the tribal council had other more pressing
issues? Maybe they had given up? Or maybe they were enlisting aid from important
people in important places?
As the park was hoping to gain tribal input and finalizing fencing plans along the
eastern boundary, tribal representatives approached Senator John Melcher, D-Mont., to
67 Glacier National Park, Environmental Assessm ent: Construction o f Fence A long Selected Portions o f
Boundary- Glacier National Park,” February 13, 1986, pp. 1, “Binder.”
68 Letter from Earl Old Person to A cting Supt. Alan O’N eil, n.d./m id-late March, 1986, “Binder.”
69 Glacier National Park, R evised Environmental Assessm ent: Construction o f Fence A long Selected
Portions o f Boundary-Glacier National Park, pp. 1, June, 1986, “Binder.”
70 See Glacier National Park, Case Incident #860102; “M eeting for public input to livestock trespass
fencing proposal,” May 7, 1986, “Binder;” Glacier National Park, Cl #860272: “B lackfeet tribal input to
livestock trespass fencing proposal,” June 14, 1986, “Binder.”
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voice their opposition to fencing and enlist him in their cause. Tribal officials pointed to
treaty provisions guaranteeing tribal members access to the park, cited the “Kipp” case
that officially recognized the right, and vowed that they would not accept even the
smallest infringement that a fence might constitute.71 At the request of the tribe, Senator
M elcher met with National Park Service representatives in W ashington, D.C. in early
September.

72

At the meeting, Senator M elcher testified that “there is some fencing

started by the Park Service ill advisedly because the clear state of the law is the Indian
treaty where the Blackfeet Tribe ceded land they have that became the bulk of Glacier
Park. That treaty says it cannot be fenced in, that they have to have access to it.” The
Senator’s testimony had its desired effect, and the NPS committee agreed to direct
Glacier Park to cease fencing activity until formal agreement had been reached with the
tribe.

73

In a subsequent press statement, Senator M elcher accused Glacier of ignoring the

legal rights of the Blackfeet and called the fencing of national parks a highly questionable
activity equivalent to “making national parks nothing more than big zoos.”74
Congressional intervention dealt a near-fatal blow to park fencing plans and
transformed a dispute between neighbors into an explosive political issue. Glacier
officials could no longer fence without express approval from the Tribal Council, an
unlikely condition then and one that has yet to materialize. In a letter to M ontana Senator
Max Baucus sent in the weeks following M elcher’s intervention, Superintendent Gilbert
Lusk succinctly expressed the park’s unwavering interpretation of the grazing issue:

71 S ee B lackfeet Nation, Tribal Resolution #292-86, September 9, 1986, Tribal Docum ents Department,
Browning, MT.
72 S ee “Park halts work on fence project: Glacier officials, Blackfeet Tribe to try and resolve cattle grazing
issue,” A ssociated Press, 18 September 1986.
73 Congressional Record- Senate, September 16, 1986, S 12612.
74 “Park halts work on fence project: Glacier officials, Blackfeet Tribe to try and resolve cattle grazing
issue,” A ssociated Press, 18 September 1986.
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[W]e view the situation as a livestock trespass issue only, and its
resolution should not be complicated by the treaty issue. The treaty issue,,
as we view it, was clearly resolved in the April 8, 1935, Court of Claims
ruling. If the tribe wishes to Challenge the 1935 ruling, it should take
place within the framework of the court system, not the NEPA process.
Unless such a challenge occurs, resulting in a different ruling, the treaty
issue is a moot point.75

Yet park officials failed to obtain political support for fencing projects from Senator
Baucus or from members of M ontana’s Congressional delegation in the years that
followed, and the 1986 Congressional hearings essentially prohibited future fencing of
park lands as a way of dealing with the problem.
In the years following the park’s second failed attempt to fence the boundary,
park officials worked with the tribe to develop new measures aimed at reducing trespass
incidences. None o f the measures proved successful, and law enforcement remains the
primary tool for preventing livestock trespass. In the days after Senator M elcher ordered
Glacier to cease fencing operations, park officials met with tribal representatives to
discuss the gradual establishment of a wildlife management buffer zone along the
boundary as an alternative to fencing. Superintendent Lusk wrote that the park was “very
supportive philosophically to the concept of a Tribal buffer zone next to the Park,” and
the parties set up a working group composed of tribal and park representatives to develop
some workable concepts dealing with wildlife management buffer zones. Both
organizations initially agreed that a mutual wildlife zone and a cooperative management
approach would be beneficial and hired wildlife biologists to work towards such a goal.76
In the years that followed, the tribe placed some restrictions upon grazing allotments in

75 Letter from Supt. Lusk to Senator Max Baucus, October 10, 1986, “Binder.”
76 See Letter from Supt. Lusk to Roland K ennedy, Chairman o f the B lackfeet Land Board, October 15,
1986, “Binder;” S.A .R . 1986; S.A .R . 1987.
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order to enhance wildlife buffer zone programs, but, according to park documents, it did
not follow through with buffer zone designations, and instead issued revenue-producing
grazing lease's.77
In addition to the wildlife buffer zone concept, park officials also attempted to
involve the BIA in round-up operations as a new approach to curbing stock trespass. For
several years beginning in 1987, the tribe temporarily quit offering grazing leases on
tribal trust lands adjacent to the park and cattle trespass virtually disappeared in certain
areas along the boundary.78 In a letter to Chief Earl Old Person, Superintendent Lusk
expressed his pleasure over the drastic reduction of trespass cattle in the park, but also
alerted the council chairman to the worsening problem of horse trespass. Noting that the
horses “all are very wild,” the superintendent blamed the beasts for causing heavy impact
in the sub-alpine meadows, with “deep trails and attendant erosion, dusting pits, and very
heavy grazing which decreases the carrying capacity for our shared elk herd.”79 Old
Person responded that “the best way to handle this problem would be to treat these
animals as if they were trespassing on the reservation, round them up, pen them, advertise
for the owners to appear, charge the owners for expenses, and sell the unclaimed horses.”
He recommended that the park work with the BIA, as the bureau had successfully
resolved such problems on the reservation in recent years through such measures.80
Over the next several months, park officials met with BIA employees in hopes of
drafting a cooperative agreement to round up trespassing horses in the park. Initially, the

77 Glacier National Park, Briefing Statement prepared for Interior Secretary Lujan re: Livestock Trespass in
Glacier National Park, June 1, 1993, “Binder.”
78 See M em o on m eeting with BIA Resource Manager Ted Hall and Ranger Conservationist B ill Draught
with Steve Gniadek re: Trespass Livestock, Decem ber 4, 1987, “Binder;” S.A .R . 1987; S.A .R . 1988; “G N P
L ivestock Trespass records 1984-95,” “Binder.”
79 Letter from Supt. Lusk to C hief Old Person, October 8, 1987, “Binder.”
80 Letter from C hief Old Person to Supt. Lusk, October 30, 1987, “Binder.”
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project appeared to hold serious potential. The park assured the tribe it would hold no
fiscal responsibility for round-up operations, park personnel met with BIA employees and
verbally agreed upon a joint round-up operation with specified responsibilities, a draft
memo of understanding officially outlined the project, and the Glacier Reporter, a local
oj

newspaper, published an impoundment notice in the spring of 1990.

In spite of these

promising signs, the joint effort for removal of horses in the park, like previous
cooperative measures, fell through the cracks and never came to fruition.
Park documents in the 1990s reveal a heightened sense of urgency and
responsibility felt by park managers to deal with stock trespass. Several documents
supported the position that due to “recurring and unacceptable resource degradation,
prompt resolution is imperative.”82 Park officials added to the list of perceived
environmental threats the unknown potential for disease transmittal from domesticated
livestock to bighorn sheep, including a documented occurrence between domesticated
animals and desert bighorn sheep.83 Expressed dismay levied by conservation groups and
private park users over the park’s policy of “allowing” trespass to happen also compelled
the park to adopt a hard-line stance against trespassing.84
The same documents also reveal deepening frustration with failed cooperative
measures aimed at eliminating stock trespass. The park even encouraged the

81 See Letter from Tribal Attorney V icky Santana to Steve Gniadek, January 6, 1989, “Binder;” Draft letter
to Tribal Attorney V icky Santana, n.d., “Binder;” Draft M em o o f Understanding: Livestock Trespass in
Glacier National Park, July 26, 1988, “Binder;” M em o from Steve Gniadek, G N P W ildlife B iologist, to
A cting C hief Ranger re: East Side Livestock Trespass, February 2, 1989, “Binder;” “Impoundment
N otice,” G la cier R eporter, 5 April 1990.
82 Glacier National Park, Briefing Statement prepared for Interior Secretary Lujan re: Livestock Trespass in
Glacier National Park, June 1, 1993, “Binder.”
83 U .S. Department o f the Interior/National Park Service, “Briefing Statement: Trespass Livestock A long
Boundary with B lackfeet Indian Reservation,” April 12, 1990, “Binder.”
84 Glacier National Park, Briefing Statement prepared for Interior Secretary Lujan re: Livestock Trespass in
Glacier National Park, June 1, 1993, “Binder.”
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establishment of a game park, with permissible in-season hunting o f reintroduced bison
and on-reservation fencing to protect the park from livestock, contiguous with the park
boundary, provided that management o f the game park was consistent with the protection
of park resources. However, park officials expressed doubts over the success of the
program because of a history of proposed buffer zones yielding to grazing leases.85 Park
managers expressed willingness towards reaching a consensus agreement on resolution
with the tribal community, but, noting that negotiations with tribal representatives had
resulted in few positive actions in the past, threatened independent action should the
parties fail to reach joint resolution.86
In 2003, the park set out to devise a strategic fencing plan, secure internal NPS
funding, and begin compiling information for an environmental assessment. Hesitant to
jeopardize the possible project, park managers planned to involve tribal input only after
they had drafted a complete plan with ecological studies, impacts, and rationale.87 As of
November of 2005, the park has developed a more detailed plan, involving consultation
with the tribe and the BIA, to deal with the issue.88 Until this plan is implemented,
regulation enforcement remains the primary mitigation measure.
Enforcement is weak, however, and trespassing persists. W ritten complaints by
park personnel in recent years testify to the low priority placed on enforcing trespass
regulations and the resulting negative impacts. A law enforcement ranger wrote in 1998
that “it is almost like we are begging the person/persons to obey park rules and
regulations.” He acknowledged that trespass was a “sensitive” issue with the park, but

85 S ee Briefing Statement prepared for Interior Secretary Lujan re: Cattle Trespass, June 1, 1992, “Binder.”
86 See Glacier National Park, “Task Directive: East Side Trespass Livestock,” April 12, 1990, “Binder.”
87 Losleben, pp. 9.
88 Steve Thom pson, Program Director for the Glacier Chapter o f the National Parks Conservation
A ssociation, telephone interview with author, N ovem ber 21, 2005.
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exclaimed that the “park needs to be more aggressive...[W ]e can’t sacrifice our
resources just because this is a ‘sensitive’ issue. There comes a point in time when
on

enough is enough!”

Another ranger labeled it an “unacceptable situation” and argued

that “besides noxious weeds replacing native vegetation, ...cattle trespass and the damage
from livestock is the number one resource problem facing the Park.” In addition to
detailing visible resource damage and threats to threatened species and predators, the
ranger described how stock trespass detracted from visitor experiences. He noted how
cattle jeopardized visitor safety by physically charging hikers, endangering drivers on
park roads, and fouling drinking water. With graphic imagery he depicted the
proliferation of unavoidable “cow pies” and claimed “it was impossible to not get cow
excrement on your shoes and legs...[T]he area smelled like a barnyard.” He continued
that if “we had been visitors, the impacts and the threats from the cows at Slide Lake
would have ruined our visit to Glacier.” In perhaps the most poignant example of the
extent of cattle trespass in the park, a park visitor innocently commented to a park
naturalist that the park “must be making a lot of money from cattle grazing, with all the
cattle I saw at Two M edicine.”90
Some tribal members disagree with park claims over adverse impacts o f stock
trespass. Ted Hall, former BIA Resource M anager with long and extensive experience
dealing with livestock trespass issues with the park, argued that cattle only minimally
impact park resources and that the biggest threat is the park’s own re-vegetation projects.
For example, when the park refurbished certain roads, it used topsoil from the west side

89 Letter from Law Enforcement Ranger Joe M anley to Jack Potter, October 13, 1998, “Binder.”
90 Letter from Ranger Brad Blickhan to Glacier personnel, October 16, 1998, “Binder.” For another
eyew itness account o f widespread cattle trespass and its effects, see Letter from Ellen J. C offee, St. Mary
Naturalist, to Resource Management, September 30, 1998, “Binder.”
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of the mountains and thereby introduced noxious weeds. Hall also believes that the park
over-exaggerates threats to the aesthetics o f the park and maintains that trespass is solely
an east-side issue that only occasionally affects the Upper Two Medicine area and Babb.
As to mitigation measures, Hall claims that impoundment of stock and jailing of owners
creates tension and fails to accomplish anything of lasting consequence. Furthermore, by
citing individuals instead of animals, the park technically violates the right of free entry
for tribal members legally recognized by the ruling in the “Kipp” case in 1974. Overall,
he agrees with park officials that efforts to alleviate the situation have largely failed over
the years; however, he disagrees with park officials over where rightfully to place the
blame.91

Livestock Trespass Areas
GlacierNationalPark

Efefl High to Very High Degree of livestock trespass
P H Low to Moderate Degree of livestock trespass

F igure II: Livestock T respass Areas, circa. 2003 (m ap taken fro m “L ivestock T respass B in d er”)
91 Ted Hall, interview with author, March 24, 2005.
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High-ranking park officials claim that in spite of numerous negotiations with
tribal representatives, positive actions have been few. They blame past failures on the
seeming “inability of (the) tribal council to make long-term commitments to courses of
action,” and have warned the Interior Secretary that any joint resolution only holds
temporary potential due to transitory and turbulent tribal politics.

09

Accusations of intra-

tribal corruption in recent years have also generated further concerns over
accountability.93 Some rangers on the east side of the park blame bureaucratic apathy
and aversion to confrontation for the perpetual dire state of affairs. A park ranger wrote
in 1998 that he had heard that
politics is to blame for our lack of resolve on the cattle trespass issue, that
we want to be good neighbors with the Blackfeet. I ’ve heard there are
treaty issues that keep us from protecting the p a rk ...If there are issues that
must be settled in court, we still have a duty to protect the Park from
extractive use until those issues are solved...W e need to make cattle
94
trespass a priority.
Some within the tribal community have a different take on the situation. Ted Hall
insists that the park basically talks the talk but has failed to walk the walk— a lot of lip
service with no actual effort put forth. Park officials, according to Hall, do not want to
spend money or create legislation and never propose solutions: they want someone else to
take care o f the problem. In an interview, Hall claimed that both the tribe and the BIA
had been in favor of the proposed joint round-up operation in the late 1980s, but that the
NPS never followed through on its pledge to fund the operation.95 Hall also clarified the
wildlife buffer zone concept for me. He professed that both the park and the tribe wanted

92 Glacier National Park, “Task Directive: East Side Trespass L ivestock,” April 12, 1990, pp. 2, “Binder.”
93 Exam ples include the B IA ’s takeover o f reservation p olice responsibilities due to negligence and an
illegal fund diversion story covered by the Great Falls Tribune. See Losleben, 9.
94 Letter from Ranger Brad Blickhan to Glacier personnel, October 16, 1998, “Binder.”
95 Ted Hall, telephone interview by author, N ovem ber 18, 2005.
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the buffer zone, but that in order to create it someone had to purchase the income
interests of the ranchers owning the land under question. “Basically,” he said, “the
ranchers need to get paid not to graze.” During his time as cultural liaison between the
park and the tribe in 1994 and 1995, Hall proposed that the park implement a resource
use tax at the gate or create new fees collection legislation to fund the buffer zone, but the
park rejected the idea. According to this former BIA Resource Director, impoundment
and legal action never accomplished anything and the park needs “to do something real
that works.”96
Park officials are not the only ones opposed to grazing on park lands. Grazing on
public lands has been a steady practice since the 1870s. Historically, range livestock
producers have possessed political power disproportionate to their actual numbers and
have managed, to a large degree, to defeat efforts by opponents to remove grazing from
public lands.

97

In the early years of the park system, the army made special effort to

prevent encroachment by sheep and cattle in the parks it oversaw. However, in a bid to
secure congressional support, Stephen T. Mather, first D irector of the NPS, reluctantly
supported grazing in the parks and the Organic Act of 1916 authorized the Interior
Secretary to issue grazing leases.

no

The grazing provision of the Organic Act of 1916

remains on the books today, although administrative regulation that disfavors livestock
grazing has mitigated the provision in recent years.99 In 2002, livestock grazing was
permitted in 32 units of the park system.100

96 Ted Hall, interview with author, March 24, 2005.
97 S ee Donahue, 5, 67.
98 S ee Sellars, 26, 84-85.
99 See 36C FR 2.60, 2001, pp. 31.
100 Andy Kerr and M ike Salvo, “L ivestock Grazing in the National Park and W ilderness Preservation
System s,” 2002, <http://www.andykerr.net/Grazing/NW PSNPSNM Grazing.html>.
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As interest in the outdoor recreational opportunities public lands offered expanded
and as the environmental movement attracted increasing numbers in the latter decades of
the twentieth century, grazing on public lands came under increasing fire from both
sports enthusiasts and conservation groups.101 M ounted efforts to impose federal
authority and environmental regulation over public lands inspired “sagebrush rebellions”
as ranchers openly defied regulations and demonized environmentalists in many parts of
the West.

im

In turn, environmental groups have vilified livestock interests, and

campaigns aimed at ending abusive livestock grazing on public lands continue to this
day.
In spite of holding a general antipathy towards grazing on public lands,
conservation groups do not lump livestock interests into a homogenous entity. For
example, the Sierra Club states on its “Federal Public Lands Grazing Policy” webpage
that
The Sierra Club recognizes that restrictions on grazing may have negative
impacts on the cultural and economic stability of some communities.
These impacts are apt to be most severe in Native American, minority and
low-income communities. W e are committed to developing partnerships
with community members to identify and implement strategies to protect
both traditional communities and the ecological integrity of public lands,
without sacrificing either.103
As discussed earlier in this chapter, officials at Glacier claimed they had received
complaints from local conservationists regarding livestock trespass in Glacier National
Park. Unlike with written complaints from park personnel and naturalists, I was unable
to locate any complaints from conservationists in the park’s archives or in the files at the

101 S ee D onahue, 247-249.
102 Ibid., 106-107.
103 Sierra Club, “Federal Public Lands Grazing P o licy ,” Adopted by the Sierra Club Board o f Directors,
Septem ber 24, 2000, < http://www.sierraclub.org/policy/conservation/grazing.asp>.
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Chief Ranger’s Office. Perhaps environmental groups have been reluctant to weigh in on
an issue with such special circumstances. Perhaps the Park Service keeps such files
elsewhere.
In January of 2003, the NPCA named Glacier one of the ten most endangered
national parks, and the private watchdog organization considers illegal livestock grazing
within the park as a serious threat to the natural resources and landscape the NPCA seeks
to protect. In August o f 2003, a program assistant for the Glacier chapter of the NPCA
issued a report that provided a brief overview o f the livestock trespass issue in order to
inform the NPCA o f how best to work with GNP and the Blackfeet Tribe, as well as to
help the organization decide what kind and level of involvement it wishes to pursue.104
The organization continues to encourage the park and the tribe to work together towards
resolution of the issue.105 The positions advanced by officials at Glacier and by the
representative body o f the Blackfeet tribe regarding the stock trespass issue have been
distinct and relatively constant, and this chapter has focused on the interplay between
these two parties. The involvement of the environmental community, however, has been
less visible and remains a topic for further exploration.

Summary
Although the Agreement o f 1896 mentions nothing about Blackfeet grazing rights
on the ceded strip, many Blackfeet interpret the pact to mean that they did retain grazing
rights. The tribe has failed to gain recognition of perceived grazing rights on the ceded
strip, but they have managed to prevent the park from fencing the boundary. To many
within the tribe, park enforcement measures and fencing proposals violate the terms of

104 S ee Losleben, 2-3.
105 Steve Thom pson, telephone interview with author, N ovem ber 21, 2005.
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the Agreement of 1896 and the intentions of the tribal signatories. Controversy over the
boundary and alleged implied grazing rights are based largely on oral history, important
in Blackfeet country but largely dismissed by American courts o f law. The recognized
right of free entry and the written agreement stipulation that the ceded strip cannot be
fenced have served as more pragmatic and efficacious arguments in challenging fencing
projects and such reasoning successfully secured Congressional support in 1986. In
addition to accusing Glacier of ignoring tribal rights, Senator M elcher called fencing of
national parks a questionable activity equivalent to “making national parks nothing more
than big zoos.” This is a telling statement because it implies that fencing, proposed by
the park as a way of eliminating an activity that offends tourist expectations, would also
detract from the desired aesthetics of the national park system. Due to such
considerations* it is likely the tribe would find numerous powerful allies if the park
attempts to fence the boundary again.
Some tribal members have not abandoned hope over gaining recognition of
grazing rights on the ceded strip and point to a case decided elsewhere as a possible
precedent in achieving their objective.106 In 1983, the 9th Circuit Court upheld the right
of the Shoshone-Bannock tribes to graze within Caribou National Forest in Idaho,
formerly part of the Fort Hall Reservation, in Swim v. Bergland. Article IV of an 1898
land cession agreement provided for tribal grazing and other use rights “ [S]o long as any
of the lands ceded.. .remain part of the public domain,” a determinable cause similar to
the one included in the Blackfeet Agreement of 1896. Adhering to the Canons of
Construction, the judges affirmed that there “is no evidence the tribe originally
understood the Article IV terms ‘public dom ain’ and ‘public lands’ in a narrow, legalistic
106 Ted Hall, interview with author, March 24, 2005; see also Jim Kipp, 91.
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sense.” The judges found that subsequent Executive actions did not extinguish reserved
grazing rights and that such rights held priority over non-tribal grazing leases.107 Some
Blackfeet interpreted this decision to mean that tribal members have a priority on
utilizing lands on the ceded strip for grazing purposes.

1OR

Despite some similarities between the situations encountered by the Blackfeet and
the Shoshone-Bannock, striking differences cast doubt over possible similar resolutions.
First, the Shoshone-Bannock agreement explicitly reserved grazing rights whereas the
Agreement of 1896 did not. Moreover, the Interior Solicitor on several occasions denied
those rights explicitly reserved in the Agreement o f 1896. Second, although the Caribou
National Forest and Glacier National Park both fall under the category of federal lands,
vastly different management philosophies make national forests and national parks
disparate entities. The grazing of livestock, like hunting and logging, is an extractive
activity that affronts both the preservation and recreation objectives of the National Park
System. Its effects, according to park personnel, cause resource degradation and detract
from the aesthetic expectations held by the tourist industry. Unlike hunting and logging,
both prohibited activities for Indians and non-Indians alike in Glacier, the intention to
reserve grazing rights on the ceded strip never made it to the ratified and official written
agreement. By placing the situation within the context of the founding and guiding
principles of the National Park System and by analyzing the history of selective
subsistence permission and rejection of reserved usufruct rights, the denial of grazing
within Glacier National Park is not surprising and future efforts to reverse this position
would very likely encounter stiff resistance.

107 See Sw im v. Bergland, January 13, 1983, 696 F.2d 712, pp. 2, 8-12.
108 Jim Kipp, 91.
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Chapter 4—The Modern Era: Wages and the Service Economy

On my first trip to the Glacier region in the summer of 2 0 0 4 ,1 set out for Babb, a
small town on the northwestern com er of the Blackfeet Reservation near the borders of
the park and Canada. As I entered the Blackfeet Reservation and came upon East
Glacier, I veered off Highway 2 under an overpass proudly welcoming visitors to the
park, wound north on Highway 49 past the historic Glacier Park Lodge, and pulled into a
small tourist area dotted with motels, diners, and convenience stores. Unsure of how best
to proceed and having forgotten the trusty road atlas, I entered a convenience store to
inquire as the best route to take. After repeating my query several times to the young
women working behind the counter, one responded, in broken, East-European English
that she could tell me how to get to W arsaw but had never heard of Babb.
Somewhat startled, I got back on Highway 2 and headed north towards my
destination. During the rest of the journey, the fact that two Polish women were running
the store pressed more heavily on my mind. I recalled reading about the staggering
unemployment rate on the reservation, ranging from 40 to 80%, and found it odd that
Eastern Europeans from halfway across the globe could secure jobs where struggling
Blackfeet Indians, residing just a stone’s throw away, could not. Several questions
jum ped into my mind. Were Eastern European workers an anomaly near the park?
Perhaps, I pondered, the young Polish women had ties to the park, maybe relatives or
acquaintances? If this were not the case, how did tribal members feel about distant
foreigners landing much-needed jobs near the neighboring tourist mecca that is Glacier
National Park?
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As I researched the history o f tribal attempts to procure an economic stake in the
park in the months that followed, I found answers to most o f my questions. I never did
learn more about the young Polish w om en’s family history or the status of their transAtlantic connections. I did learn, however, that Eastern Europeans were not strangers
behind the counters of businesses on the eastern edge of the park, and that the practice of
importing workers from overseas certainly did generate resentment and indignation
among many in the Blackfeet community. The difficulty encountered by tribal members
in trying to secure gainful employment from the park or its concessionaires further
contributed to the widespread feeling of betrayal that pervades the reservation as
questionable business licensing and hiring practices have made it difficult for the
Blackfeet to gain an economic stake in the lands they once controlled. Deprived of their
former subsistence base, many Blackfeet in the modern era rely on the cash economy and
wage labor to put bread on the table. The transition from a land-based economy to a
service economy has not been easy. Convinced that the Agreement of 1896 implies
rights of preference and guarantees the opportunity to eke out a living on the ceded strip,
many within the tribal community have denounced park policies and the issue of
employment and business rights in and around Glacier National Park provides yet another
point of contention between the modern Blackfeet and the 21st century National Park
Service.
The Blackfeet Nation, like many other Indian tribes, possesses a long history of
tribal unemployment and economic hardship. Unlike many tribes, the Blackfeet
reservation borders a world-famous national park that boasts more than two million
visitors a year who liberally spend cash dollars treating themselves to an unforgettable

131

excursion into the Montana wilderness. The park’s existence, however, has not served as
a panacea for the tribe’s economic woes. Historically, tribal members have held few jobs
with the Park Service or with its concessionaires, and, unlike many surrounding
communities that thrive on catering to the well-to-do tourists that visit the park every
summer, have generally failed to capitalize on the tourist industry that supports the park.
One tribal mem ber’s struggle to obtain business rights within the park in the early 1990s
instigated a grassroots campaign protesting hiring practices that blossomed into a larger,
unified tribal movement reasserting tribal rights on lands formerly owned by the tribe.
Drawing upon a broad interpretation of the Agreement of 1896, some tribal members
have clamored for preference rights in hiring practices and business licensing. Although
the tribe has failed to win recognition o f these alleged rights, carefully-planned and
nonviolent tribal protests pressured the park and its primary concessionaire into striking
agreements with the tribe to improve hiring practices and support of native artisans.
The roots of economic duress in Blackfeet country date back to the early years of
the reservation era. The federal government, in keeping with its paternal practice of
treating Indian nations as wards unable to manage their own affairs, did not make funds
from land cessions available to Blackfeet members and instead held the monies in trust
and doled out the proceeds as annuities to the tribe. The national nefarious corruption
involved with the management and distribution of these funds did not bypass the
Blackfeet Reservation. Around the turn of the century, agents on the reservation
considered discontinuing issuing rations to the tribe, but the tribe vehemently opposed the
proposition and stressed that employment opportunities virtually did not exist. Irrigation
projects undertaken after 1907, aimed at promoting farming and providing employment,
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failed miserably.1 Few Indians owned livestock or other assets, and unemployment and
poverty plagued the reservation. By 1918, agent Fred C Campbell considered the
reservation bankrupt.2
Even if the tribe possessed large amounts of capital at the time of the
establishment of Glacier National Park, it would have had to compete with very powerful
interests to secure landholdings suitable for tourism near the park. Shortly after the
creation of the park in 1910, the Great Northern Railway, with backing from the
Department of the Interior, purchased a 160-acre tract o f reservation land stretching from
East Glacier to the actual entrance of the park. The sale included neither negotiations
with nor compensation for the Blackfeet. W ith Congressional approval, the Great
Northern subsequently purchased several hundred more acres in the area, taking land
from townsites on the reservation for a nominal fee. The Reclamation Service received
similar generous treatment from the Department of the Interior and leased property,
formerly on the reservation, to a subsidiary of the Great Northern. These land transfers,
according to historian Jack Holterman, “ruled out the chance for the Blackfeet to set up
their own businesses near the Park.”3 From the beginning, big corporate money and
political cronyism effectively prevented the Blackfeet from establishing a foothold near
the anticipated tourist destination.
By 1913, when the Great Northern completed its magnificent Glacier Park Hotel
within the boundary of the reservation, the railroad had spent nearly a million dollars in

1 W illiam E. Farr, The R eservation Blackfeet, 1882-1945: A P hotographic H istory o f Cultural Survival,
(Seattle: U niversity o f W ashington Press, 1984), 99-100.
2 S ee Holterman, 30-31, 38.
3 For more on early land transfers near GNP, see Holterman, 35, 39.
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and around Glacier National Park.4 As discussed in the previous chapters, the railroad
employed some Blackfeet to entertain guests at the Glacier Park Hotel and thereby
provided employment for tribal members. They did not, however, receive fair
compensation from the railroad for their duties: after performances they passed around a
hat and enjoyed some kitchen scraps.5 Over time the Indians tired of the charade and, no
longer able to suppress feelings of exasperation over receiving poor pay to create a
romantic image that benefited the Great Northern, quit entertaining at the Glacier Park
Hotel. Many on the reservation considered it demeaning for a small contingency to act as
showpieces for little pay. On the other hand, some who participated personally in the
shows took pride in educating others about traditional Blackfeet culture. For some,
rehashing the stories and rituals of old made for a good time and offered opportunities for
Blackfeet orators to tell their stories.6 Some tribal members ventured off the reservation
and capitalized on the tourist fascination for Blackfeet souvenirs by selling signed
photographs, painted buckskins, and miniature teepees. The Indians participated in the
railroad’s promotional efforts for nearly 40 years, and the earnings from their
performances, posing sessions, and entrepreneurial endeavors represented some of the
only material compensation the tribe drew from the park’s existence during that time.7
The reservation Blackfeet outside the promotional world of the Great Northern
struggled to make ends meet. Investments in cattle and irrigation projects failed to
4 Burnham, 107.
5 A Senate investigator o f the Blackfoot A gency com m ented on the disrespectful treatment and poor pay
the Indians received. See Holterman, 40.
6 A March 21, 2005 interview with Ed D esR osier, w hose mother worked as a traditional dancer for the
Great Northern in the 1940s, informed the discussion on tribal opinions regarding the Great Northern’s
promotional presentations. Earl Old Person also com m ented on his role in the Great Northern programs in
the late 1930s. S ee Eileen Finan, “Indians say they feel alienated from land that was once theirs,” G reat
F alls Tribune, 6 June 1994.
7 For more on B lackfeet marketing in Glacier and the highly popular W inold R eiss calendar series, see Farr,
191-192.
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ameliorate the desperate economic conditions that pervaded the reservation. A
reinvigorated cattle business and gas and oil sales in the late thirties and early forties
offered a glimpse of hope for some, but overall, according to historian W illiam E. Farr,
“the reservation and its institutions had failed,” and as the 1940s rolled around, “the
Blackfeet were as dependent a people as they had been following the end of the buffalo.”
The Blackfeet shows at Glacier Park Lodge came to an end in the early 1950s, and tribal
members rarely succeeded in landing jobs in park hotels or with the NPS.9
Their economic ties to the park severed, some within the tribe devised a plan to
draw tourist money to reservation lands near the park. In the early 1950s, the tribe
approached the park with plans to develop a resort along the shore of Lower St. Mary
Lake. Although the Park Service had no legal jurisdiction over the area, the tribe needed
its support in order to obtain the capital investment necessary for the project. The park
expressed willingness to work with the tribe; nevertheless, the tribe turned to the private
sector. Ultimately, the project fell apart.10
W orn but not beaten, the Blackfeet Tribal Council persevered in its attempts to
capitalize on the lucrative tourist revenue that the park attracted and, in the late 1960s and
early 1970s, continued planning to develop a recreational tourist industry to serve those
headed to the park: They hoped to accomplish this by improving the existing facilities
outside the park and by constructing new ones to provide year-round services. Proposed
projects included a year-round complex at Chewing Black Bones on the shores of Lower
St. Mary Lake, a year-round complex featuring a ski area at Divide Mountain, other

8 Ibid., 97, 102.
9 Keller and Turek, 262.
10 For m ore on failed B lackfeet efforts to develop along the shores o f Lower St. Mary Lake, see Burnham,
152-153.
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facilities around Browning and East Glacier, and an upgraded St. Mary Tourist Center at
the park entrance, including lodges, restaurants, stores, and an information center. The
tribe also offered to buy 40 acres of park property to develop a Blackfeet Interpretive
center.11 Park officials questioned the feasibility of constructing an interpretive center
within a thousand yards of the existing St. Mary Visitor Center and expressed concern
over “an apparent duplication of certain facilities...if they would provide similar
services.” 12 Park officials further discouraged the acquisition of park land as only
Congress could approve such a transfer o f federal lands.13
After the Bureau o f Outdoor Recreation made $550,000 available on a matching
fund basis for development of a new St. Mary complex in 1972, Superintendent William
J. Briggle responded to calls for interpretive changes in the content of the St. Mary
Visitor Center by proposing to the Tribal Council a refitted, cooperative visitor center
with new exhibits and cultural demonstrations.14 NPS officials agreed that it was
“basically an excellent idea,” but relayed a number of recommendations and conditions
ensuring the Park Service would maintain administrative control of the complex.15
Bureaucratic complications and pressing tribal economic concerns eventually killed the
project, and the tribe failed to capitalize on G lacier’s tourism .16 They did, however,
continue to press for jobs within the park.
As described in the previous chapters, the events of the 1970s forced park
officials in Glacier to pay more attention to their neighbors. Beginning in the early

11 Letter from Supt.
B riggle to Director o f the M idw est Region, August 25, 1972, GNPA: F19-13.
12 Letter from A cting Director o f the M idw est R egion to the Director o f the NPS, September 20, 1972,
GNPA: F19-13.
13 Letter from Supt.
B riggle to Director o f the M idw est Region, August 25, 1972, GNPA: Fl'9-13.
14 Letter from Supt.
Briggle to Director o f the M idwest Region, February 22, 1973, GNPA: F19-13.
15 Letter from Director o f M idw est R egion to Supt. Briggle, March 27, 1973, GNPA: F19-13.
16 Burnham, 154.
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1970s, the park encouraged tribal input on cultural programs and began to direct more of
its interpretive programs towards appreciation of native cultures, even employing tribal
members to give presentations on Blackfeet culture.17 Furthermore, communication
between the two parties increased and joint meetings became more frequent. Since the
park did not have a good reputation for integrating the Blackfeet into its workforce, tribal
employment with the park frequently appeared among the subjects of mutual interest
discussed at most of the meetings. Steps taken in the 1970s and 1980s to increase
Blackfeet employment within the park included, to name a few, the establishment of
positive equal employment opportunity goals, the posting of lists of locally-issued
vacancy announcements, and recruiting sessions at Babb, the Tribal Employment Rights
Office, Blackfeet Community College, and Browning High School career days.18 The
park displayed some progress with wage grade jobs and various blue-collar jobs, but
career-conditional and permanent jobs rarely went to tribal members.
Aware of this situation, the park felt obligated to detail possible reasons why it
did not hire many Blackfeet onto permanent positions. Park officials claimed that many
of the “non-discrimination laws and policies of the government are actually hampering
the park’s efforts to hire more Blackfeet people.” 19 For certain jobs, applicants had to file
under the Park Service centralized Denver system, and a “number of the names o f Indian
youths showed up quite low on the registers so we could not hire them.” Other suggested
obstacles included difficulties tribal members faced in filling out the necessary forms and
17 M any o f the presentations were funded by the Glacier Natural History A ssociation, not the park itself.
18 S ee Letter from Supt. Iversen to Blackfeet Tribal Council, January 10, 1973, GNPA: F19-13; M em o o f
M eeting between Glacier National Park Staff and Blackfeet Indian Tribal Council M embers, May 10, 1979,
GNPA: F20-8; M em o o f M eeting with Glacier National Park and Blackfeet Tribal Council, N ovem ber 3,
1982, GNPA: F19-14; S.A .R . 1986, G NPA. M any o f the m em os o f m eetings discussed “plans” to improve
em ploym ent practices, but questions over their actual implementation have led me to omit them.
19 U .S. Department o f the Interior/National Park Service N ew s R elease, “Joint M eeting B etw een Blackfeet
Tribal Council and Glacier National Park Staff,” January 25, 1978, GNPA: F19-13.
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lack of seasonal housing. Furthermore, the park placed points under Native American
•

Language, but many young tribal members did not know the Blackfeet language.

00

Efforts and excuses failed to please or appease tribal members who still considered park
hiring practices unfair; however, the Park Service was not the only source of employment
in and around the park. Glacier Park, Inc., the park’s primary concessionaire, exerted
huge economic impacts on the region and was equally, if not more, guilty when it came
to excluding the Blackfeet from sorely-needed wages.
For the first forty years after the park’s creation, the Great Northern Railway and
its subsidiary, the Glacier Park Hotel Company, acted as the major developers and
primary concessionaires within Glacier National Park. As the automobile became the
preferred means of travel to and through the park during the 1940s, the Great Northern
and its subsidiary suffered heavy losses. An NPS directive after WWII demanding that
concessionaires at the National Parks spend several million dollars for expansion and
modernization o f facilities to accommodate growing numbers of visitors did not bode
well for the company, which lost over $1.4 million in the 1940s. Thus, the Great
Northern embarked on a decade-long venture to maneuver itself out of the Park
concession business. In November o f 1960, Don Hum mel’s Glacier Park, Inc., bought all
the Great N orthern’s holdings and became the major concessionaire in Glacier National
Park, a title it still holds.21
In an interview with historian Philip Burnham, long-time Blackfeet historian Jack
Holterman asserted that the real problem with jobs and money at Glacier lay not with the

20 M em o o f M eeting between Glacier National Park Staff and Blackfeet Indian Tribal Council M embers,
M ay 10, 1979, GNPA: F20-8.
21 For more on the downfall o f the Great Northern and the rise o f GPI, see N ew ell, W alter, and M cD onald,
174-178.
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Park Service, but with GPI.22 Ed DesRosier, who led a heated public campaign against
both the park and GPI to run his own tour service into the park legitimately, agrees and
accused GPI o f “taking without giving.” GPI, according to DesRosier, never engaged in
community involvement, cared little about local unemployment, and extensively
recruited out of state and out o f country. Overall, the “general feeling is that GPI was
never a good partner to the tribe.”

9*3

DesRosier did not sit idly by and passively submit to

G PI’s perceived callous demeanor. He took matters into his own hands.
Ed DesRosier grew up near the park near Lower St. M ary’s Lake, the same spot
that the tribe unsuccessfully had tried to develop in decades past. His mother, a fullblooded Blackfoot, had worked as a dancer for the Great Northern at the Glacier Park
Lodge in the 1940s. His father was French-Irish. As a child his relatives instructed him
in the oral history of the Blackfeet people and told him how the tribe had traditionally
used the park for hunting, gathering, and spiritual purposes.24 Versed in traditional
Blackfeet ties to the park and familiar with the region itself, DesRosier decided he could
combine his business sense and long experience with the Department of Transportation
with his cultural knowledge to create an interpretive tour of the park that focused on
Blackfeet history and culture. Thus, Sun Tours was born.

25

In the spring of 1992, DesRosier approached Superintendent Gil Lusk with his
plans to start a tour of the park. Accompanied by community leaders and tribal
representatives and armed with a recognized tribal business license, DesRosier conveyed
to the Superintendent that he was not only serious about his plan but also legitimate.

22 Burnham, 197.
23 Ed D esR osier, interview with author, March 21, 2005.
24 Ed D esR osier, interview with author, September 28, 2005.
25 Ed D esR osier, interview with author, March 21, 2005.
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Courteous but noncommittal, Lusk referred DesRosier to GPI president Dale Scott. At a
meeting with the prospective entrepreneur, Scott outlined the special nature of C PFs
transportation contract with the park.26 The act that established the National Park Service
authorized the service to negotiate contracts without following the usual government
bidding procedures. Under the terms of park concession law, concessionaires must
operate under regulations and standards established by the Park Service, even if it means
that portions of the concession may be operated at a loss.27 GPI was not the only
concessionaire in the park, but it did hold an exclusive transportation contract with the
park. Technically not a monopoly, the exclusive contract appeared as such to many tribal
members who considered it unfair that large corporate interests with no concern for local
affairs should control concessions in the park. Scott refused to negotiate and
condescendingly offered DesRosier a bus-driving position. Insulted, DesRosier refused
and moved forward with his designs.28
Still somewhat hopeful that the Superintendent would come through with a
permit, DesRosier bought a van, printed and distributed brochures, assembled a staff, and
started to conduct business without a permit.29 After a week of conducting tours, a park
ranger pulled over a Sun Tours guide and wrote him a $100 ticket for doing business
inside the national park without a permit. Similar arrests occurred the next two days.
The three defendants sought to have the citations against them dismissed, citing the
recognized right of unrestricted access and claiming the right to do business in the park

26Ibid.
27 United States Department o f the Interior/National Park Service, “General Information Concerning the
Granting o f C oncessions in the Areas Adm inistered by the National Park Service,” n.d./1970, GNPA: F173.
28 Ed D esR osier, interview with author, March 21, 2005.
29 Ibid.
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under the Agreement of 1896. Like many others on the reservation, DesRosier and
company believe that their elders had intended for future generations of descendants to
benefit from the land that formerly belonged to the Blackfeet. In the modern world, that
means jobs and continued livelihood. In early January o f 1993, the federal magistrate
who heard the case dismissed their objections and ruled that regulation of commercial
enterprise in the park applied to all people. He also referred to the 1935 Court of Claims
determination officially terminating Blackfeet rights in the park. U.S. Magistrate Robert
Holter found the three guilty o f the violations and fined them a total of $200.30
Six months passed between the transgressions and the ju d g e’s verdict, but much
happened in the interim. Infuriated over the arrests, DesRosier attended the first tribal
council meeting in the week following the citations. DesRosier voiced his concerns and
frustrations, and a councilman stood up and asked, “W hat are you gonna do, stage a
protest?” After a pause during which he acquired an immediate affinity for the idea,
DesRosier replied, “W ell, if that’s what you’ve heard, then yes!”31 When I asked
DesRosier how news of the imminent protest spread, he answered that the “moccasin
telegraph” took care of it. Noticing my poorly-concealed look of incomprehension, he
explained, “That’s reservation lingo for word-of-mouth.”

The moccasin telegraph

broadcast its message loud and clear, and less than two months later a large crowd of
tribal protesters gathered at the Glacier Park Lodge to make their voices heard.
On Friday and Saturday, August 1 and 2, more than 50 tribal members and nonIndian supporters congregated on Highway 49 in front of the Glacier Park Lodge, G PI’s

30 For more on the citations and the rulings, see David Lee, “Rangers issue tickets to Indian tour service,”
G reat Falls Tribune, 26 July 1992; “B lackfeet G uilty o f running illegal shuttle,” H ungry H orse N ew s, 7
January 1993; “Blackfeet fined for business venture,” G reat F alls Tribune, 5 January 1993.
31 Ed D esR osier, interview with author, September 28, 2005.
32 Ed D esR osier, interview with author, March 21, 2005.
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base o f operations, to protest the hiring and business practices of the park’s largest
concessionaire. One purpose of the rally was to educate tourists and the com pany’s
guests. Demonstrators lay in the highway halting traffic, passed out information sheets
and questionnaires to tourists, and showcased signs reading “Boycott Glacier Lodges,”
“United we stand,” “More jobs for Indians,” and “NPS, GPI Racist.”33 At one point, a
protestor led a procession to the front door of the lodge and led a traditional tribal song.
Many tourists wandered out of the lodge to discover what the commotion was all about
and inquired into the causes of tribal discontent. Some were moved and asked how they
could help.34
Although the arrests of the tour guides provided the initial spark for the protests
and the main rallying cry centered on G PI’s hiring and business practices, other issues
surfaced and, as DesRosier told the press, the rally was really “about Blackfeet rights in
Glacier National Park.”35 Several Blackfeet Tribal Business Council members and area
business figures attended the demonstration and addressed the crowd over loudspeakers.
Speakers demanded that GPI prove it would comply with tribal employment rights laws
and negotiate other points of contention, such as land and water rights, reminding those
present that the company was located on the reservation and used Blackfeet water in the
hotel and employee residences. An area businessman complained that the tribe had
“ordinances that are being violated...non-Indian businesses are not recognizing tribal
jurisdiction on the reservation. I ’m tired of the tribe accepting a passive role. We need to

33 For more details on the weekend protest, see D avid Lee, “Indians Protest at Glacier L odge,” G reat F alls
Tribune, 3 A ugust 1992; “B lackfeet protest Glacier Park, Inc. business practices,” The D a ily Inter Lake, 3
A ugust 1992.
34 Ed D esR osier, interview with author, September 28, 2005.
35 David Lee, “Indians Protest at Glacier Lodge,” G reat Falls Tribune, 3 August 1992.
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take a stand on a wide range of issues threatening tribal sovereignty.”

On Saturday a

BIA police officer issued GPI President Dale Scott a citation for failure to have a tribal
business license to operate the lodge on the reservation. Later in the day GPI staff
produced the required permit.

37

The large non-violent protest received considerable publicity from the local media
and the park reacted quickly to the rising tensions along its eastern border. Noting that
most of the recent activity was directed at GPI and not the Park Service, park officials
nonetheless felt compelled to issue a briefing statement to the Director of the NPS within
days of the protest detailing the recent Blackfeet activities near the park. Admitting that
the picketing had not been disruptive, the statement warned that there “may be potential
for picketing at M any Glacier Lodge (the location for Secretary’s Advisory Board
meeting) this coming Saturday, Sunday, Monday, or Tuesday.”
The park was correct in its prediction—the tribe planned on bringing their protest
into the park proper during the anticipated convention. Tribal members distributed flyers
advertising the rally and requesting of supporters, on behalf of the Blackfeet Tribal
Business Council, “your support and attendance at a demonstration of unity at the Many
Glacier Hotel,” scheduled for Monday, August 10, 4:00 P.M. W hat began as a protest
against hiring and business practices blossomed into a community awareness movement
on the reservation recognizing Blackfeet rights. In addition to demanding that the park
offer Blackfeet businesses the opportunity to compete for tourism trade, the flyer insisted
that the “National Park Service must respect its treaty agreement with the Blackfeet

36 Ibid.
37 “Blackfeet protest Glacier Park, Inc. business practices,” The D a ily In ter Lake, 3 A ugust 1992.
38 Glacier National Park, “B riefing Statement: Recent Blackfeet A ctivities near Glacier National Park,”
A ugust 6, 1992, GNPA.
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People, must fulfill the rights our grandfathers and grandmothers negotiated.”39 Thus,
D esRosier’s struggle for business rights became a catalyst for the reassertion of tribal
rights on federal land and rekindled widespread community activism, the likes of which
had not been seen since the late 1970s after the “Kipp” and “M omberg” cases.
Park officials, concerned about the park’s public image and wary of a possible
deterioration in relations with the neighboring tribe, contacted the Tribal Business
Council to determine its plans for the upcoming publicized demonstrations and met with
tribal representatives the day before the planned protest. Superintendent Gil Lusk
promised to “work with them to facilitate their First Amendment rights.”40 The park
followed through on its pledge to accommodate the tribe’s intentions and, in addition to
authorizing a special use permit for the demonstration, provided shuttle and coordinated
parking to facilitate transportation to and from the designated demonstration sites.41 GPI
also provided large buses to transport individuals. Both the park and its major
concessionaire hoped that the demonstration would proceed peacefully and would only
cause minimal disturbances to visitors, concessioners, and NPS employees and property.
As a precaution, the park detailed additional park rangers, referred to as a “Special Events
Team,” in case the protest spiraled out of control 42
On Monday, August 10th, more than 100 tribal members and supporters gathered
at the Many Glacier Hotel outside the National Park System Advisory Board Meeting to
urge settlement of long-festering issues between the tribe and concessionaire Glacier Park
39 A copy o f the “Rally Rally Rally” brochure can be found at G NPA.
40 U .S. Department o f the Interior/National Park Service N ew s Release: “Park Service A ssists B lackfeet
D em onstration,” n.d., G NPA.
41 The permit contained standard applicable regulations, such as the prohibiting o f solicitation, the selling
o f item s, aggressive or abrasive behavior, loud musical instruments that may hold the attention o f park
visitors, littering, and so on. See U .S. Department o f the Interior/National Park Service, “Special U se
Permit,” August 9, 1992, GNPA.
42 Glacier National Park, “Talking Points for B lackfeet Dem onstration,” n.d., GNPA.
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Inc. Although a park directive instructed park personnel to inform protesters about the
presence o f the Special Events Team only if specifically asked, demonstrators
immediately noticed the armed rangers and were somewhat taken aback and frightened 43
Tribal members held aloft signs reading “More Jobs for Indians,” “Honor Blackfeet
Rights,” and others addressing issues such as G NP’s and G PI’s alleged prejudicial hiring
policies toward Indians, tribal rights for commercial activities in Glacier, and G PI’s
disregard for Blackfeet water rights and business licensing rules. As promised, the Park
Service invited the demonstrators inside to address the Board and discuss problems with
both GPI and the park. During the meeting, the parties reached agreements on a variety
of issues. GPI agreed to sign a lease for water the Glacier Park Lodge had been drawing
from a reservoir on tribal land. The firm also promised to improve hiring o f Blackfeet
employees by extending help to the Blackfeet Community College to develop a
curriculum for hospitality industry studies and by offering a “hospitality school
scholarship” for Blackfeet students 44 GPI further pledged to support Blackfeet
craftspeople by purchasing merchandise for sale in its retail outlets and concession shops.
Finally, GPI agreed to negotiate a subconcessions agreement with Ed DesRosier to allow
Sun Tours to operate legally in the park.45 The peaceful protest concluded with a
friendship dance on the front lawn of the hotel.
To most observers, the events in early August proceeded smoothly and yielded
positive results. In a resolution released the day after the protest at Many Glacier Hotel,

43 Ibid.; Ed D esR osier, interview with author, September 28, 2005.
44 For more on the protest, the demands made by tribal members, and the agreements reached, see S.A.R.
1992, GNPA; “Blackfeet Tribe protests yield Park agreem ents,” H ungry H orse N ew s, 13 August 1992.
45 At a table with D esR osier and a few others, Supt. Lusk and GPI CEO Joe Fassler, aware they were under
public scrutiny and caught in the moment, offered a subconcessions agreement and D esR osier accepted.
Ed D esR osier, interview with author, September 28, 2005.
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the National Park System Advisory Board commended “the Blackfeet Nation and Glacier
National Park for their mutual efforts to address common concerns, and for the progress
made to date,” and encouraged “continued dialogue in a concerted effort to identify areas
of agreement and understanding.”46 An observer from distant Illinois wrote a piece for
the Hungry Horse News, a local newspaper, claiming that the peaceful demonstration
“has brought together the present concessionaire and the Park Service into a significant
relationship that all of us should welcome.” He further exclaimed: “W hat a tremendous
and valuable opportunity exists between Browning and W est G lacier... [W]e praise the
leaders in this and wish them well!”47 Not all shared his celebratory appraisal o f the
situation. A local contributor to the same paper noted that many tribal protesters “made
threats and were downright mad at Glacier Park Inc. and Glacier National Park,” and
expressed disapproval over private confessions made by Park personnel that “Blackfeet
in recent months have demanded they be hired for jobs though they aren’t qualified and
they refuse to even fill out applications.” He concluded that tribal “authorities should be
reasonable. Demands of this type and numerous threats to potential employers serve no
purpose other than to aggravate the situation.”48
The same day the Advisory Board released its resolution, the tribe issued its own
resolution that identified its three major concerns: the failure of GNP and GPI to hire
members of the Blackfeet tribe, the sale of non-authentic Indian arts and crafts within
park concessions, and difficulties tribal members were experiencing in taking advantage
of economic opportunities within the park. To rectify these problems, the resolution

46 National Park System A dvisory Board, “Resolution 108,” A ugust 11, 1992, G NPA.
47 John M auff, Chicago, IL, “Park history liv es in Blackfeet culture” (letter to the editor), H ungry H orse
News, 17 September 1992.
48 Brian Kennedy, “C ool heads and rain could help B lackfeet,” (opinion piece), H ungry H orse N ew s, 13
A ugust 1992.
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proposed that GNP and GPI establish programs for the recruitment, hiring, and training
of tribal members in all positions. It also suggested the National Park Service establish a
policy of prohibiting the sale of non-authentic Indian arts and crafts within Glacier.49
Tribal members surely took some satisfaction from the pledges made by GPI, but it stood
to question whether the firm would follow through on its promises.
On July 13, 1993, GPI entered into a subconcessions agreement with Ed
DesRosier authorizing Sun Tours, a Blackfeet-owned cultural and historical interpretive
tour, to operate legally within the park until the end of the year. The agreement mandated
that Sun Tours comply with the policies and directives of the NPS and of GPI, that ticket
sales could not be available from locations in the park, and that nothing presented on the
guided tour “shall denigrate National Park Service programs or policies.”50 A
concessions management employee with Glacier admitted that the protests and the
tensions it produced in part led park officials to pressure GPI into offering DesRosier a
subconcessions contract. However, she also claimed the park felt that a native
interpretive tour was an important aspect of the park that did not previously exist and
officials welcomed the addition.51 In the subconcession agreement with Sun Tours, GPI
also claimed that it desired “to supplement its tour services with interpretive bus tours
conducted by Blackfeet Tribal members.”

When confronted with these assertions,

DesRosier scoffed and sarcastically and mockingly remarked, “Oh yeah, we agree this is
a good thing.” Just short of labeling such claims bold-faced lies, DesRosier insisted to
49 B lackfeet Nation, Tribal Resolution, August 11, 1992, GNPA.
50 Glacier National Park, “Operating and Maintenance Plan Betw een Sun Tours, Inc. and Glacier Park, Inc.
Approved by the National Park Service,” July 13, 1993, pp. 1, 3-4, GNPA.
51 Jan Knox, C oncessions M anagement Director o f GN P, interview with author, W est Glacier, MT, March
1,2 0 0 5 .
52 U .S. Department o f the Interior/National Park Service, “Subconcession Agreem ent for Blackfeet
Interpretive Transportation Tour Services in Glacier National Park,” a.k.a Subconcession to CCG L A C 002-81. pp. 1, GNPA.
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me that the agreement came only “after we beat them over the head with it (our
demands).”53
In addition to granting a contract to DesRosier, the park and GPI did achieve
- some gains with regards to other promises they made in the wake of the nonviolent
protests. The presence of an intermediary helped the parties involved work cooperatively
and make real progress. In April of 1993, the park brought on tribal member and BIA
employee Ted Hall as the Park’s Native American Coordinator to serve as consultant and
liaison with the tribe and the BIA with the major focus directed toward employment
issues.54 Hall’s appointment hardly represented an act of pure altruism, nor did it signify
a proactive park initiative to enhance relations with its neighboring tribe. Rather, it
resulted from a legal challenge mounted by Hall over none other than prejudicial hiring
practices. In 1988, Hall had applied for an assistant superintendent position with Glacier.
Boasting 18 years experience as a BIA administrator and meeting all five criteria for the
job title, one of which was extensive knowledge o f Indian treaties and affairs, Hall felt
more than qualified for the position. The job went to someone else. Hall challenged the
decision, citing the 1896 Agreem ent’s Indian hiring preference clause. After half a
decade and numerous appeals, the park service settled out o f court and offered him the
liaison position for one year.55
As Native American Program Coordinator, Hall worked with the Concessions and
Express Services departments of GNP, with GPI, and with the tribe to develop recruiting,
hiring, and training programs for tribal members, and also worked with the Arts and

53 Ed D esR osier, interview with author, March 21, 2005.
54 Other areas included w ildlife management, cattle trespass, land developm ent, and fire m anagement. See
Glacier National Park Release: “N ative American Coordinator D etailed to Glacier,” April 14, 1993, G NPA.
55 Ted Hall, interview with author, March 2 4 ,2 0 0 5 . For more on the legal case, see H all v. Watt; Eileen
Finan, “B lackfeet, Glacier live with uneasy relationship,” G rea t F alls Tribune, 6 June 1994.
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Crafts coordinator to influence and evaluate the sales o f authentic Indian arts and crafts in
the park’s concession shops.56 The impact that the protests and H all’s influence had on
both the park and GPI was astonishing. In his annual report to the Director of the
National Park Service, Superintendent Lusk devoted an unprecedented two and a half
pages to affairs regarding tribal employment and detailed steps taken to enhance equal
employment opportunity and gains made in hiring tribal members. Numbers still were
low, however, with only 36 of 367 positions held by tribal members.

S7

G PI’s hiring of

Native American seasonal employees increased approximately 58% from 1992 to 1993,
CO

to a total of 200.

Furthermore, the firm increased its purchases of Native American

crafts for resale in its retail outlets and had purchased roughly $24,000 worth of crafts by
the end of August in 1993.59
Despite the obvious improvements in hiring tribal members and in the overall
relationship between the park, GPI, and the tribe, DesRosier pressed to obtain an
independent contract from the park. In order to make available an independent contract,
GPI had to waive its rights to provide interpretive vehicle tours from a Blackfeet
perspective, an act company officials did not look upon favorably. At the end o f the first
year o f Sun Tours’s sub-contract, G lacier’s Superintendent suggested renewing the
contract under existing terms. DesRosier objected and spent the winter of 1993-1994
lobbying with the regional office, making phone calls and writing letters to people of
importance in hopes o f creating a special permit to accommodate his intentions. Finally,

56 See Glacier National Park, “Squad N otes,” M ay 17, July 13, July 27, August 3, A ugust 10, A ugust 17,
1993.
57 See S.A.R. 1993, pp. 6-7, G NPA. N ative Americans held 29 o f 2 6 0 (11.1% ) temporary positions, and 7
o f 107 (6.5% ) permanent positions.
58 Ibid, 8.
59 Glacier National Park, “Squad N otes,” August 17, 1993, G NPA.
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his work paid off and in the spring of 1994 GPI agreed to waive its right to provide
Blackfeet interpretive tours. On June 14th, 1994, Ed DesRosier signed an independent
concession permit with the Department of the Interior authorizing Sun Tours as a
licensed concessioner in Glacier National Park.60
Sun Tours got off to a successful start, with its gross receipts and ridership
numbers doubling within a year despite, according to DesRosier, G PI’s cut-throat and
underhanded business practices.61 D esRosier’s concession permit forbade him from
picking up within the park proper; nevertheless, GPI still felt threatened and even
rearranged its schedules in order to steal some of its rival’s customers before the Sun
Tours buses arrived for their scheduled pick-ups.62 Sun Tours survived G PI’s aggressive
campaign tactics, and business has grown most years since 1994. Although he managed
to take on mammoth powerful enterprises such as Glacier National Park and Glacier Park
Inc. victoriously, thereby carving a special niche for himself and his employees,
DesRosier perceives his personal victory as only scratching the surface of something
much larger and of greater importance to the tribe as a whole: the recognition of tribal
rights, sovereignty, and cultural self-determination.63
After his conviction in 1993 for operating a business within park limits without a
permit, DesRosier, with tribal financial support, appealed the ruling based on the implied
right to conduct business in the Agreement of 1896. In 1995, a court of appeals
expunged his charges due to the fact that the defendant had eventually been allowed to do
what he was originally charged with. Like many others on the reservation, DesRosier

60 S ee Department o f the Interior/National Park Service,C oncession Permit #C P -G L A C 010-94, G NPA.
61 For gross receipts and ridership information, see S.A.R. 1994-1995, pp. 18, GNPA.
62 See Department o f the Interior/National Park Service, C oncession Permit #C P -G L A C 010-94, GNPA; Ed
D esR osier, interview with author, March 21, 2005.
63 Ed D esR osier, interview with author, March 21, 2005.
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believes that the government does not want to open up a proverbial “can of worms” by
testing the rights guaranteed in the land cession agreement of 1896 for fear of having a
weak precedent tested in the courts again. Confident and tenacious, DesRosier wanted to
press for clarification of Blackfeet rights on the ceded strip even after the court threw out
the case. The tribal council, however, encouraged him to drop the issue and settle for the
expunged charges. DesRosier did not possess the resources to pursue battle in the legal
arena, and without tribal backing he had no alternative but reluctantly to abandon his
mission. He expressed in an interview that he has “strong feelings the issues could come
up again sometime in the near future, and I hope they do.”64
Right around the time when DesRosier grudgingly forsook his mission to press
the issue of tribal rights, the tribe lost its conduit of direct communication and influence
in the upper echelons of Glacier National Park. In July o f 1995, Ted H all’s detail as
Native American Program Coordinator came to an end.65 In 2005, Hall worked for the
BIA Irrigation Department in Browning, MT, and spoke with me about the results of his
work with the park during his year-long tenure as cultural liaison. Hall claims that during
his assignment, park recognition of tribal employment and preference rights improved.
Recruitment efforts succeeded in providing seasonal work for tribal members.
Employment of native interpretive presenters increased, and the “Native Speaks”
program grew considerably. More dancers performed at park visitor centers, and park
officials held more conferences with tribal members. After his departure/according to

64 Ibid.
65 S.A .R . 1994-1995, pp. 9, GNPA.
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Hall, park policies towards improving tribal employment worsened and few Blackfeet
have landed permanent positions in the park in the years since.66
Ed DesRosier also provided commentary on the lasting consequences of the
agreements reached between the tribe, GNP, and GPI. Sun Tours has grown considerably
since its inception, and now runs full-day tours out of East Glacier and half-day tours out
of W est Glacier. His personal relations with the park have improved, but his frequent
referrals of tourists to G PI’s services have rarely been reciprocated. I asked if his success
has opened doors for other tribal members desirous of starting businesses near the park,
and he sadly admitted that, unfortunately, few have followed in his stead. He claims that
park employment practices towards the Blackfeet have improved, but they still have a
way to go. GPI still recruits tribal members through programs at the Blackfeet
Community College, and, in addition to providing roughly 200 low-wage seasonal jobs,
hires some locals on year-round at the Glacier Park Lodge as supervisors and
maintenance workers. The Park Service also grants some Blackfeet summer positions.
Overall, however, he feels that both GPI and GNP do not recruit aggressively enough.67
At my last meeting with DesRosier at a restaurant just outside of East Glacier in
September of 2005, we happened to share the establishment with a crew of GPI
employees at Glacier Park Lodge who were celebrating an end-of-the-season going-away
party. Many employees at the lodge were in their twenties and, judging by their name
tags, hailed from states on the East Coast. DesRosier explained that many Eastern
college students still arrive en masse by bus, plane and train to work in the park’s hotels
and restaurants, a visible symbol for many Indians on the reservation o f G PI’s continued

66 Ted Hall, interview with author, March 24, 2005.
67 Ed D esR osier, interview with author, March 21, September 28, 2005.
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disregard for local unemployment. Furthermore, GPI still imports workers from Eastern
Europe in spite of the boisterous and repeated objections state politicians have raised at
state tourism meetings in recent years. GPI cites a high turnover rate in low-paying,
seasonal jobs as justification for this practice. Confined by work visas and the absence of
nearby support networks, foreigners are less inclined than locals to quit mid-season. As
DesRosier and I concluded our meeting, the remaining two GPI employees at the
restaurant began chanting a song in unison. Neither Ed or I could identify the language
used. As we made our final farewells, the owner of the establishment informed us that
the young men were singing a Bosnian traditional folk song. DesRosier turned to me and
good-naturedly, yet with solemn undertones, remarked, “You see...they’re still taking
our jobs.”68

The Bigger Picture
Neither the situation around Glacier nor the accusations and grievances levied by
the Blackfeet are unique to northwestern Montana. Plush resorts and facilities frequented
by the well-to-do and lying adjacent to poor Indian communities are a common sight at
many parks and historic sites across the W est.69 Many native communities residing near
park units continue to struggle as they seek to benefit from the enormous economic
opportunities that parks offer. Direct employment with the parks or with their
concessionaires provides one avenue for financial gain; the marketing of local
commercial enterprises in and around the park units represents another. Employed by
businesses as curiosities designed to draw tourists and revenue to the parks in their infant
years, many tribal communities neighboring parks in the modem era do not share in the

68 Ibid.
69 Burnham, 206.
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prosperity begotten by high-profile tourist destinations and, like the Blackfeet, have felt
alienated by the NPS and its concessionaires in recent decades.
As historians Robert H. Keller and Michael F. Turek ably demonstrated in their
sweeping overview American Indians and National Parks, the variety in the relationships
between native communities and national parks makes generalizing difficult and varying
employment policies illustrate how complex park management can become.70
Nonetheless, like the Blackfeet, many tribal societies adjacent to national parks feel
underrepresented within the National Park Service. The Ute Mountain Indian
Reservation shares a border with M esa Verde National Park in southwestern Colorado,
but despite park recruitment programs at local community colleges and native fairs, the
NPS has had limited success hiring Indians. In 1994, Indians held only two of 120
positions. Olympic National Park in W ashington has ten tribes residing along its
perimeter yet historically has hired few natives. At Grand Canyon National Park in
Arizona, the NPS has rarely employed Indians in park management positions, and
controversy over employment preference and NPS languor in promoting tribal enterprises
contributed to a state of poor relations between the park and the Havasupai in the late
1970s. At Canyon De Chelly National Monument, governed by the NPS and located in
the heart of the Navajo Indian Reservation, the Navajo make up 90% of the staff.

7]

Keller and Turek posited several reasons that help explain the situation. Poor pay
for entry-level jobs helps explain why the hiring and promotion of Indians progresses so
slowly. Furthermore, administrators advance in the NPS through frequent transfers,
oftentimes over long distances, and many natives prefer to stay near reservations and

70 Keller and Turek, xiii, 236.
71 For NPS em ploym ent at these park units, see Keller and Turek, 41, 133, 173, 235.
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family networks. A former NPS director opined that resistance to Indian employment
exists within the service itself.72 A more important factor with regards to tribal demands
for preferential hiring at park units is the inherent nature and mission of the National Park
Service. At a meeting between Glacier staff and members o f the Blackfeet Tribal
Council in 1979, Emma “Pinky” Plume, National Park Service Indian Liaison for the
Rocky M ountain Region, claimed that the “National Park Service system is not the best
suited to Native A m ericans... [MJany o f them apply to parks where they don’t stand a
chance of getting a job at all due to high numbers of people applying and the tough
competition to get a high rating on the registers.”73 The National Park Service is a large
bureaucracy imposed within an even larger bureaucracy, the Department of the Interior.
Federal employment regulations are strict and bear upon applicants indiscriminately. The
national park ideal mandates that the NPS serve everyone, and this democratic ideal
applies to all aspects of park services, including employment. An unfortunate
consequence of this proclaimed egalitarianism for native communities with immediate
interests and explicit rights is that the rights of all American citizens outweigh those of
any individual group.
Controversy over Indian interests in the tourist trade has also affected native
groups neighboring park units on a national scale. At a meeting between Glacier staff
and the Blackfeet Tribal Council in the winter of 1982, a tribal representative complained
that “Glacier Park Lodge is not displaying anything of the Blackfeet people and their

72 Ibid., 237.
73M em o o f M eeting between Glacier National Park Staff and B lackfeet Indian Tribal Council Members,
M ay 10, 1979, pp. 3, GNPA: F20-8.
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culture,” despite the fact that the lounge was called the M edicine Lodge.74 Since the
parks’ early years, concessionaires have capitalized on the tourist fascination with Indian
themes and have marketed “Indian” products; however, many of these products have not
been crafted by native artisans. In the early 1990s, the Blackfeet accused GPI of selling
non-authentic Indian crafts in its gift shops and demanded that the firm promote
authentic, Indian-made arts and crafts. Such sentiments were neither new nor limited to
northwestern Montana. In the 1930s, concerned park officials expressed fears that an
influx of cheap handicrafts could spell ruin for native craftspeople. In 1935, Congress
created the Indian Arts and Crafts Board to protect native artists against the
encroachment of mass-produced artifacts.75 In 1960, official NPS policy set concession
standards for regulating crafts marketing, but many tribes have complained that the NPS
has failed in its commitment and that the policy exists only on paper.

1 ft

Contention over

craft sales has been most pronounced at park units in the Southwest, most notably at
M esa Verde National Park and Grand Canyon National Park.77 In the 1970s, controversy
ensued at Grand Canyon National Park as local Navajo artisans decided to bypass the
middle-man and attempted to market their services within the park without official
sanction, just as Ed DesRosier did decades later with much more ultimate success.
In the late 1920s, Navajo artisans, mostly women and children, established a
Navajo roadside trade in rugs and silverwork outside of Grand Canyon National Park. As
juniper necklaces became popular with young whites in the 1960s, the trade boomed and
the profitable industry soon spread into the park. The marketing of Navajo jew elry inside

74 M inutes o f M eeting with Glacier National Park Staff and B lackfeet Tribal Council and Other Tribal
Representatives, N ovem ber 3, 1982, pp. 3, GNPA: F 19-14.
75 Burnham, 127.
76 Keller and Turek, 283.
77 See Burnham, 259, 279-280.
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the park threatened the exclusive long-term contract held by Fred Harvey, the park’s
primary concessionaire, whose corporate monopoly included the sale of souvenirs,
curios, and trinkets. Bound by a contractual obligation with a private business, the NPS
erected signs, evicted and arrested Navajo transgressors, and effectively suppressed the
trade by the early 1990s, an act that caused much resentment among the Navajo.78 Like
the Blackfeet, the Navajo perceived NPS concession policies as unjust favoritism of
corporate interests at the expense of local native communities, a tradition, according to
scholar Philip Burnham, “under fire all over Indian country.”

70

Native communities were not the only ones resentful of national park concession
policy. All over the country, communities neighboring parks felt disenfranchised by
corporate bias as local businesses could not compete for contracts and were thereby
excluded from providing services within the park. The vested interests of corporations
did not escape criticism and proponents of concession reform scored a victory with the
National Parks Omnibus Management Act of 1998, Title IV of which dealt with
concession reform, a product, according to NPS Deputy Director Denis Galvin, “of over
20 years of work by legislators, departmental officials, and interested citizens who
desired to change the concessions contracting process.”

on

The Act made concessions

contracts more accessible to the general business community by eliminating barriers to

78 Keller and Turek, 150.
79 Burnham, 13.
80 “Statement o f Denis Galvin, Deputy Directory, National Park Service, Department o f the Interior, Before
the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, Subcommittee on National Parks, Historic
Preservation, and Recreation, Regarding Final Concession Regulations, June 8, 2000,”
<http://www.nps.gov/legal/testimony/106th/concess6.htm>.
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competition, namely the preferential right of renewal for large operations, thereby ending,
in theory, a long tradition of regulated corporate monopolies.81
For fifty years after Yellowstone’s establishment, the government liberally
granted commercial leases to big firms for certain services and competition determined
consumer prices and service quality. Unmanaged development plagued the early parks,
and, beginning in the 1920s and continuing through the 1930s, the Park Service’s first
two directors, Stephen T. M ather and Horace Albright, initiated policies to replace
excessive competition with government regulated monopolies and long-term exclusive
contracts. They considered unbridled Competition incompatible with the goals of the
national parks and created a program of regulated monopolies to ensure reliable and
respectable visitor services consistent with park values.82 Under NPS concession policy
prior to 1998, parks awarded long-term contracts to large corporations without
advertising or competitive bidding and included preferential rights of contract renewal.83
In the 1990s, public pressure to reform the concessions process intensified and
some politicians banded together and proposed legislation to reform the granting of
concessions in the National Park system. In 1993, Senator Dale Bumpers, D-AR,
introduced a bill in the Senate to reform concession policy in the National Park System.84
The bill passed by a huge margin in the Senate (90-9), and while pending before the
House of Representatives, Representative Pat Williams, D-Mont., attached an
amendment, at the urging of Blackfeet leaders, stipulating that the Park Service should
give preference in awarding concessions contracts to qualified Indian-owned companies

81 S ee National Parks Omnibus M anagem ent A ct o f 1998, N ovem ber 13, 1998, 105 P.L. 391, Title IV, pp.
403.
82 Keller and Turek, 148-149.
83 For a brief overview o f concession policy developm ent, see Burnham, 77-78.
84 National Park Service C oncessions P olicy Reform A ct o f 1993, (first introduced 1/26/93), S.208.

or to those that demonstrate a commitment to hiring Indians.85 In testimony before the
House of Representatives, co-sponsor Tim Johnson of South Dakota explained that many
of our national parks, particularly those out West, were carved out of
Indian treaty lands. When these lands were taken, the tribes lost a potential
economic resource that, over time, one that is likely more valuable than
are minerals, timber, or other nonrenewable resources. Since then, even
though many reservations are close to the parks and suffer from up to 80
percent unemployment, the tribes have not shared in the economic
opportunities created by the presence of the parks. At most national parks
near reservations, one finds few Indians employed by the National Park
Service or by the concessionaires, few Indian businesses involved in any
way in concessions, and little recognition o f the culture and achievements
of the Indian people.
He continued that the amendment “is designed to promote Indian employment, business
utilization, and other involvement in existing as well as future concessionaire activities at
parks located on or near a reservation.”

The concession reform bill passed in the

House, and after years of intense negotiations over the details and semantic clarification,
it became Public Law in November of 1998.

on

Although the Act did not explicitly direct the Park Service to grant preference to
Indian-owned companies, it did authorize the Secretary of the Interior to consider, as a
secondary factor in selecting the best proposals, “the extent to which plans for
employment of Indians (including Native Alaskans) and involvement of businesses
owned by Indians, Indian tribes, or Native Alaskans (figures) in the operation of a
concession.”88 The Act also promoted the sale of authentic United States Indian, Alaskan
Native, Native Samoan, and Native Hawaiian handicrafts and exempted all revenue

85 S ee Eileen Finan, “Blackfeet, G lacier live with uneasy relationship,” G reat Falls Tribune, 6 June 1994.
86 H ouse o f Representatives, “National Park Service C oncessions R eform -H on . Tim Johnson, Extension o f
Remarks,” May 11, 1994, pp. E 897, < http://thom as.loc.gO v/cgi-bin/query/z7rl03:E llM Y 4-349>.
87 For a tim eline o f major actions on Senate Bill #208, see “B ill Summary and Status for the 103rd
Congress: S .208,” < http://tliom as.loc.gO v/cgi-bin/bdquery/z7dl03:SN 00208:@ @ @ R >.
88 National Parks Omnibus M anagem ent Act o f 1998, 403.
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derived from such sales from any franchise fee payments, thus providing incentive for
concessioners to purchase and market authentic native handicrafts.89 According to
DesRosier, the terms of the 1998 concessions management reform are just starting to take
effect and their success has yet to be measured.90

Summary
As with the alleged right to graze livestock, the Blackfeet have failed to gain
recognition of the alleged rights to conduct business on the ceded strip and preference in
hiring. The Agreement of 1896 does not expressly mention any right to conduct
business, but it does contain a clause pertaining to preferential hiring. Article III of the
Agreement states that it “is agreed that in the employment of all agency and school
employees preference in all cases be given to Indians residing on the reservation.”91 This
clause has formed the basis for tribal demands for preferential hiring, and Ted Hall based
his legal appeals o f his unsuccessful bid for Assistant Superintendent on this clause. By
settling out o f court with Hall, the NPS avoided engaging in a protracted legal battle
dealing with the controversy over rights reserved in the Agreement of 1896 and lent
further credence to tribal accusations that the park remains hesitant to test a weak
precedent in the legal arena.
A strictly semantic reading of the clause would invalidate claims o f preferential
hiring, as the NPS is not the “agency” referred to in the agreement, nor is it a “school.” A
reading based on the Canons of Construction, however, could conclude that the tribal
signatories understood the clause in a more general sense and intended to reserve

89 Ibid., 416.
90 Ed D esR osier, interview with author, March 21, 2005.
91 Charles Kappler, Indian Affairs: Law s an d T reaties, v .l, (W ashington: Government Printing O ffice,
1904), 606.
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preferential hiring for tribal descendants in any institution that sprang up on the ceded
strip. The issue has not been officially settled, but judging by a history Of rulings based
on narrow, semantic interpretations dismissive of native rights and protective of the
underlying principles of the park ideal, the likelihood of resolution in the tribe’s favOr
seems unlikely. Preferential hiring of any sort compromises the democratic ideal
embodied in the Park Service’s enabling legislation.
Through cleverly planned shows of tribal solidarity and community activism, the
Blackfeet did succeed in forcing Glacier National Park and its primary concessionaire to
alter their policies to provide more opportunities for local natives to benefit from the
revenue generated by the park’s existence. Although concession reform was already on
the national radar since the late 1970s, the nonviolent protests yielded immediate results
that took effect before the enactment o f concession reform policies that began in 1998.
W hether or not the NPS and GPI will hold true to their pledges to improve employment
of Blackfeet and marketing of Blackfeet crafts remains to be seen, but the opportunity for
Indian-owned businesses to secure contracts for certain services is now a more readily
attainable goal. Depending on the Interior Secretary’s discretion, Indian-owned
businesses may receive extra points when vying for concession contracts, provided, of
course, that the proposed services conform to the founding preservation and recreation
ideals of the National Park System. Sun Tours represents such a service. By transporting
tourists in high-occupancy vehicles, DesRosier explained, Sun Tours reduces automobile
traffic in the park and thereby complies with park objectives.

92 Ed D esR osier, interview with author, March 21, 2005.
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Q?

Conclusion

On a sunny autumn day in late September of 2 0 0 5 ,1 accompanied a private tour
group on one of the last Sun Tours trips of the season. The tour guide, Edward North
Piegan, told the group to call him by his traditional name, M at-tson-war-nik-kap-pi. The
group had difficulty pronouncing his name, so he told us it was all right if we used the
English translation: “Sweetheart.” Like Curly Bear W agner had done during his
performance at the Glacier Park Lodge, Sweetheart added quite a bit o f comic relief to his
tour presentation. Above all, Sun Tours attempts to provide an entertaining and
educational experience for tourists and includes neither political commentary nor
condemnation of park policies. In addition to describing the history of the park and the
natural resources unique to the area, Sweetheart interpreted the park’s resources from a
Blackfeet perspective and described how the tribe had traditionally used the plants for
medicinal purposes and the mountains for religious purposes. Once the van reached
Logan Pass and the eastern parts of the park, the tour guide narrated in more detail how
young Blackfeet warriors had traditionally ventured into the mountains for extended
vision quests, seeking dreams and spiritual power. Edward DesRosier, founder and
proprietor of Sun Tours, considers him self lucky and takes pride in being able to share his
passion for his culture and the land with others.1
This short anecdote is symbolic for several reasons. Not only was the Glacier
region important to the tribe for physical survival before the establishment of the park, it
was also a place of great spiritual importance. This study has focused on Blackfeet
material subsistence in Glacier National Park, but for some within the tribal community
1 Ed D esR osier, interview with author, March 21, 2005.
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the area holds equal importance for spiritual subsistence. W hen in the early 1990s oil
drilling threatened sacred landscapes on the ceded strip in Lewis and Clark National
Forest, Tiny-Man Heavy Runner notified the United Nations that the Blackfeet culture
was under siege and that cultural genocide was imminent. Heavy Runner informed me
that traditional Blackfeet education lay in the mountains, and that “this (the mountains) is
our church.” In a classic example of shifting alliances, Glacier officials, environmental
groups, and segments of the Blackfeet tribe banded together in the mid-1980s to oppose
drilling in the Badger-Two Medicine Area of Lewis and Clark National Forest. Due to
the relentless efforts of Heavy Runner and other tribal members, the tribe has managed to
obtain designation of about 70% of the affected area as a Traditional Cultural District,
which makes it more difficult, though not impossible, for oil companies to drill.
Many sites within Glacier National Park also continue to hold spiritual
significance for some members of the tribe. In 1973, the Tribal Council declared lands
on the ceded strip as sacred ground and resolved that they should not be disturbed.in any
way without prior consent of the Blackfeet Tribe.4 One site, Chief Mountain, straddles
both sides of the boundary and its protection from adverse visitor impacts remains a point
of contention between some in the tribe and the Park Service. With the revival o f
traditional native religion in recent decades, traditional usage of Chief Mountain has
risen. In the fall of 1977, the Blackfeet Tribal Business Council went on record to protect
the Chief Mountain area from undesirable intrusion and closed certain surrounding areas

2 Tiny-M an Heavy Runner, interview with author, March 23, 24, 2005.
3 Keith Tatsey, Chairman o f the Tribal Badger-Two M edicine M anagem ent Comm ittee, interview with
author, March 25, 2005.
4 Blackfeet N ation, Tribal Resolution #219-72, M ay 10, 1973, Tribal Docum ents Department.

163

east of the boundary to camping, fishing, and other recreational activities.5 The following
summer, Congress passed the American Indian Religious Freedom Act that enabled
native peoples to access and use sacred sites on federal lands.6 In December o f 1981, the
Blackfeet Tribal Business Council declared the Chief Mountain Area east of the
boundary as off-limits to all persons except those entering the area for spiritual questing
purposes, and requested that the National Park Service do the same on the western side of
the mountain, claiming that “Indian people who have retreated to Chief Mountain for
spiritual purposes have reported instances o f being disturbed by tourists and other nonaligned curiosity seekers.”7
The NPS Regional Director replied that due to Congressional mandates, the Park
Service could not remove any portion of the park from public access.

Q

In the early 1990s,

Superintendent Gil Lusk issued a formal proclamation supporting tribal efforts to
preserve traditional practices on Chief Mountain, as well as the area closures east of the
boundary. The statement also promised that park personnel would extend special effort
to inform climbers and hikers in the park of the religious significance o f the site.9
Superintendent Lusk also proposed nominating the site for designation as a National
Historic Landmark, yet despite meetings attended by archaeologists and representatives

5 B lackfeet Nation, “Protection o f C h ief Mountain as an Historic, Cultural and Spiritual Site,” excerpt o f
minutes from Blackfeet Tribal B u siness C ouncil M eeting, September 1, 1977, Tribal Docum ents
Department.
6 See American Indian R eligious Freedom Act, P.L. #95-341.
7 See Blackfeet N ation, Tribal R esolution #1 4 0 -8 2 , Decem ber 3, 1981, Tribal D ocum ents Dept. See also
Letter from W oody Kipp to NPS A ssociate Director Stanley Albright, D ecem ber 10, 1981, GNPA: F176-5;
B lackfeet Nation, “C hief Mountain as an Historical/Contemporary Spiritual Retreat Area,” n.d., Tribal
D ocum ents Department.
8 Letter from NPS Regional Director James B. Thom pson to Chairman B oggs, February 18, 1982, GNPA:
F I 76-5.
9 U .S. Department o f the Interior, “M anagem ent D irective 13.4: Visitor U se and Blackfeet Spiritual U se o f
C hief M ountain,” N ovem ber 1, 1993, G NPA.
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from the tribe and the park, by 2005 nothing has so far come of the plan.10 Park officials
may support preservation of the area, but selective accessibility violates the democratic
ideal of the national park system. The official position advanced by NPS is that the “park
has been set aside for all people, not just Native Americans, and the closure of Chief
Mountain to all but Native American religious uses would not be legal or proper.” 11
In addition to highlighting the spiritual importance o f the area, the Sun Tours
anecdote is symbolic for other reasons. The tour service demonstrates that some things
have changed. Ed DesRosier considers it ironic that his mother worked as a dancer for a
big corporation, the Great Northern, for low wages to create a romantic image to draw
tourist dollars, and that fifty years later her son operates his own business in the park that
proudly represents Blackfeet culture and its historical ties to the park.

12

The official GNP

website and park brochures list Sun Tours as a transportation tour service and openly
acknowledge that the tribe has used the Glacier region for centuries, an admission that
has only come very recently. In 1992, the National Park Service commissioned a report
to inventory the ethnographic resources of the park and the traditional associations of the
lands to the Blackfeet people. The result, Our M ountains Are Our Pillows: An
Ethnographic Overview o f Glacier National Park by Brian Reeves and Sandy Peacock,
was a hulking volume that described the myriad of ways in which the tribe has used the
region for over a thousand years. Although the Park Service has opened the door to
Indian-owned businesses and has re-integrated the Blackfeet into the history of the park,

10 See M em o from Cultural R esources Management Ranger Bruce Fladmark to Supt., Assistant Supt.
GLAC re: Record o f M eeting, C hief Mountain National Landmark Nomination, April 29, 1991, GNPA.
1' Briefing Statement prepared for Secretary Lujan re: Relations with the Blackfeet Indians: R eligious
Freedom, June 1, 1992, G NPA.
12 Ed D esR osier, interview with author, March 21, 2005.
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it remains reluctant to allow subsistence activities it deems unacceptable to the national
park idea.
In this thesis, I have focused more specifically on the exercise of Blackfeet
material subsistence in Glacier National Park in the modern era. A resurgence of interest
in traditional tribal culture in the 1960s and the success of Civil Rights Movement
inspired activism in Indian country and led tribal peoples across the nation to pressure the
federal government into honoring native rights. The Blackfeet channeled this impulse
into testing their rights in Glacier National Park. Proactive tribal measures taken in the
mid-1970s forced the park officials in Glacier to pay more attention to its discontented
neighbors. As a result, officials at Glacier began to consult the tribe on matters
pertaining to park affairs and communications between the two parties improved. Tribal
assertion of rights in recent decades, coupled with scholarly studies of traditional tribal
use of park lands, forced the park to recognize the ancient ties that the Blackfeet hold
with the lands in and around Glacier, a fact previously obscured and denied by park
officials and scientists alike. The park geared more of its interpretive programs toward
native themes and invited Blackfeet representatives to give presentations to tourists
describing the historical importance of the Glacier region in Blackfeet culture. Although
park officials have failed to recognize implied preferential business or hiring rights,
opportunities for Indian-owned businesses to operate in the park have increased and the
park and its major concessionaire have displayed a willingness to incorporate tribal
members into the workforce and support native artisans. Overall, the park has become
more accommodating to Blackfeet interests in recent decades than it has in the past,
although some within the Blackfeet community question the sincerity of such efforts.
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When I told Leon Rattler that I was researching the historical relationship between the
Blackfeet and Glacier National Park, he sarcastically replied: “W hat relationship?” 13
Recent attempts to force recognition o f subsistence rights, reserved or implied,
have made little headway and the park has surrendered little ground with regards to the
permission of native subsistence activities in Glacier National Park. Park officials
opposed to the exercise of Blackfeet reserved rights have enjoyed the unwavering support
of federal legal representatives, whose rulings, questioned by many observers, have
historically repudiated native rights and proved consistently protective of the underlying
goals of the national park ideal. A judge affirmed the reserved right of unrestricted
access in 1974, but the status of the other three reserved rights has not changed since the
early years of the twentieth century. Hunting and wood-gathering are extractive activities
inimical to the national park ideal and remain prohibited. The park allows the public to
fish its waters under regulation and in-season, but affords no special rights for the
Blackfeet. Grazing, an implied right not covered in the Agreement of 1896, compromises
the objectives of the national park system and is also prohibited. Thus, although
Blackfeet pressures upon the park have engendered policy change in recent decades, the
founding ideals of the national park system have continued to trump native rights and the
exercise of subsistence activities that compromise the objectives of the national park idea
still meet with strict interdiction.

13 Leon Rattler, interview with author, March 23, 2005.
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